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Abstract 
This paper analyses optimal monetary policy in response to shocks using a model that avoids 
making specific assumptions about the stickiness of prices, and thus the nature of the Phillips 
curve. Nonetheless, certain robust features of the optimal monetary policy commitment are 
found. The optimal policy rule is a flexible inflation target which is adhered to in the short 
run without any accommodation of structural inflation persistence, that is, inflation which it 
is costly to eliminate. The target is also made more stringent when it has been missed in the 
past. With discretion on the other hand, the target is loosened to accommodate fully any 
structural inflation persistence, and any past deviations from the inflation target are ignored. 
These results apply to a wide range of price stickiness models because the market failure 
which the policymaker should aim to mitigate arises from imperfect competition, not from 
price stickiness itself. 
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1 Introduction
There is much debate among both economists and central bankers about the appropriate balance between
rules and discretion in monetary policy. A central question in this debate is whether it is possible to find a
rule that performs well in a broad range of circumstances, given the pervasive uncertainty which surrounds
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the shocks hitting the economy. This paper contributes
to the debate by studying the nature of the optimal monetary policy commitment under a wide range of
assumptions about the price-setting behaviour of firms, and thus a large set of alternative Phillips curves
consistent with different degrees of inflation persistence.
In spite of the breadth of models covered, the optimal policy commitment is reducible to some simple
principles. First, discretion needs to be constrained by resisting the temptation to accommodate inflation
persistence. A policymaker acting with discretion would have an incentive to make any disinflation sub-
optimally slow if inflation displays any “intrinsic” persistence: that is, persistence implied directly by the
price-setting behaviour of firms. Second, if inflation exceeds its target value then the target in the future
must be tightened by an equivalent amount. This ensures that the price level is stabilized in the long run.
A policymaker acting with discretion would have no incentive to pay any heed to past failures to meet the
inflation target. By credibly resisting the urge to return inflation slowly to target, and by committing to
correct past failures to control inflation, a better response of inflation and aggregate output to the shocks
hitting the economy is achieved.
Intrinsic inflation persistence is said to occur when firms’ past price-setting decisions, as manifested in
changes in inflation and relative prices, affect the current position of the short-run Phillips curve, and thus
the range of feasible inflation-output gap combinations. Another way of saying this is that intrinsic inflation
persistence occurs if past inflation rates and relative prices appear as state variables in the Phillips curve.
In the widely used Calvo (1983) price-setting model, the resulting New Keynesian Phillips curve exhibits
no intrinsic inflation persistence because it implies inflation is a purely forward-looking variable. However,
this paper considers a far wider range of price-setting models in which the Phillips curve generally contains
a backward-looking component and where intrinsic inflation persistence is ubiquitous.
Calvo pricing is based on the assumption that every firm in the economy has the same probability
of changing price at all times. But rather than confine attention to models with this highly restrictive
assumption, this paper allows for a completely general specification of time-dependent pricing, and one
that also permits heterogeneity in price stickiness between industries. In other words, the probability of a
firm choosing a new price can be any function of the time elapsed since a price change last occurred, and
the industry the firm is based in. This includes the alternative time-dependent pricing models of Taylor
(1980), Wolman (1999), and many others as well. But irrespective of the particular assumptions made
about price stickiness, it turns out that it is possible to construct a targeting rule that is optimal within
this class of models. Importantly, this means that it is not necessary to know which model within the class
is true in order to find the appropriate optimal targeting rule.
To understand why it is possible to find an optimal policy targeting rule that is valid for all these
different models of price stickiness, it is first necessary to identify the market failures that monetary policy
has a role in mitigating. There are two of these and both stem from firms being imperfectly competitive
price setters. The first results from firms’ failure to take account of the effects of their pricing decisions
on aggregate demand, creating an aggregate demand externality of the type discussed by Mankiw (1985).
The second is that the market power of firms can lead to relative-price distortions and thus an inefficient
allocation of resources in the economy.
A further source of relative-price distortions is the presence of price stickiness. Because price-adjustment
times are not coordinated in general, the timing of firms’ price changes affects relative prices, even when
1
there is no change in demand or costs to warrant a relative-price adjustment. But if firms are maximizing
profits when they select new prices then it turns out that such optimizing behaviour is very helpful to the
policymaker. It is shown that for the policymaker to eliminate this type of relative-price distortion it is only
necessary to intervene in the economy to the extent that firms having fully flexible prices would want to set
the prices that support the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. As these prices can be known without
reference to the particular model of price stickiness, the policymaker’s problem is accordingly simplified.
This convenient feature of firms’ behaviour is found because there is some common ground between the
policymaker’s aim of minimizing price distortions and firms’ goal of maximizing profits. A firm’s profits are
influenced to some extent by the gap between the price of its product and the prices of similar substitutable
products sold by its competitors. If the gap becomes too wide then profits will suffer, but price distortions
will clearly be increased too because an excessive spread of prices for similar products is inefficient. If part
of the task of maximizing profits is to ensure that a firm’s price gap relative to its rivals is not too wide,
then it follows that profit maximization may actually help reduce price distortions in some situations. Thus
profit-maximizing behaviour is a double-edged sword: it leads firms with market power to create some price
distortions, but it also induces them to minimize other distortions that result from price stickiness.
The policymaker has one policy instrument (the nominal interest rate) with which to address the two
market failures identified above, namely the aggregate demand externality and the relative-price distortions
generated by imperfect competition and sticky prices. As it is not simultaneously possible to resolve both
market failures, a compromise between these two objectives leads to an optimal monetary policy based
around a flexible inflation target, that is, a target for a weighted average of the inflation rate and the
output gap (the percentage deviation of aggregate output from its efficient level). It is shown that the
relative need for correction of the two market failures can be judged without reference to the stickiness of
prices, so there is just one optimal weighting of inflation and the output gap that applies to all models
of price stickiness. The weights attached to the two objectives depend only on the extent of imperfect
competition.
The differences between the optimal targeting rule and the optimal conduct of policy with discretion are
manifested in the level the flexible inflation target is set at. With discretion, the target is revised frequently
to accommodate fully any “intrinsic” inflation, that is, inflation which depends on state variables appearing
in the Phillips curve such as past inflation rates and relative prices. But if a commitment is made at a
certain time to set monetary policy according to a rule thereafter, the optimal targeting rule mandates a
flexible inflation target that is instead lowered in line with the cumulative overshoot of inflation from its
target value since the commitment came into force. The policymaker is not allowed to slacken the target
temporarily even if inflation has picked up in the meantime and has resulting in a higher current level of
“intrinsic” inflation. Indeed, the past failure to control inflation actually calls for a tighter target in the
present. However, any intrinsic inflation which is already present when the commitment comes into force
should be fully accommodated, making the optimal targeting rule time inconsistent. If the policymaker
is required to use a rule that is time consistent in its treatment of intrinsic inflation, then the optimal
time-consistent rule adopts the stance of resisting the temptation to accommodate all intrinsic inflation,
irrespective of when it took root.
Such differences can be explained by showing that there is a difference between how intrinsic inflation
should be seen ex ante and ex post. A policymaker contemplating the possibility of intrinsic inflation arising
in the future sees it as bad for price distortions. However, a policymaker faced with a situation in which
intrinsic inflation has already emerged because of a past failure to achieve price stability sees accommodation
of it as the best course to take in minimizing price distortions. As the policymaker with discretion is free
to revise any plans made in the past, the ex post view of intrinsic inflation drives monetary policy. When
a commitment is made from a particular date onwards, the ex ante view predominates, even though an
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ex post view of intrinsic inflation existing at the time of the commitment is also taken. Time-consistent
optimal policy requires that the ex ante view of intrinsic inflation be adopted at all times.
This paper builds upon the analysis of optimal monetary policy presented in Woodford’s (2003) In-
terest and Prices, drawing on many of the techniques used in that work such as the use of a utility-based
loss function to evaluate the conduct of monetary policy, and the notion of optimality from the timeless
perspective when studying time-consistent policy rules. The major contribution of this paper is to address
the optimal monetary policy problem when there is intrinsic inflation persistence present. The baseline
model used by Woodford incorporates a Calvo pricing assumption and thus implies no intrinsic inflation
persistence. While this leads to significant differences in the results where the analysis of discretionary
policy is concerned, there is at least one timelessly optimal targeting rule presented by Woodford which is
found to apply just as well to all the models of price stickiness considered in this paper.
There have been a number of modifications suggested to the baseline model of Woodford in order to
generate intrinsic inflation persistence. One of the most widespread of these is the idea of Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999) that a certain fraction of firms might use a rule of thumb when setting prices. The optimal monetary
policy implications of adding this feature to Woodford’s model have been explored by Steinsson (2003). But
there is a crucial difference between the intrinsic inflation persistence created by the rule of thumb and the
intrinsic inflation persistence found in this paper. The former relaxes the assumption that firms maximize
profits when setting prices, but maintains Calvo’s assumption about the likelihood of price adjustment.
This paper pursues the opposite strategy whereby the assumption of profit maximization is maintained
but the Calvo pricing assumption is relaxed. Because the use of the rule of thumb means that firms are
not maximizing profits, an additional market failure is created in addition to those highlighted earlier, and
monetary policy acquires a role it would not otherwise have possessed. This leads to differences between
the optimal policy implications found in this paper and those presented by Steinsson. Similar differences
are also found when intrinsic inflation persistence is introduced using the assumption that firms use an
indexation rule linked to past inflation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). The implications for
optimal monetary policy in this case are analysed by Giannoni and Woodford (2005), and the conclusions
differ from those of this paper because the use of the indexation rule means that firms are not maximizing
profits when they change price.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the assumptions of the model, incorporating the
full range of time-dependent pricing models. Then section 3 studies the optimal behaviour of firms and
the policymaker and derives the equilibrium of the model, taking log-linear approximations as necessary.
Section 4 examines the resulting Phillips curve and the extent of intrinsic inflation persistence. Section
5 derives the optimal policy implications in the cases of discretion and commitment from both a specific
initial date and the timeless perspective. Some examples of these results applied to particular price-setting
models are given in section 6, along with a discussion of how the results relate to other findings in the
optimal monetary policy literature. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in section 7.
2 The model
2.1 Households
The economy contains a continuum of households. Each household consumes a basket of goods and devotes
some fraction of its time to work. Each household specializes in providing one differentiated labour input,
though each labour input is supplied by a large number of households. Households are indexed by a pair
(ı, ) denoting the -th household supplying the ı-th labour input, with ı,  ∈ Ω where Ω is the unit interval.
All households have the same set of preferences defined over consumption and leisure. In what follows,
let ct(ı, ) denote household (ı, )’s consumption of the basket of goods at time t, and ht(ı, ) denote the
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number of type-ı labour hours that household (ı, ) supplies. The lifetime utility function of household (ı, )
is
Ut(ı, ) ≡ max
cτ (ı,)
hτ (ı,)
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt [u(cτ (ı, ))− v(hτ (ı, ))] (2.1.1)
where u(·) is a strictly increasing and concave function, v(·) is a strictly increasing and convex function,
and 0 < β < 1 is the household’s subjective discount factor.
Households can purchase a basket of consumption goods at money price Pt. Hours of type-ı labour are
remunerated by money wage Wt(ı). Because many households supply each type of labour input, households
are price takers in both labour and goods markets. All households are assumed to start with equal financial
wealth. Asset markets for state-contingent securities are complete. It is assumed these asset markets are
open to households before they know what type of labour they will supply, and that each household is
equally likely to be assigned to supply each specialized labour input. Since asset markets are complete, and
initial financial wealth and expected lifetime labour income are equal ex ante before households know their
type, and the utility function (2.1.1) is additively separable between consumption and leisure, households
will choose to have their consumption fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks. There is thus a level of
consumption Ct = ct(ı, ) common to all households at time t. The number of hours of labour supplied
may differ across households, but only because there is potentially a dispersion of real wages for different
types of labour input. All households supplying type-ı labour receive the same wage, and thus supply a
common number of hours Ht(ı) = ht(ı, ) each. Let wt(ı) ≡ Wt(ı)/Pt denote the real wage for labour of
type ı at time t. The first-order condition for maximizing (2.1.1) with respect to the labour supply Ht(ı)
subject to a given real wage wt(ı) is
vh(Ht(ı))
uc(Ct)
= wt(ı) (2.1.2)
where uc(·) is the marginal utility of consumption and vh(·) is the marginal utility of leisure.
The prices of the complete set of assets available to households are reflected in the asset-pricing kernel
Mτ |t. This gives the price of a basket of consumption goods in one particular state of the world at time τ
relative to the conditional probability of that state occurring, the price being expressed in terms of period-t
consumption baskets. Maximizing utility (2.1.1) with respect to consumption intertemporally and across
different states of the world leads to the following Euler equation:
βτ−tuc(Cτ )
uc(Ct)
= Mτ |t (2.1.3)
2.2 Industries and differentiated goods
Households’ consumption basket is made up of a range of differentiated goods. Each good is produced by
a single firm using just one of the differentiated labour inputs, though each labour input is used by a large
number of firms. Goods are indexed by a pair (ı, ) denoting the -th good produced using the ı-th labour
input, with ı,  ∈ Ω. The same system is used to index firms because production of each differentiated good
is monopolized by a single firm.
While each firm’s product is in some way unique, firms producing goods with similar characteristics
are grouped together into industries. Each firm belongs to one and only one industry. There are n ≥ 1
industries in total, with industry i having size 0 < ωi ≤ 1. An industry’s size is measured by the fraction
of the economy’s firms that are based in it, so industry weights ωi must sum to one. The unit interval Ω
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is partitioned into industries Ωi as follows:
n⋃
i=1
Ωi = Ω ≡ [0, 1) , Ωi ≡
[
i−1∑
j=1
ωj ,
i∑
j=1
ωj
)
(2.2.1)
Firm (ı, ) is said to belong to industry i if ı ∈ Ωi. It is assumed that all firms using the same differentiated
labour input belong to the same industry, and each industry i employs a range of inputs ı ∈ Ωi.
Let Ct(ı, ) denote all households’ total consumption of the good produced by firm (ı, ). Households are
willing to substitute between the products of firms within industries. That willingness is captured by the
elasticity of substitution within industry i, denoted by εit > 1, which may vary exogenously across industries
and over time. The elasticity represents the degree of competitiveness within industry i. Households’
consumption basket Cit of the products of industry i and the corresponding price index Pit are
Cit ≡
(
1
ωi
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
Ct(ı, )
εit−1
εit ddı
) εit
εit−1
, Pit ≡
(
1
ωi
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
Pt(ı, )1−εitddı
) 1
1−εit
(2.2.2)
where Pt(ı, ) is the money price charged by firm (ı, ) for the good it produces at time t. If households
minimize the expenditure required to achieve a given level of consumption Cit of industry i’s products
according to the basket in (2.2.2), then they allocate their spending between the firms within that industry
as follows:
Ct(ı, ) =
(
Pt(ı, )
Pit
)−εit
Cit (2.2.3)
This is the demand function faced by firm (ı, ) in industry i, with the price elasticity of demand being the
elasticity of substitution εit.
Just as households are prepared to substitute between goods produced within an industry, they are
also willing to substitute between the products of different industries. The overall consumption basket and
corresponding price index are
Ct ≡
(
n∑
i=1
ωiC
ε−1
ε
it
) ε
ε−1
, Pt =
(
n∑
i=1
ωiP
1−ε
it
) 1
1−ε
(2.2.4)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the products of different industries. The size of ε
relative to the εit is not restricted. Again, minimizing the expenditure necessary to achieve a particular
level of the overall consumption basket Ct in (2.2.4) leads to the following industry demand curve that
determines the allocation of spending across industries:
Cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Ct (2.2.5)
The industry demand curve has price elasticity ε.
2.3 Production, costs and profits of firms
If firm (ı, ) is based in industry i then its production function for output Yt(ı, ) is
Yt(ı, ) = AitHt(ı, )ηyh (2.3.1)
where Ait is the common exogenous level of technology in industry i, and Ht(ı, ) denotes the number of
hours of type-ı labour employed by firm (ı, ). Technology may vary across industries and over time. The
parameter 0 < ηyh ≤ 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to the employment of labour hours.
5
As each labour input is used by a large number of firms, every firm is a price taker in the labour market.
So a firm paying real wage wt(ı) in an industry with technology level Ait subject to production function
(2.3.1) faces the following real total and marginal costs of producing output yt at time t:
C(yt;Ait, wt(ı)) = wt(ı)
(
yt
Ait
) 1
ηyh
, CY (yt;Ait, wt(ı)) = wt(ı)
ηyh
y
1−ηyh
ηyh
t
A
1
ηyh
it
(2.3.2)
Firms are the sole producers of their individual products, so they have the power to set prices. Prices
are posted in money terms, and Pt(ı, ) denotes the money price used by firm (ı, ) at time t. The resulting
level of demand Yt(ı, ) is found by combining the demand curves in (2.2.3) and (2.2.5):
Yt(ı, ) =
(
Pt(ı, )
Pit
)−εit (Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt (2.3.3)
Demand depends on the firm’s own price Pt(ı, ), the industry price level Pit, the aggregate price level Pt,
and the level of aggregate demand Yt. The price indices Pit and Pt are defined in (2.2.2) and (2.2.4). An
individual firm takes all industry and aggregate variables as given, so its price elasticity of demand is εit.
For a given choice of price Pt(ı, ), the resulting level of real profits can be obtained from demand
function (2.3.3) and cost function (2.3.2). It is assumed also that all firms receive a proportional wage-bill
subsidy of 0 ≤ s < 1 from the government. Suppose a firm in industry i using labour input ı at time
t charges a price pit(ı) in money terms, with implied relative price %it(ı) ≡ pit(ı)/Pt compared to the
economy-wide price index. Industry i itself has an overall relative price of %it ≡ Pit/Pt at time t compared
to all other industries in the economy. The real wage of the specialized labour input ı is currently wt(ı).
The real profits of this firm are denoted by the function z(%it(ı); %it, Yt, Ait, wt(ı), εit), where Yt is aggregate
output, Ait is the current level of technology in industry i, and εit is the elasticity of demand in industry i:
z(%it(ı); %it, Yt, Ait, wt(ı), εit) ≡ %it(ı)1−εit%εit−εit Yt − (1− s)C
(
%it(ı)−εit%εit−εit Yt;Ait, wt(ı)
)
(2.3.4)
2.4 Price setting
Not all firms choose a new money price at every point in time. For each firm, there is a probability of
changing price which is a function of the industry it is based in and the time that has elapsed since it
last changed its money price. This represents a model of time-dependent pricing augmented to allow for
heterogeneity in price stickiness between industries.
Let At denote the set of firms that change price at time t, and Dt(ı, ) the duration of price stickiness
for firm (ı, ) at time t. The probability of a firm in industry i choosing a new price now given that its price
was last changed j periods ago is denoted by αij :
αij ≡ P
(At ∣∣ Ωi , Dt−1 = j − 1) (2.4.1)
The probabilities of price adjustment are collected into sequences {αij}∞j=1, referred to as hazard functions
for price changes. Apart from being well defined probabilities, there are two weak restrictions imposed on
the probabilities {αij}∞j=1 in (2.4.1). The first is that some prices in each industry are sticky for at least
one period; the second is that there exists a lower bound αi > 0 on the probabilities of price adjustment:
αi1 < 1 , αij ≥ αi (2.4.2)
The restrictions in (2.4.2) are needed to rule out the case where all prices are fully flexible and thus
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monetary policy has no real effects, and also the case where all prices are permanently sticky and no
meaningful equilibrium exists. These restrictions do not actually have much substantive economic content
because the results of this paper will apply to economies arbitrarily close to full price flexibility, or arbitrarily
close to the case where prices can be completely sticky for a period of time. The assumptions are therefore
broad enough to accommodate almost any pricing hazard function, including the well-known special cases
of Calvo (1983) price setting (αij = αi) and Taylor (1980) contracts (αij = αi for j less the length of the
contract in industry i and αij = 1 otherwise, then letting αi tend to zero). No restrictions are placed on
how much the hazard function in one industry can differ from that in another.
By accepting the trivial restrictions in (2.4.2), there must exist unique stationary distributions of the
duration of price stickiness for each industry.1 Let θij denote the proportion of firms in industry i using a
price set j periods ago:
θij ≡ P
(Dt = j ∣∣ Ωi) (2.4.3)
Each sequence {θij}∞j=0 represents a probability distribution so 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1 and
∑∞
j=0 θij = 1 for all i. From
(2.4.1) and (2.4.3), the price durations in an industry are linked to that industry’s pricing hazard function
by:
θi,j+1 = (1− αi,j+1)θij (2.4.4)
This is demonstrated by noting that the proportion of firms using a price set j + 1 periods ago can be
obtained by multiplying the proportion of firms using a price set j periods ago by the probability that these
firms will not choose a new price. Using (2.4.4) and the assumptions in (2.4.2), the sequence {θij}∞j=0 must
also satisfy:
θi,j+1 ≤ θij , θi1 > 0 , θij ≤ (1− αi)jθi0 (2.4.5)
These mean, respectively for each industry, that there are always more firms using a newer price than an
older price; that there are at least some firms using a price set in the past; and that the distribution of
price durations must eventually decay no slower than at a geometric rate.
The hazard functions {αij}∞j=1 are not parameterized directly. Instead, the recursive parameterization
developed in Sheedy (2007b) is exploited here to simplify the subsequent analysis. This involves generating
industry i’s hazard function {αij}∞j=1 using the recursion:
αij = αi +
min{j−1,mi}∑
k=1
ϕik
 j−1∏
`=j−k
(1− αi`)
−1 (2.4.6)
It is shown by Sheedy (2007b) that the parameter αi controls the level of the hazard function, and the
sequence of parameters {ϕij}mij=1 controls its slope. The number mi is the order of the recursion used for
industry i. Proposition 2 in Sheedy (2007b) shows that by making mi sufficiently large, any hazard function
satisfying the assumptions in (2.4.2) can be represented in this way.
It is convenient to collect all mi + 1 hazard-function parameters together by defining φi0 ≡ 1− αi and
φi,j+1 ≡ −ϕij for j = 1, . . . ,mi. It is proved in Proposition 4 of Sheedy (2007b) that (2.4.6) implies the
age distribution of prices {θij}∞j=0 for industry i must be generated by a linear recursion of order mi + 1
using parameters {φij}mi+1j=1 :
θij =
min{j,mi+1}∑
k=1
φikθi,j−k , θi0 = 1−
mi+1∑
k=1
φik (2.4.7)
In what follows, let m ≡ max{m1, . . . ,mn} denote greatest order of recursion needed to approximate the
1This statement is proved in Proposition 4 of Sheedy (2007b).
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pricing hazard function for any industry in the economy.
A final assumption concerns the coordination (or independence) of price changes. It is assumed that
price adjustment times cannot be coordinated at the level of the industry or the national economy. But
for simplicity, it is supposed that all firms using the same specialized labour input (a small subset of one
industry) perfectly coordinate the timing of their price changes.
2.5 Market clearing
Equilibrium in labour and goods markets requires that
Ct(ı, ) = Yt(ı, ) , Cit = Yit , Ct = Yt ,
∫
Ω
Ht(ı, )d =
∫
Ω
ht(ı, )d (2.5.1)
for all goods (ı, ), for all industries i, and for all types of labour input ı. The terms Yit and Yt denote
the baskets of industry i output and economy-wide output respectively, defined in the same way as the
consumption baskets Cit and Ct in (2.2.2) and (2.2.4):
Yit ≡
(
1
ωi
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
Yt(ı, )
εit−1
εit ddı
) εit
εit−1
, Yt ≡
(
n∑
i=1
ωiY
ε−1
ε
it
) ε
ε−1
(2.5.2)
2.6 Policymaker
Optimal policy from the perspective of a benevolent policymaker is defined with respect to a utilitarian
social welfare function. This objective function is denoted by Ut and is obtained by integrating lifetime
utility (2.1.1) over the set of all households:
Ut ≡
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
Ut(ı, )ddı (2.6.1)
This paper abstracts from the active use of fiscal policy and concentrates on how monetary policy
can be used to maximize objective (2.6.1). Fiscal policy simply comprises a sequence of lump-sum taxes
and transfers, and a proportional wage-bill subsidy paid to all firms. The wage-bill subsidy rate s is set to
ensure the economy operates at an efficient level of aggregate economic activity on average. The government
budget does not always have to be in balance, and any deficits are financed by issuing one-period risk-free
nominal bonds. But fiscal policy is Ricardian and lump-sum taxes are assumed to be adjusted to ensure
government solvency in all circumstances.
Monetary policy is implemented by setting the gross interest rate It on one-period risk-free nominal
bonds. For there to be no arbitrage opportunity in the presence of a range of other securities, the nominal
interest rate It must be related to the asset-pricing kernel Mt+1|t and economy-wide price index Pt as
follows:
Et
[
Mt+1|t
Pt
Pt+1
]
= I−1t (2.6.2)
By substituting the first-order condition (2.1.3) for the optimal allocation of consumption spending and
the goods market clearing condition (2.5.1) into (2.6.2), and then taking expectations, the intertemporal
Euler equation is obtained:
βItEt
[
uc(Yt+1)
uc(Yt)
Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1 (2.6.3)
This establishes a channel through which monetary policy can affect aggregate demand. All that remains to
be specified is whether the policymaker maximizing (2.6.1) acts with discretion or is able to make binding
commitments. Both cases are considered in the following sections of the paper.
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3 Optimal behaviour of firms and the policymaker
The aim of this section is to identify the variables in the economy which are relevant to firms’ and the
policymaker’s pursuit of their objectives, and to derive metrics that allow their success in meeting those
goals to be assessed. This analysis is important because it will illustrate the extent to which these objectives
are in conflict.
The optimal behaviour of both firms and the policymaker is studied for the economy described in section
2 by deriving equations characterizing the behaviour of the agents. As an exact solution to these equations
cannot be found, recourse is had to the technique of log linearization. A steady state is first identified
around which a log-linear approximation can be made. To simplify the analysis, a steady state is chosen in
which prices are fully adjusted, inflation is zero, and where there is symmetry across all industries. Further
details of this steady state are provided in appendix A. In what follows, a bar over a variable denotes its
steady-state value, and sans serif letters denote the log deviation (approximate percentage difference) of
the corresponding roman letter from its steady-state value. When a variable is indeterminate in the steady
state (for instance, any money price), the sans serif letter denotes just the logarithm of that variable. So for
example, Y¯ is steady-state aggregate output, and Yt ≡ log Yt−log Y¯ is the log-deviation of aggregate output
Yt from its steady-state level; whereas Pt ≡ logPt is just the log of the aggregate price level Pt. Second- and
higher-order terms in the log-deviations are suppressed unless otherwise specified in all following equations.
3.1 Policymaker
The first step is to establish a benchmark by which to judge the success or failure of any monetary policy.
This is done by characterizing a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources in the economy, hypothetically
supposing the policymaker could set aside the price mechanism and act as a social planner. Because there
are potentially many Pareto-efficient allocations, uniqueness is obtained restricting attention to allocations
in which all households have the same level of consumption, mirroring the equal consumption of the market
allocation found in Section 2.1 when initial financial wealth and expected lifetime income is equal and asset
markets are complete.
This Pareto-efficient allocation is found by maximizing total utility (2.6.1) (involving the industry-
specific and overall consumption baskets Cit and Ct, defined respectively in (2.2.2) and (2.2.4)) subject
to the production function (2.3.1) and all households having the same level of consumption. As there are
no technological differences between goods in the same industry and because households’ preferences for
leisure do not depend on the type of labour input they supply, all firms in the same industry produce the
same level of output in the Pareto-efficient allocation. The values of variables in this efficient allocation
are marked by asterisks, with Y ∗t = C∗t being the efficient level of aggregate output and consumption, Y ∗it
being the efficient level of output of firms in industry i, and H∗it the corresponding efficient level of labour
usage by firms in that industry. Shadow relative prices and real wages for each industry are denoted by
%∗it and w
∗
it respectively. These are the prices that would support the efficient allocation of resources under
the market mechanism.
Using the equations for the production function (2.3.1), the marginal cost function (2.3.2), the industry
demand curve (2.2.5), the optimal labour supply condition (2.1.2), the output basket (2.5.2), and goods and
labour market equilibrium conditions (2.5.1), the following system of equations characterizes the Pareto-
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efficient allocation of resources:
Y ∗it = AitH
∗ηyh
it (3.1.1a)
Y ∗it = %
∗−ε
it Y
∗
t (3.1.1b)
vh(H∗it)
uc(Y ∗t )
= w∗it (3.1.1c)
Y ∗t =
(
n∑
i=1
ωiY
∗ ε−1
ε
it
) ε
ε−1
(3.1.1d)
%∗it = CY (Y ∗it ;Ait, w∗it) (3.1.1e)
A key equation that ensures efficiency is (3.1.1e), equating prices to marginal costs. This is violated under
conditions of imperfect competition. As has already been mentioned, the system of equations in (3.1.1) is
difficult to solve, so the next result gives a log-linear approximation to the solution.
Lemma 1 A log-linear approximation to the solution of system of equations (3.1.1) for the Pareto-efficient
level of aggregate output Y ∗t and shadow relative prices %∗it is given by
Y∗t = ηyAt , ρ
∗
it = −ηρ(Ait − At) (3.1.2)
where Y∗t is the log-deviation of efficient output Y ∗t , ρ∗it ≡ log %∗it is the log of the industry i shadow relative
price, and At ≡
∑n
i=1 ωiAit is the weighted average of the log-deviation of technology across all industries.
Both parameters ηy and ηρ are strictly positive.
Proof. See appendix B.1. 
The efficient level of aggregate output simply depends on the average level of technology in the economy
at any given point in time. And if one industry experiences a productivity advantage over another owing
to better technology, then this is reflected in that industry having a lower Pareto-efficient shadow relative
price.
The solution outlined above is of course not attainable in practice. But monetary policy can still be
appraised by looking at how far the actual level of output and actual relative prices are from their efficient
levels derived in Lemma 1. To this end, the economy-wide output gap Yt ≡ Yt/Y ∗t is defined. Similarly,
if %it ≡ Pit/Pt is the actual industry i relative price, the relative price gap %it/%∗it is important in seeing
the extent to which the efficient allocation of resources between industries is perturbed. Misallocation of
resources can also take place within industries, and the extent of this problem can be seen from the size of
the cross-sectional variance of (log) prices within an industry, denoted by σ2it ≡ VΩi [logPt(ı, )] for industry
i at time t. The following result formalizes these claims by deriving a second-order approximation of the
policymaker’s objective function.
Lemma 2 A second-order approximation of the negative of the social welfare function −Ut, defined in
(2.6.1), is given by the following quadratic loss function Ut,
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
ηx
ε
y2τ +
n∑
i=1
ωi
(
(ρiτ − ρ∗iτ )2 + σ2iτ
)]
(3.1.3)
where third- and higher-order terms have been suppressed, along with terms that are independent of monetary
policy. The loss function depends on the (log) output gap yt ≡ Yt−Y∗t , the (log) relative price gap ρit− ρ∗it,
where ρit ≡ log %it, and the cross-sectional variance σ2it of (log) prices within industries. Both Y∗t and ρ∗it
are defined in Lemma 1 and the parameter ηx is strictly positive.
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Proof. See appendix B.2. 
Therefore, it is the job of monetary policy to close the output and relative price gaps and minimize the
cross-sectional dispersion of prices within industries as much as possible.
The policymaker affects these variables by varying nominal interest rates, which affect the level of
aggregate demand. This works through the consumption Euler equation (2.6.3), which can be log linearized
as follows,
yt = Etyt+1 − η−1ic {it − Etpit+1 −R∗t } (3.1.4)
where pit+1 ≡ Pt+1 − Pt denotes inflation in the aggregate price level between period t and t + 1 , it ≡
log It − log I¯ is the log-deviation of the (gross) nominal interest rate from its steady-state value, and
R∗t ≡ EtY∗t+1−Y∗t is the natural real interest rate, an exogenous variable depending on the expected change
in the efficient level of aggregate output Y∗t . The details of this log linearization are contained in appendix
A. The strictly positive parameter η−1ic is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When prices are
not completely flexible, equation (3.1.4) indicates how nominal interest rates can affect the output gap yt.
Changes in the output gap then have a knock-on effect on the other variables with which the policymaker
is concerned.
3.2 Firms
This section now considers how firms should set prices in order to maximize profits, with the aim of
discovering how this affects the relationship between the output gap, relative prices and inflation. It is also
important to know whether the actions of firms are likely to assist or to hinder the policymaker in pursuing
the objectives set out in section 3.1.
3.2.1 Profit-maximizing price setting with flexible prices
It is useful to begin with the hypothetical case of perfectly flexible prices. Suppose that some firms using a
particular labour input ı and based in a particular industry i have the opportunity to change their prices
without constraint now and in the future. If these firms maximize profits then they must clearly choose a
relative price %ˆit(ı) for which the first derivative of the profit function (2.3.4) is zero:
z%(%ˆit(ı); %it, Yt, Ait, wt(ı), εit) = 0 (3.2.1)
An expression for this derivative can be obtained from equation (2.3.4),
z%(%; %it, Yt, Ait, wt(ı), εit) = (1− εit)%−εit−1%εit−εit Yt
{
%− (1− s)εit
(εit − 1) CY
(
%−εit%εit−εit Yt;Ait, wt(ı)
)}
(3.2.2)
where 1/(εit − 1) denotes these firms’ desired (net) markup of price on marginal cost. The elasticity of
demand εit is greater than unity so the markup is always well defined.
If firms in industry i using labour input type ı set profit-maximizing relative price %ˆit(ı) then these firms
will face a common level of demand Yˆit(ı) and need to employ labour hours Hˆit(ı). This level of employment
then affects the real wage wˆt(ı) faced by the firms with flexible prices using labour input ı. The equations
necessary to find the values of all these variables are the production function (2.3.1), the demand function
(2.3.3), and the labour supply function (2.1.2). It turns out that any group of firms in industry i with this
pricing freedom would like to set the same relative price %ˆit irrespective of the particular type of labour
input it uses. This is because the production and cost functions are the same for all labour input types used
by a particular industry. The index ı is thus dropped from the relative price %ˆit, output Yˆit and employment
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Hˆit of all firms using labour input ı and having flexible prices. The system of equations determining these
variables is:
Yˆit = AitHˆ
ηyh
it (3.2.3a)
Yˆit = %ˆ−εitit %
εit−ε
it Yt (3.2.3b)
vh(Hˆit)
uc(Yt)
= wˆit (3.2.3c)
%ˆit =
(
εit
εit − 1
)
(1− s)CY (Yˆit;Ait, wˆit) (3.2.3d)
Just like the equations in (3.1.1), the system (3.2.3) is difficult to solve analytically. The next result
presents a log-linearization of the solution.
Lemma 3 A log-linear approximation to the profit-maximizing flexible relative price %ˆit defined by the
system of equations (3.2.3) is given by
ρˆit = ηxyt + ρ∗it + ηit (3.2.4)
where ρˆit ≡ log %ˆit, yt is the output gap, ρ∗it is the efficient relative price defined in Lemma 1, and it ≡
log(εit/(εit−1))− log(ε/(ε−1)) is the log-deviation of the optimal (gross) markup. The coefficients ηx and
η are both strictly positive.
Proof. See appendix B.3. 
The profit-maximizing flexible relative price depends positively on the output gap yt because higher
output leads to higher costs as a result of diminishing returns to labour and higher real wages. It moves
one-for-one with the efficient relative price ρ∗it because this reflects changes in technology that affect costs
at the industry level. Finally, variations in industry-specific competitiveness as measured by changes in
desired markups are captured by the shocks it. A positive shock means that firms are pushing for higher
relative prices.
3.2.2 Profit-maximizing, forward-looking price setting with sticky prices
Attention now returns to the original problem of the finding the profit-maximizing price when prices are
sticky. This task turns out to be closely related to the profit-maximization problem with flexible prices
treated in section 3.2.1. But when prices are expected to be sticky it is no longer sufficient to consider the
effects of a new price on profits in the current period; future periods’ profits need to be taken into account
for as long as a price could potentially remain in use.
Suppose a firm gets an opportunity to choose a new money price at a particular point in time. The
optimal price the firm chooses is referred to as a reset price. It shown below that there is one common
profit-maximizing reset price for each industry at each point in time, denoted by Rit for industry i at
time t. As the reset price is likely to be sticky in the future, the choice of Rit potentially affects firms’
profits at all times from period t onwards. But the effect on future profits needs to be discounted for
two reasons. First, because the profits occur in the future the income stream is discounted by financial
markets when calculating a present value. Second, while reset price Rit is definitely used in period t, in
each period afterwards there is a probability that a new reset price will be chosen before these profits are
actually realized. Let ςij denote the survival function for prices set by firms in industry i, where ςij is the
probability that a price set by one of the firms in this industry at time t is still in use at time t+ j. From
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repeated application of equation (2.4.4) it follows that the survival probabilities are proportional to the
distribution of the duration of price stickiness:
ςij =
j∏
k=1
(1− αik) = θij
θi0
(3.2.5)
Now consider a firm in industry i using type-ı labour. If at time τ this firm is still using a reset price
from period t then its current level of real profits is given by z(Rit/Pτ ; %iτ , Yτ , Aiτ , wτ (ı), εiτ ), where the
profit function is defined in (2.3.4). As will be demonstrated below, the equilibrium real wage wt(ı) depends
only on the industry the firm is in and the time period in which the currently used reset price was chosen.
Its equilibrium value at time τ is thus denoted by wi,τ |t. The objective function Fit that firms maximize
when choosing reset price Rit is obtained by multiplying the level of profits by the asset-pricing kernel Mτ |t
and the survival probability θi,τ−t/θi0 from (3.2.5), and then summing over all time periods from t onwards:
Fit ≡ max
Rit
∞∑
τ=t
(θi,τ−t/θi,0)Et[Mτ |tz(Rit/Pτ ; %iτ , Yτ , Aiτ , wi,τ |t, εiτ )] (3.2.6)
The first-order condition for maximizing (3.2.6) is obtained by differentiating (3.2.6) with respect to the
reset price Rit, ∞∑
τ=t
(θi,τ−t/θi,0)Et[Mτ |tP−1τ z%(Rit/Pτ ; %iτ , Yτ , Aiτ , wi,τ |t, εiτ )] = 0 (3.2.7)
where the first derivative of profit function (2.3.4) is given in (3.2.2). The equilibrium real wage wi,τ |t is
obtained as in section 3.2.1 by combining the production function (2.3.1), the demand curve (2.3.3), and
the labour supply function (2.1.2). Let Yi,τ |t and Hi,τ |t be the common levels of output and employment
for firms in industry i at time τ using the reset price Rit set in period t. By using these equations, and by
substituting in the expression for the derivative of the profit function from (3.2.2) into (3.2.7), the following
system of equations is obtained:
Yi,τ |t = AiτH
ηyh
i,τ |t (3.2.8a)
Yi,τ |t =
(
Rit
Piτ
)−εiτ (Piτ
Pτ
)−ε
Yτ (3.2.8b)
vh(Hi,τ |t)
uc(Yτ )
= wi,τ |t (3.2.8c)
∞∑
τ=t
(θi,τ−t/θi,0)Et
[
Mτ |t
(
Rit
Pτ
)−εiτ
%εiτ−εiτ Yτ
{
Rit
Pτ
−
(
εiτ
εiτ − 1
)
(1− s)CY (Yi,τ |t;Aiτ , wi,τ |t)
}]
= 0 (3.2.8d)
The close connection between the solution of this system and the corresponding system of equations (3.2.3)
for firms with flexible prices can be seen by log-linearizing the solution to (3.2.8).
Lemma 4 A log-linear approximation of the solution to the system of equations (3.2.8) defining the
profit-maximizing reset price is given by
Rit =
∞∑
τ=t
ϑi,τ−tEt[Pτ + ρˆiτ ] , ϑij ≡ β
jθij∑∞
k=0 β
kθik
(3.2.9)
where Rit ≡ logRit is the log reset price, Pt ≡ logPt is the log price level, and ρˆit is the profit-maximizing
flexible relative price given in Lemma 3. The sequence of weights {ϑij}∞j=0 sums to one, is non-increasing,
and each weight is non-negative.
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Proof. See appendix B.4. 
Equation (3.2.9) states that the profit-maximizing reset price Rit is a weighted average of the sequence
of current and expected future profit-maximizing flexible prices, that is, Pτ + ρˆiτ , using weights based on
the discount factor β and survival probabilities ςij = θij/θi0.
Once the choice of reset price for each firm in each industry has been determined, the industry price
levels and aggregate price level themselves can be calculated. As all firms in the same industry changing
price at the same time find it optimal to choose the same reset price, it follows from equation (2.2.2) and
the age distribution of prices in (2.4.3) that the price level for industry i can be written as a function of
past and present reset prices:
Pit =
 ∞∑
j=0
θijR
1−εit
i,t−j
 11−εit (3.2.10)
This equation, and the aggregate price level equation (2.2.4), can be log-linearized as follows:
Pt =
n∑
i=1
ωiPit , Pit =
∞∑
j=0
θijRi,t−j (3.2.11)
The aggregate price level Pt is thus a weighted average of industry price levels Pit, which in turn are weighted
averages of current and past reset prices Rit. The weights are respectively the sizes of each industry, and
the age distribution of prices within industries.
Just as Lemma 2 derived a loss function for the policymaker, it is possible to obtain an analogous loss
function for firms (that is, a second order approximation of the negative of the profit function). Later on,
this will be used to assess the extent to which the objectives of firms and the policymaker conflict.
Lemma 5 The objective function Fit of firms in industry i changing price at time t is defined in equation
(3.2.6). The following loss function Fit is a second-order approximation of −Fit,
Fit ≡ 12
∞∑
τ=t
ϑi,τ−tEt[{Rit − Pτ − ρˆiτ}2] (3.2.12)
where third- and higher-order terms have been suppressed, along with terms that are independent of these
firms’ pricing decisions. The profit-maximizing flexible relative price ρˆit is defined in Lemma 3, and the
sequence of weights {ϑij}∞j=0 in equation (3.2.9).
Proof. See appendix B.5. 
Firms’ losses stem from their reset prices differing from the prices they would choose in the absence
of constraints on price adjustment. When prices are sticky it is impossible to find a reset price that
can match all of the optimal flexible prices in every time period simultaneously. But it is clear that the
profit-maximizing reset price given in Lemma 4 minimizes loss function (3.2.12) to the greatest possible
extent.
4 The Phillips curve and intrinsic inflation persistence
Section 3 has identified how firms would choose prices to maximize profits in a world in which those prices
are likely to remain sticky. The next step is to aggregate this optimizing behaviour into a Phillips curve
relating the (gross) inflation rate Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 and relative prices %it ≡ Pit/Pt to real economic activity,
as measured by the output gap Yt ≡ Yt/Y ∗t , and the exogenous shocks. A crucial feature of the Phillips
curve is the extent to which it exhibits intrinsic inflation persistence.
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4.1 Phillips curve
As there is a potentially large number of industries, the aggregated system of pricing equations is most
conveniently represented using vector and matrix notation. In what follows, boldface letters are used to
denote the n × 1 vector of the corresponding industry-specific variables. Hence the vector of industry-
specific price levels is written as Pt ≡ ( P1t , . . . , Pnt )′. Similarly, ω ≡ ( ω1 , . . . , ωn )′ is the vector of
industry sizes. Using this notation, the aggregate price level Pt in (3.2.11) can be expressed as Pt = ω′Pt.
The (gross) rate of price inflation specific to industry i is defined as Πit ≡ Pit/Pi,t−1, and the log-
deviation of this inflation rate from its steady-state value is denoted by piit. The vector of industry-specific
inflation rates is pit, and consequently economy-wide inflation is given by pit ≡ ω′pit. The vectors ρ∗t and
ρˆt refer to (log deviations of) the relative prices that would be desired respectively by the policymaker
and profit-maximizing firms in a world where prices are completely flexible. These are the relative prices
characterized in Lemmas 1 and 3. Equation (3.2.4) shows that ρˆt and ρ∗t are related according to
ρˆt = ηxιyt + ρ∗t + ηt (4.1.1)
where yt is the (log) aggregate output gap, ι is an n× 1 vector of 1s, and t is a vector of industry-specific
competitiveness shocks.
Lemma 4 describes how a profit-maximizing firm would behave once it decides to change its price given
the likelihood of this price being sticky in the future, as indicated by the hazard function in (2.4.1). This
behaviour is aggregated to obtain a system of equations describing the determination of the inflation rate
in each industry.
Proposition 1 Using the log-linearizations of the equations describing the profit-maximizing behaviour
of firms in Lemmas 3 and 4, the log-linearizations of the price indices in (3.2.11), and the recursive para-
meterization in (2.4.7), the following set of pricing equations is obtained. There exist a sequence of n× 1
vector coefficients {γj}mj=1, sequences of n × n matrices {Λj}m+1j=1 and {Ξj}∞j=0, and an n × n invertible
matrix ℵ such that the vector of industry-specific inflation rates pit is given by
pit =
m∑
j=1
γjpit−j − ρt−1 +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρt−j + ℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjEt[ηxωyt+j + Ωρ∗t+j + ηΩt+j ] (4.1.2)
where pit ≡ ω′pit is the economy-wide inflation rate, ρt is the relative price vector, yt is the economy-wide
output gap, ρ∗t is the vector of efficient relative prices, t is the vector of competitiveness shocks, and m is
the order of the hazard-function recursion. The diagonal matrix Ω contains the industry sizes ωi along the
principal diagonal. The matrix Ξ0 is equal to the n× n identity matrix I, and ι is an n× 1 vector of 1s.
Proof. See appendix C.1. 
Equation (4.1.2) is stated in terms of the vector of industry-specific inflation rates pit. The Phillips
curve for the whole economy is obtained by averaging the equations in (4.1.2) over industries using the
industry sizes as weights. The following Phillips curve is obtained
pit =
m∑
j=1
γjpit−j +
m+1∑
j=1
λ′jρt−j + ω
′ℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjEt[ηxωyt+j + Ωρ∗t+j + ηΩt+j ] (4.1.3)
where γj ≡ ω′γj and λ′j ≡ ω′Λj have been defined, and the fact that the weighted average of the relative
price vector ρt is always zero has been used.
Both equations (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) effect a decomposition of the determinants of inflation into forward-
and backward-looking components. The content of Proposition 1 is in showing which variables enter into
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each component and with what coefficients. The backward-looking part depends on m lags of economy-wide
inflation pit and m + 1 lags of the relative price vector ρt. The number m is the order of the recursive
representation (2.4.7) needed to capture all the details of the hazard functions (2.4.1). This could be
any non-negative number: it is not possible to set an upper bound on it that applies to all models of
price stickiness. The forward-looking component contains all the current and expected future values of the
output gap yt, efficient relative prices ρ∗t , and competitiveness shocks t. These are the variables affecting
the profit-maximizing flexible relative prices ρˆt given in equation (4.1.1).
The equations in (4.1.2) constitute a set of constraints on a policymaker caring about both inflation and
the output gap. But it is important to recognize a fundamental difference in respect of the forward- and
backward-looking components of the constraints. As of time t, the backward-looking component cannot be
affected by any current policy actions because it is predetermined. And while it is true that in a rational
expectations equilibrium, the expectations in the forward-looking may depend on the past because the
variables turn out to be serially correlated, there is no necessity for them to do so. They are thus amenable
to being influenced by monetary policy, though the extent of this influence will depend on the ability of
the policymaker to enter into binding commitments to undertake actions in the future. Therefore it is the
backward-looking component that is used to formulate a precise definition of intrinsic inflation persistence,
which together with the exogenous shocks forms the only part of (4.1.2) that must ultimately be taken as
given by a policymaker with the ability to steer expectations.
4.2 Intrinsic inflation persistence
The history of inflation and relative prices that enters the backward-looking component of (4.1.2) is denoted
by Ht,
Ht ≡ { pit−1 , . . . , pit−m , ρt−1 , . . . , ρt−m−1 , Pt−1 } (4.2.1)
where the set Ht has been augmented by the past general price level Pt−1, which is needed if equation
(4.1.2) is to be used to obtain the current price level as well as inflation rates and relative prices. The
expression for the backward-looking component of (4.1.2) is taken as the definition of the level of intrinsic
inflation prevailing at time t given history Ht in (4.2.1). The current level of intrinsic inflation in each
industry is denoted by an n× 1 vector xt:
xt ≡
m∑
j=1
γjpit−j − ρt−1 +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρt−j (4.2.2)
For economy-wide inflation pit the relevant level of intrinsic inflation is obtained by taking a weighted
average of xt across industries, which is denoted by xt ≡ ω′xt.
The trade-off the policymaker faces is made apparent by separating the forward-looking component
of (4.1.2) into a component that depends on the output gap and a component that depends on various
exogenous shocks that affect inflation. The influence of aggregate demand on inflation pit is denoted by ut,
which is defined as follows:
ut ≡ ηxℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjωEtyt+j (4.2.3)
The remaining influences on inflation come from shocks to industry-specific technology and competitiveness.
These are referred to collectively as “cost-push” shocks. The technology shocks are “efficient” cost-push
shocks because they create a need for price adjustment if an efficient allocation of resources is to be attained.
Lemma 1 has shown that efficient relative prices ρ∗t are a function only of the exogenous technology shocks.
On the other hand, the competitiveness shocks t are “inefficient” cost-push shocks because they relate
to pressure for price adjustment that would perturb the allocation of resources further away from what is
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efficient. The two types of cost-push shock are denoted by ℘t and t respectively, and expressions for these
are taken from (4.1.2):
℘t ≡ ℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjΩEtρ∗t+j , t ≡ ηℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjΩEtt+j (4.2.4)
By using definitions (4.2.2), (4.2.3) and (4.2.4), the pricing equations in (4.1.2) can be stated succinctly
as follows:
pit − ut = xt + (℘t + t) (4.2.5)
When averaged over all industries this becomes pit − ut = xt + (℘t + t), where xt, ut, ℘t and t denote
the weighted averages of the vectors in (4.2.2), (4.2.3) and (4.2.4).
Equation (4.2.5) demonstrates that the current level of intrinsic inflation xt should properly be seen as
a constraint on what monetary policy can currently achieve. The left-hand side of (4.2.5) comprises the
variables that are the objectives of the policymaker. For a given value of the right-hand side of (4.2.5),
inflation pit can only be lowered at the expense of aggregate demand ut. Hence, at time t, for a given history
Ht and in the absence of current and expected future cost-push shocks, pit < xt if and only if ut < 0. That
is, without favourable cost-push shocks, the policymaker can only achieve an actual inflation rate below the
current level of intrinsic inflation by having a negative level of aggregate demand ut, which from (4.2.3) is a
weighted average of output gaps from period t onwards. Thus there is a real cost of achieving an inflation
rate different from the current level of intrinsic inflation.
This brings to the fore an important feature of intrinsic inflation persistence which can easily be mis-
construed. Intrinsic inflation does not refer to a level of inflation that is inevitable; the policymaker still
has a choice and can trade off inflation for real activity in the short run to some extent. Instead, an increase
in the level of intrinsic inflation constitutes a deterioration in the range of feasible inflation and output gap
combinations, reducing the level of aggregate economic activity consistent with each given rate of inflation.
Or equivalently, intrinsic inflation is the level of inflation which would result from a given history if the
output gap were zero both now and in the future, and there were no further cost-push shocks. This follows
immediately from (4.2.5) on setting ut, ℘t and t to zero. Hence the concept of intrinsic inflation is closely
related to the real costs of disinflation, but this should not hide the fact that the policymaker still has a
choice to make.
In studying how past inflation affects the range of feasible inflation and output gap combinations
available today and in the future, it is useful to define the time-path of intrinsic inflation. The time-path
of intrinsic inflation is the series of inflation rates following on from a given history and supposing that all
intrinsic inflation is fully accommodated (pit = xt) now and in the indefinite future, so that any cost-push
shocks are absorbed by output gap fluctuations. Formally, starting from history Ht in (4.2.1), let p˜iτ (Ht) be
the inflation vector that is realized in period τ if piτ = xτ in all periods τ ≥ t. Using the expression for xt
in (4.2.2), it is shown in Lemma 8 how this path can be calculated using a system of difference equation for
the inflation vector p˜iτ (Ht) and relative price vector ρ˜τ (Ht).2 The time-path of intrinsic inflation p˜iτ (Ht)
is the solution of
p˜iτ (Ht) ≡
m∑
j=1
γj p˜iτ−j(Ht)− ρ˜τ−1(Ht) +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρ˜τ−j(Ht) (4.2.6a)
ρ˜τ (Ht) ≡ p˜iτ (Ht)− ιp˜iτ (Ht) + ρ˜τ−1(Ht) (4.2.6b)
where the convention is adopted that p˜iτ (Ht) = piτ if τ < t, and similarly for ρ˜τ (Ht). The implied time-path
2Details are provided in appendix B.8.
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of the price vector Pτ is calculated once the paths of inflation and relative prices from (4.2.6) are known
using the formula P˜τ (Ht) ≡ ιPt−1+ρt−1+
∑τ−t
j=0 p˜it+j(Ht). From these definitions and (4.2.5) it is apparent
that, starting from history Ht and in the absence of further cost-push shocks from period t onwards, the
output gap is zero in all current and future periods if actual inflation is allowed to follow the time-path of
intrinsic inflation, that is piτ = p˜iτ (Ht), in all periods from t onwards.
It is shown in Lemma 8 that all models of price stickiness considered here have the property that
limτ→∞ p˜iτ (Ht) = 0 starting from any history Ht. This means that any currently prevailing intrinsic
inflation must eventually decay, though the precise rate of decay is sensitive to the shape of the hazard
function for price changes and the extent of heterogeneity. It is not possible to make any other general
statements about the pattern of decay; for example, it need not even be monotonic. But the fact that
the path of intrinsic inflation has limit zero means that there is always some speed of disinflation which is
sustainable without sacrificing real output. If the policymaker tries to achieve a disinflation more rapidly
than this then aggregate output will be at a suboptimal level. So the class of price stickiness models studied
here does not predict a cost of disinflation per se, but rather a cost of insufficiently slow disinflation.
Both xt and p˜iτ (Ht) in (4.2.2) and (4.2.6) depend on the particular history Ht of price setting in the
economy up to period t. But it is useful to have some measure of how much intrinsic inflation persistence
results from the shocks that the economy is typically subject to. The impulse response function of intrinsic
inflation is a concise way of summarizing this information. It is calculated using the time-path of intrinsic
inflation supposing a history in which price stability has been achieved prior to period t, but where a one-off
cost-push shock has occurred with equal magnitude in all industries at time t. The size of this shock is
normalized so that the initial effect on aggregate inflation is 1%. Then the impulse reponse function p(j)
gives the level of intrinsic inflation p˜it+j(Ht) in period t + j. So when for example 0 < p(j + 1) < p(j)
for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the inflation initially resulting from the cost-push shock must be reduced gradually and
monotonically if a recession is to be avoided.
The expression in (4.2.2) for the current level of intrinsic inflation shows that it generally depends on
past relative prices, as well as past aggregate inflation rates. But there is one important special case in
which information about relative prices can be ignored when examining intrinsic inflation at the aggregate
level, and in which aggregate inflation is independent of the efficient cost-push shocks. This is where all
firms in all industries share the same hazard function for price adjustment.
Proposition 2 If the pricing hazard functions in (2.4.1) satisfy αij = αj for all industries i = 1 . . . , n
then economy-wide intrinsic inflation xt ≡ ω′xt and the efficient cost-push shock ℘t ≡ ω′℘t defined in
(4.2.2) and (4.2.4) are given by:
xt =
m∑
j=1
γjpit−j , ℘t = 0 (4.2.7)
Thus only m lags of the economy-wide inflation rate pit are needed to determine the current level of intrinsic
inflation.
Proof. See appendix C.2. 
This section has demonstrated how intrinsic inflation persistence affects the current short-run menu of
inflation and output gap combinations available to the policymaker. But it turns out that this concept is
also very useful in understanding the objectives of the policymaker.
4.3 The objective function of the policymaker
An expression for the policymaker’s loss function has already been derived in Lemma 2. But that result
stated the losses in terms of the cross-sectional variances σ2it of prices within each industry. This is incom-
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plete because these variances can in fact be obtained from the history of inflation rates and relative prices
once the hazard functions are specified. This section shows that there is a very close connection between
the cross-sectional variances, the profit functions of firms, and the concept of intrinsic inflation introduced
in section 4.2.
Written using vector and matrix notation, the expression for the policymaker’s loss function in equation
(3.1.3) is
Ut ≡ 12
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[ηx
ε
y2τ + (ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ ) + σ′τΩστ
]
(4.3.1)
where ρt is the vector of relative prices, ρ∗t is the vector of efficient relative prices given in (3.1.2), and σt
is a vector of cross-sectional standard deviations σit of prices within industries. The diagonal matrix Ω
contains the industry sizes ωi along the principal diagonal.
There is in fact considerable overlap between equation (4.3.1) and the loss functions of firms (that is,
the negative of the profit function) characterized in Lemma 5. Equation (3.2.12) gives the definition of loss
function Fit relevant to firms in industry i choosing a reset price at time t. The prices chosen by such firms
impinge on the losses of the policymaker, and in turn, the policymaker’s decisions impinge on the profits
of firms. Current and future monetary policy decisions also have an impact on the realized losses of those
firms which are still using prices set in the past. To account for this, denote by Fi,t|T the expected current
and future losses from period t onwards of a firm in industry i that set its current price at time T . An
expression for Fi,t|T is obtained by discarding the first t− T terms of the sum in (3.2.12):
Fit =
∞∑
τ=t
ϑi,τ−tEt
[
(Rit − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2
]
, Fi,t|T =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
ϑi,τ−TEt[(RiT − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2] (4.3.2)
where the sequence of weights {ϑij}∞j=0 is defined in (3.2.9). The next result formally states the relationship
between firms’ and the policymaker’s loss functions, and the connection with the concept of intrinsic
inflation introduced in section 4.2.
Proposition 3 Given the profit-maximizing behaviour of firms outlined in Lemmas 3 and 4, the benevolent
policymaker’s loss function Ut in (4.3.1) can be partially stated in terms of firms’ loss functions Fit and
Fi,t|T defined in (4.3.2) as follows
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[ηx
ε
y2τ + (ρt − ρ∗t )′Ω(ρt − ρ∗t )− (ρτ − ρˆτ )′Ω(ρτ − ρˆτ )
]
+
n∑
i=1
ωiθi0
ϑi0
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tFiτ +
t−1∑
τ→−∞
βτ−tFi,t|τ
] (4.3.3)
where ρ∗t and ρˆt are the relative prices desired by policymakers and firms respectively in the absence of any
impediment to immediate price adjustment. The weights θi0 and ϑi0 are defined in equations (2.4.3) and
(3.2.9).
A consequence of (4.3.3) is that the derivative of Ut with respect to the price vector Pτ depends only
on the gap between the relative prices ρˆτ and ρ∗τ that are desired in the absence of price stickiness, and the
derivative with respect to reset price vector Rτ is zero:
∂Ut
∂Pτ
= βτ−tΩ(ρˆτ − ρ∗τ ) ,
∂Ut
∂Rτ
= 0 (4.3.4)
Using these results, the loss function Ut can also be stated in terms of the deviation of actual inflation pit
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from intrinsic inflation xt and the efficient cost-push shock ℘t defined in (4.2.2) and (4.2.4) respectively:
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[ηx
ε
y2τ + (piτ −xτ − ℘τ )′ℵ−1(piτ −xτ − ℘τ )
]
(4.3.5)
The n× n matrix ℵ is symmetric and positive definite.
Proof. See appendix C.3. 
The first part of the result in equations (4.3.3) and (4.3.4) indicates the extent of the overlap between the
interests of firms and those of the benevolent policymaker. There are two sources of conflict between these
parties where the respective loss functions do not coincide. The first concerns the level of aggregate output.
Individual firms set their prices without taking account of the effect this might have on aggregate demand,
and thus on the welfare of other agents in the economy. This is the so-called aggregate demand externality
identified by Mankiw (1985). The second conflict results from the differences between the relative prices
that firms and the policymaker would like to see in the hypothetical case where prices are perfectly flexible,
namely ρˆt and ρ∗t . Notice that no knowledge of the hazard functions for price adjustment is required when
calculating the extent of this conflict. The terms in the loss function (4.3.1) that do require knowledge of
the hazard functions are also found in the loss functions of firms. Therefore, the need for a benevolent
policymaker to correct price distortions is indicated only by the disagreement between the policymaker and
firms conditional on the absence of price stickiness.
The second part of Proposition 3 demonstrates the difference between the policymaker’s attitude to
intrinsic inflation ex ante and ex post. The vector of inflation rates pit only enters the loss function (4.3.5)
as a deviation from the current level of intrinsic inflation xt and efficient cost-push shocks ℘t. So while
allowing inflation to fluctuate does increase price distortions when intrinsic inflation is zero; once intrinsic
inflation is created by past fluctuations in inflation, price distortions are minimized by fully accommodating
the intrinsic inflation.
There is a further connection between price distortions, profit-maximization and intrinsic inflation. It
turns out that the complete accommodation of existing intrinsic inflation requires that both firms and
the policymaker should fully agree on the prices they would like to choose if thought themselves able to
make price adjustments in every time period. If this agreement can be reached using monetary policy then
the accommodation of intrinsic inflation is fully consistent with both the policymaker minimizing price
distortions and firms maximizing profits. This result is stated formally below, along with a description
of the determinants of inflation if this policy of accommodating intrinsic inflation is pursued to its fullest
extent.
Proposition 4 When firms act to maximize profits as described in Lemmas 3 and 4, the following three
statements are equivalent:
(i) The following terms in the loss function Ut from (4.3.1) corresponding to relative-price distortions are
minimized from period t0 onwards:
Pt0 ≡
1
2
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0Et0
[
(ρt − ρ∗t )′Ω(ρt − t∗t ) + σ′tΩσt
]
(4.3.6)
(ii) Existing intrinsic inflation and current and future efficient cost-push shocks are perfectly accommod-
ated, that is, pit = xt + ℘t for all t ≥ t0;
(iii) The interests of the policymaker and firms would be aligned were no impediments to full price flexibility
perceived, that is, ρˆt = ρ∗t in all periods t ≥ t0.
20
Proof. See appendix C.4. 
Hence if monetary policy were solely directed towards the complete accommodation of intrinsic inflation
and efficient cost-push shocks from some date onwards, then price distortions would be eliminated to the
greatest possible extent, and inflation would be determined by the intrinsic inflation that exists prior to
date t0 and the cost-push shocks that occur from period t0 onwards.
To see the extent to which the presence of efficient cost-push shocks creates a case for time-varying
inflation when prices are sticky, let pi∗∗t|t0 be the weighted average of the vector pi
∗∗
t|t0 , which defined to be
the solution of the following system of difference equations,
pi∗∗t|t0 ≡
m∑
j=1
γjpi
∗∗
t−j|t0 − ρ∗∗t−1|t0 +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρ∗∗t−j|t0 + ℘t (4.3.7a)
ρ∗∗t|t0 ≡ pi∗∗t|t0 − ιpi∗∗t|t0 + ρ∗∗t−1|t0 (4.3.7b)
where ℘t is defined in (4.2.4) and the convention is adopted that pi∗∗t|t0 = 0 and ρ
∗∗
t|t0 = 0 if t < t0. The level
of inflation that minimizes relative-price distortions when prices are sticky is characterized by the following
result.
Proposition 5 Let pi∗t|t0 be the inflation rate that minimizes the loss from relative-price distortions from
period t0 onwards, as measured by Pt0 in (4.3.6).
(i) The rate of inflation needed to minimize price distortions is equal to
pi∗t|t0 = p˜it(Ht0) + pi∗∗t|t0 (4.3.8)
where p˜it(Ht0) is the time-path of intrinsic inflation defined in (4.2.6), and pi∗∗t|t0 is the solution of
(4.3.7), which depends only on the exogenous cost-push shocks ℘t from period t0 onwards.
(ii) As the initial period t0 recedes into the past (t0 → −∞), the inflation rate pi∗t|t0 in (4.3.8) tends to a
stochastic process pi∗t that is solely a function of the history of exogenous cost-push shocks ℘t:
pi∗t ≡ lim
t0→−∞
pi∗t|t0 (4.3.9)
(iii) If the pricing hazard functions in (2.4.1) satisfy αij = αj for all industries i = 1 . . . , n then
pi∗t|t0 = p˜it(Ht0) , pi∗t = 0 (4.3.10)
so the rate of inflation that minimizes price-distortions from t0 onwards depends only on the time-path
of intrinsic inflation starting from history Ht0. If inflation is chosen to minimize price distortions in
all periods (t0 → −∞) then the optimal inflation rate is zero at all times.
Proof. See appendix C.5. 
It is noteworthy that even when no intrinsic inflation persistence is present, the inflation rate that
minimizes price distortions may vary over time when the speed of price adjustment differs across industries.
This time-variation results from efficient cost-push shocks, which occur when there are fluctuations in the
Pareto-efficient relative prices ρ∗t . But when all industries have the same hazard function for price changes,
the only source of time-variation in the inflation rate minimizing price distortions is intrinsic inflation that
was already present before this goal was adopted.
A policy directed exclusively towards accommodating intrinsic inflation persistence and efficient cost-
push shocks is not optimal in general because it focuses too much attention on minimizing price distortions,
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ignoring the market failure that results from the aggregate demand externality. The trade-off between
mitigating these two market failures means that a strict inflation target is not optimal. The optimal
trade-off is characterized in the next section.
5 Optimal monetary policy
Now the objectives and the constraints of the policymaker have been clarified, the question of optimal
monetary policy can be addressed more precisely. It should be clear from both the constraints and objective
functions identified in section 4 (especially equations (4.2.5) and (4.3.5)) that intrinsic inflation will play
a key role. Furthermore, Proposition 4 shows that there is an equivalence between minimizing price
distortions, accommodating existing intrinsic inflation, and aligning the interests of firms and policymakers
concerning the relative prices they would choose in the absence of price stickiness. Because of this latter
result, the conflict between firms and the policymaker over price distortions in a world with price stickiness
is reducible to conflict in a world without price stickiness. This allows certain general principles of optimal
policy to be derived that apply to the whole range of time-dependent pricing models, and ensures that the
targeting rules which implement optimal monetary policy are relatively simple in all cases.
The result that minimizing price distortions from a given point in time onwards is equivalent to ac-
commodating intrinsic inflation which already exists at that point provides the key to understanding the
differences between optimal policy with discretion and an optimal commitment to a policy rule. The case
of rules is further subdivided into commitments that are optimal from the point of view of the policymaker
at a particular point in time (referred to as t0–commitment), and timeless-perspective commitment where
the policy rule is constrained to be time consistent, forbidding any special treatment of the initial date on
which the commitment comes into force. The differences between t0–commitment and timeless-perspective
commitment also turn out to be explicable in terms of intrinsic inflation persistence. The three cases of
discretion, t0–commitment, and timeless-perspective commitment are analysed separately below.
5.1 Discretion
When the policymaker acts with discretion it means that current monetary policy can be set without
reference to any commitments made in the past. The policymaker decides optimal policy by computing the
likely paths of the target variables for each choice of interest rates, and thus evaluates the expected loss
from each available option.
The interest rate decision is not the only factor that affects the expected paths of the target variables;
there are also state variables which are beyond the control of the policymaker. These can be classified
as either exogenous or predetermined. The set of relevant predetermined endogenous variables is given in
the history Ht defined in (4.2.1) which is used to calculate the current level of intrinsic inflation. This
set contains all the predetermined variables that appear in equation (4.1.2). Because this history affects
the range of inflation and output gap pairs that are available to the policymaker, it will also affect the
combination that is optimally chosen. Thus if the public has rational expectations they will make their
beliefs about the policymaker’s future actions depend on the endogenous variables influenced by policy
today that will be part of the relevant history in the future. So even though a policymaker with discretion
cannot directly control future expectations, the indirect effect of changing current endogenous variables on
these future histories must be taken into account. Equilibria in which the public’s expectations depend
only on endogenous variables which are actually needed to compute the likely future paths of the target
variables are referred to as Markovian equilibria. The following result shows that there is an intermediate
target for monetary policy which implements the discretionary Markovian equilibrium.
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Theorem 1 Suppose the policymaker maximizes (2.6.1) subject to the behaviour of profit-maximizing firms
as characterized in Lemma 4. Suppose also the policymaker acts with discretion. Then the discretionary
Markovian equilibrium is implemented by setting monetary policy to pursue the following intermediate target
pit +
1
ε
yt = xt + ℘t (5.1.1)
in all time periods. This flexible inflation target is adjusted in the short run to accommodate fully any
intrinsic inflation xt and any efficient cost-push shocks ℘t, defined in (4.2.2) and (4.2.4) respectively.
Proof. See appendix D.1. 
This flexible inflation target has a number of notable features. First, the weights attached to the inflation
and output gap variables are independent of the pattern of price adjustment and depend solely on the extent
of imperfect competition in the economy, as measured by the average price elasticity of demand ε. Since
this elasticity must be greater than unity in a monopolistically competitive world, percentage deviations of
output from potential count for less than deviations of inflation from its target value. In more competitive
economies the weight attached to the output gap is lower, and as the limit of perfect competition is reached
this weight tends to zero. The two objectives only receive equal weight in the limiting case of the lowest
amount of price competition consistent with the existence of an equilibrium. But in general, the inflation
target is not strict, and some attention must be paid to the output gap.
However, the most striking feature of the intermediate target which implements the discretionary equi-
librium is its complete accommodation of intrinsic inflation persistence. As was discussed in section 4.2,
intrinsic inflation refers to inflation which would occur in the absence of cost-push shocks and where the
output gap is expected to remain zero, taking the history of pricing decisions as given. A consequence of
this definition is that reducing actual inflation below the current level of intrinsic inflation will lead to a
widening of the output gap, unless there happens by coincidence to be a favourable cost-push shock at the
same time. But Theorem 1 shows that a policymaker with discretion would never want to carry out such a
disinflation. Once intrinsic inflation is present, the policymaker sees no benefit in tackling it because to do
so would actually increase price distortions as well as lead to a deterioration in the output gap. And because
the inflation target is not strict, the policymaker will not refrain from allowing inflation to deviate from
target if an excessively large output gap would result. This allows intrinsic inflation to become established,
which is then accommodated by the policymaker in the future.
A final feature of (5.1.1) is that the flexible inflation target is also adjusted to accommodate fully the
current and future efficient cost-push shocks in ℘t. With adverse cost-push shocks, the policymaker will
allow inflation to rise, but favourable shocks lead to an opportunistic disinflation.
5.2 Commitment made at a specific initial date
The results of section 5.1 highlight a serious flaw in having too much discretion in the setting of monetary
policy. On the one hand, intrinsic inflation is bad for price distortions ex ante, but once present, it should
be tolerated to minimize price distortions ex post. A policymaker with discretion will not tackle intrinsic
inflation persistence because once intrinsic inflation has arisen there is simply no incentive to do so. This
section explores the benefits of making a binding commitment to a policy rule that does not allow intrinsic
inflation persistence to be accommodated.
The policymaker now considers not just the current interest rate decision but the full range of state-
contingent paths for interest rates from some initial period t0 onwards. Supposing that the public believes
that the policymaker is indeed bound by these commitments, it possible to calculate state-contingent paths
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for the target variables, evaluate the expected loss, and find the optimal path to commit to. The following
result shows that there is a targeting rule which implements this optimal state-contingent commitment.
Theorem 2 Suppose the policymaker maximizes (2.6.1) and sets policy subject to the behaviour of profit-
maximizing firms as characterized in Lemma 4. Suppose also that the policymaker makes a commitment
to conduct monetary policy according to a state-contingent rule in all time periods from t0 onwards. The
optimal state-contingent path for the target variables is achieved by committing monetary policy to the
following intermediate target,
pit +
1
ε
yt = pi∗t|t0 −
t−1∑
τ=t0
(piτ − pi∗τ |t0) (5.2.1)
where the optimal inflation target pi∗t|t0 is equal to p˜it(Ht0)+pi∗∗t|t0 as is shown in equation (4.3.8) of Proposition
5. The first component p˜it(Ht0) is the time-path of intrinsic inflation from t0 onwards defined in (4.2.6),
and the second component pi∗∗t|t0 in (4.3.7) and depends only on the sequence of efficient cost-push shocks
{℘t} from t0 onwards.
Proof. See appendix D.2. 
Just as with the intermediate target (5.1.1) for discretion, the t0-commitment is to a flexible inflation
target based on a weighted average of inflation and the output gap. The weights placed on these two target
variables are independent of the hazard functions and are the same as in the case of discretion. And also as
in the case of discretion, the level of the flexible inflation target is history dependent. However, the nature
of this history dependence is very different.
The first point to note is that any new intrinsic inflation which gets into the economy from period
t0 onwards is not accommodated by the rule, even though there is a temptation to do so. However, any
intrinsic inflation which already exists at the point when the commitment is made is still accommodated
completely. So unlike the flexible inflation target in the case of discretion, the level of the target is not
revised based on the history Ht, but can only depend in a predetermined way on the history Ht0 from the
time when the commitment came into force.
While the level of the flexible inflation target is not influenced by the relevant state variables in Ht,
it has additional history dependence arising from some irrelevant state variables in the form of all the
past misses of the inflation target that have occurred since it was first adopted. These target deviations
are both possible and likely because the inflation target is flexible and puts some weight on output gap
fluctuations. But equation (4.1.2) shows that they need not be relevant for determining the set of feasible
inflation and output gap combinations open to the policymaker. Commitment to a rule involving irrelevant
state variables is used as a means of steering private-sector expectations in order to open up a better set
of possibilities for the target variables. This form of optimal history dependence has been emphasized by
Woodford (2000). The precise nature of the commitment in the present case is to revise down the current
level of the flexible inflation target in response to every failure to hit the target in the past. The revision
is made one-for-one with past target deviations, so basically a 1% cumulative overshoot entails a 1% lower
target in the current period. Notice that this policy is effectively stabilizing the price level in the long run.
This supports the conclusion found by Woodford for the special case of the Calvo pricing.
In summary, the optimal t0–commitment is to a rule in which only intrinsic inflation that has arisen
prior to t0 is accommodated, and in which all failures to hit the inflation target from period t0 onwards
are eventually corrected in future periods. But both of these features clearly make the policy rule time
inconsistent, which is an unattractive feature that risks damaging its credibility.
24
5.3 Commitment from the timeless perspective
An optimal commitment made at a specific date has been seen to prescribe a rule which treats intrinsic
inflation differently depending on whether it has already taken root prior to the adoption of the rule, or has
arisen afterwards. This creates a time-inconsistency problem because if new intrinsic inflation occurs after
the commitment, a reconsideration of the rule at a later date will propose that the new intrinsic inflation
be accommodated, contrary to the stiffer response called for by the original rule. The revised rule will also
want to wipe the slate clean in terms of past misses of the inflation target.
One resolution of the time-inconsistency problem of optimal monetary policy commitments has been
suggested by Woodford (2003). A commitment made from the timeless perspective permits no special
treatment of the initial period in which the rule is adopted. This works by making a binding commitment
to minimize the loss function from some point in time onwards, but subject to a finite number of constraints
on the values of the target variables during a transitional period. And crucially, these constraints must
themselves be of the same time-consistent form as is optimal for the future paths of the target variables.
Thus a policy rule that is optimal from the timeless perspective is one in which if the policymaker were
initially forced to ensure that the target variables move in accordance with the rule, it would be optimal
to adopt the same rule (and the same evolution of the target variables) in all future periods.
One feature of this equilibrium concept is that there are frequently multiple timelessly optimal paths
for the target variables. However, Woodford shows that these timelessly optimal equilibria differ from each
other only by a deterministic component that eventually approaches zero as time passes. Rather than
attempt to characterize all possible timelessly optimal rules, the following result focuses on one particular
class that emerges as the natural generalization of Theorem 2 for t0–commitment.
Theorem 3 Suppose the policymaker aims to maximize (2.6.1) and sets policy subject to the behaviour
of profit-maximizing firms as characterized in Lemma 4. If the policymaker is constrained for the first m
periods by the necessity of inflation evolving in accordance with a function of the history of inflation and
relative prices Ht and the current exogenous state vector then the resulting timelessly optimal equilibrium
can be implemented by the following targeting rule:
pit +
1
ε
yt = pi∗t − (Pt−1 − P∗t−1) (5.3.1)
The optimal price-level path {P∗t } is composed of the sum of P¯, an arbitrarily chosen long-run target, and
P∗∗t , which is related to the inflation target pi∗t defined in equation (4.3.9) of Proposition 5 according to
P∗∗t − P∗∗t−1 = pi∗t and depends only on the exogenous efficient cost-push shocks {℘t}.
Proof. See appendix D.3. 
This targeting rule can also be characterized as a flexible inflation target, just like the intermediate
targets for discretion and t0–commitment in (5.1.1) and (5.2.1). As before, the weights attached to the
target variables are unaffected by the shape of the hazard functions, and are the same as those found to be
optimal under discretion and t0–commitment. However, it is apparent from the right-hand side of (5.3.1)
that the history dependence of the level of the flexible inflation target is different from those earlier results.
The most striking difference is the complete absence of any intrinsic inflation term. This means that the
policymaker should resist the temptation to accommodate intrinsic inflation at all times, no matter when it
arose. Furthermore, the targeting rule has the property that any failure of inflation to be on target in the
past leads to an adjustment to the level of the inflation target in the present, which effectively stabilizes
the price level in the long run. As discussed in section 5.2, the rule optimal for a t0–commitment looks
at inflation target deviations only from t0 onwards. But since the timeless-perspective policy cannot make
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reference to a specific start date it achieves the same result by looking at the past deviation of the price
level from some long-run target path. Over time, this gap will grow wider whenever inflation misses its
target since the evolution of the long-run target path {P∗t } is completely exogenous.
The timeless-perspective targeting rule (5.3.1) is also the simplest of the three intermediate targets
(5.1.1), (5.2.1) and (5.3.1). The only component of rule that requires knowledge of the pattern of price
adjustment is the exogenous series {pi∗t } for the long-run level of the inflation target. As is shown in
Proposition 5, time variation in pi∗t arises only because of differences in the speed of price adjustment
between industries coupled with the presence of different technology shocks hitting each industry. If either
of these features is absent, a constant and zero long-run inflation target is optimal.
6 Discussion
6.1 Some examples of specific price setting models
A number of specific price-setting models are now considered to illustrate the similarities and differences
between the optimal policy prescriptions of section 5 in the cases of discretion and commitment, and to
compare these with existing work on optimal monetary policy. The models cover a range of assumptions
about the shape of the hazard function for price adjustment, and the variation in hazard functions across
industries. The extent to which the models exhibit intrinsic inflation persistence differs accordingly as well.
Example 1 (Identical flat hazard functions for each industry) This case occurs where there is one single
probability of price adjustment that applies to all firms at all times, that is, αij = α. This is of course the
well-known Calvo (1983) model of price setting, leading to the New Keynesian Phillips curve:3
pit = ℵ
∞∑
j=0
βjEt[ηxyt+j + ηt+j ]
The Phillips curve given above is a special case of equation (4.1.3). The key point to note about this model
is its prediction of the complete absence of any intrinsic inflation persistence. Inflation is an exclusively
forward-looking variable, depending only on current and expected future output gaps and cost-push shocks.
Therefore, the impulse response function p(j) of intrinsic inflation, defined in section 4.2, is equal to 0 for
all j ≥ 1.
The welfare implications of this Calvo pricing model are derived by Woodford (2003). He shows that
the utility-based loss function (4.3.5) is given by the following expression,
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
ηx
ε
y2τ +
1
ℵpi
2
τ
]
Note that this has the same form as the “ad hoc” quadratic loss functions widely used in the optimal policy
literature, though the weights on the two target variables are pinned down precisely by the parameters of
the model. All that matters for households’ welfare is the deviation of aggregate output from its efficient
level and the deviation of inflation from its long-run target value of zero.
Woodford also derives the intermediate targets (5.1.1), (5.2.1) and (5.3.1) for this model, corresponding
3This is just the usual expression for the New Keynesian Phillips curve, pit = βEtpit+1 + ℵ(ηxyt + ηt), solved forward.
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to the cases of discretion, t0–commitment and timeless perspective commitment respectively,
Discretion : pit +
1
ε
yt = 0
t0–commitment : pit +
1
ε
yt = −
t−1∑
τ=t0
piτ
Timeless perspective : pit +
1
ε
yt = P¯− Pt−1
where the form of these expressions and the notation have been modified slightly to make them comparable
with the results of this paper in Theorems 1–3. The discretionary target is a classic flexible inflation target
with no time variation or history dependence in the level of the target. This is because there is no intrinsic
inflation to accommodate, and no efficient cost-push shocks because all industries have the same speed of
price adjustment. The t0–commitment modifies the flexible inflation target by adjusting the current level
of the target in line with past inflation target deviations. Since the long-run inflation target is zero, the
cumulative overshoot of the target is obtained by summing actual inflation rates from t0 up to the period
before the current one. There is no intrinsic inflation prevailing at time t0 to accommodate and no efficient
cost-push shock. Similarly, the only modification to the flexible inflation target for the timeless-perspective
commitment is that it is necessary to take account of the past price-level deviation from a constant long-run
target.
Example 2 (Identical upward-sloping hazard functions for each industry) This case maintains the homo-
geneity of the pricing hazard function across industries as in Example 1, but supposes that newer prices are
stickier than older prices, resulting in an upwards-sloping hazard function. It is shown in Sheedy (2007b)
that there exists a first-order recursive representation (2.4.6) in which the hazard function is upwards
sloping everywhere, that is, αj < αj+1. Since m = 1, there is one lag of inflation in the Phillips curve
(4.1.3):
pit = γpit−1 + ℵ
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
1− γj+1
1− γ
)
Et[ηxyt+j + ηt+j ]
By appealing to Theorem 1 of Sheedy (2007b), the upward-sloping hazard function implies γ > 0. Therefore,
this price setting model exhibits positive intrinsic inflation persistence, as can be seen either from this
positive coefficient on lagged inflation or the impulse response function p(j) of intrinsic inflation, which is
positive everywhere, that is p(j) > 0 for all j ≥ 1.
The presence of intrinsic inflation persistence means that disinflation cannot be achieved costlessly even
once the factors giving rise to it have dissipated. But the presence of intrinsic inflation also changes the
form of the utility-based loss function (4.3.5). This is modified by including the deviation of inflation from
the current level of intrinsic inflation, rather than just the rate of inflation itself:
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
ηx
ε
y2τ +
1
ℵ(piτ − γpiτ−1)
2
]
As a consequence, some of the optimal policy implications are altered relative to the case of a flat hazard
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function. The intermediate targets in equations (5.1.1), (5.2.1), and (5.3.1) now become:
Discretion : pit +
1
ε
yt = γpit−1
t0–commitment : pit +
1
ε
yt = γt−t0+1pit0−1 −
t−1∑
τ=t0
(piτ − γτ−t0+1pit0−1)
Timeless perspective : pit +
1
ε
yt = P¯− Pt−1
Notice that both discretion and t0–commitment accommodate some intrinsic inflation. For discretion, it is
all intrinsic inflation present at time t; for t0–commitment, it is only the intrinsic inflation that prevailed
at t0, the date when the commitment came into force. As the timeless perspective commitment ignores
all intrinsic inflation, its targeting rule has the same form as that in Example 1 for a flat hazard function.
There are no efficient cost-push shocks to accommodate in any of these cases because all industries share
the same hazard function.
Example 3 (Different flat hazard function for each industry) Here the second key assumption of Example
1 is relaxed, while the first one is maintained. The hazard function is now allowed to vary across industries,
but unlike the case considered in Example 2, these hazard functions are all required to be flat. Formally,
the price-adjustment probabilities in (2.4.1) are such that αij = αi for all j, and αi 6= αj if i 6= j. The
precise distribution of the price-adjustment probabilities across the n industries is left unspecified. To aid
comparison with Examples 1 and 2 it is assumed that all industries have identical technology (Ait = At) so
ρ∗t = 0. The Phillips curve (4.1.3) in this case is given by:
pit = ω′Λρt−1 + ω′ℵ
∞∑
j=0
βjΛjEt[ηxωyt+j + ηΩt+j ]
Intrinsic inflation persistence here comes from the one lag of the relative price vector ρt. There are no lags
of economy-wide inflation. This does not mean, however, that intrinsic inflation persistence is irrelevant
when considering economy-wide shocks. When the speed of price adjustment varies across industries then
a given economy-wide shock leads to a range of price responses in different industries and hence affects
relative prices. In the next period, this perturbation of the past relative price vector puts limits on how
quickly inflation can return to its long-run level without aggregate output deviating from its efficient level.
The properties of this model have been studied extensively in Sheedy (2007a). In particular, it has
been shown that the intrinsic inflation persistence presence in this model is of a somewhat peculiar form.
The impulse response function of intrinsic inflation satisfies p(j) < 0 for all j ≥ 1, that is, there is negative
intrinsic persistence. In other words, there is a tendency for inflation to overshoot its average level after a
shock. However, in spite of this unusual behaviour of intrinsic inflation, the analysis developed in section
5 still applies. At no stage was it necessary to impose restrictions on the shape of the impulse response
function of intrinsic inflation.
The utility-based loss function can easily be obtained from equation (4.3.5),
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[ηx
ε
y2τ + (pit − (Λ− I)ρt−1)′ℵ−1(pit − (Λ− I)ρt−1)
]
and the optimal intermediate targets (5.1.1), (5.2.1), and (5.3.1) for the cases of discretion, t0–commitment,
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and timeless–perspective commitment respectively are:
Discretion : pit +
1
ε
yt = ω′Λρt−1
t0–commitment : pit +
1
ε
yt = ω′Λt−t0−1ρt0−1 −
t−1∑
τ=t0
(piτ − ω′Λτ−t0−1ρt0−1)
Timeless perspective : pit +
1
ε
yt = P¯− Pt−1
As before, all intrinsic inflation prevailing at time t is fully accommodated with discretion. When a t0–
commitment is made, only existing intrinsic inflation as of period t0 is accommodated. And the targeting
rule used for the timeless–perspective commitment ignores intrinsic inflation completely, and has exactly
the same form as in Examples 1 and 2.
6.2 Relation to other analyses of optimal monetary policy
In recent years the problem of optimal monetary policy has attracted an increasing amount of research.4
This section will make a brief attempt to point out the key differences in assumptions and conclusions this
paper has in comparison with some of that work.
6.2.1 Inflation bias and stabilization bias
It is first necessary to mention a classic issue in monetary policy analysis that has been neglected in this
paper. Since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), the rules versus
discretion debate in monetary policy analysis has often been conducted around the issue of the inflation
bias. An inflation bias occurs when a policymaker with discretion tries to engineer a surprise inflation to
raise aggregate output to its efficient level. This course of action is thought desirable because the level of
output that would otherwise prevail (even after prices or expectations have fully adjusted) is below the
efficient level. An inflation bias results because the public rationally foresees this policy and raises its
expectations of inflation, thus robbing the policymaker of the ability to use a surprise change in monetary
policy to achieve this end, but nonetheless leading to a ratcheting up of actual inflation. A desirable feature
of a monetary policy rule is thus to commit to a lower average level of inflation than would prevail with
discretion. The problem is absent from the model in this paper because the wage-bill subsidy assumed here
eliminates the gap between the natural and efficient levels of aggregate output on average.
In some versions of the model of the inflation bias, such as that of Barro and Gordon, once a commitment
to a lower level of inflation is successfully made, all the drawbacks of discretionary policy are eliminated.
The problem is thus relatively simple to resolve in principle, though possibly difficult in practice. However, it
has been frequently pointed out that eliminating the inflation bias is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for a policy rule to be optimal in a wider class of Phillips curve models. Not only does the average level of
inflation differ for an optimal commitment relative to discretion, but so too must the response to shocks.
This issue is referred to as the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy, and has been analysed
by Clarida et al. (1999); Jonsson (1997); Svensson (1997) and Woodford (2003) among others. It arises
because a monetary policy rule is able to steer the public’s expectations about the future after a shock has
occurred in a way that would not be credible if the policymaker had the discretion to change course later.
The characterization of the optimal commitment highlighted in this paper refers to the features of a policy
rule that ensure the stabilization bias of discretionary policymaking is removed. Removing the inflation
4For a flavour of this see the papers of Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999); Khan, King and Wolman (2003); Kollmann (2004);
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) as well as Woodford (2003).
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bias by means of a wage-bill subsidy allows attention to be focused on the issue of the stabilization bias,
which has so far received less attention.
6.2.2 The objectives of firms and the policymaker
In relation to other work concerned with the appropriate response of monetary policy to shocks, most of
the major differences with this paper can be reduced to the assumptions made about the objectives of the
policymaker and of firms, and the extent to which these agents rationally pursue those objectives. Tradi-
tionally, optimal monetary policy has been defined with respect to a quadratic loss function including, at
least, inflation and output (or unemployment) deviations from some desirable levels.5 That these variables
do correspond to the implicit or explicit goals of many central banks and governments is not to be denied,
but for a normative analysis of policy, it should not be assumed that a loss function taking this form is auto-
matically congruent with the welfare of households in the economy. Since the pioneering work of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998) and Woodford (2003), many of the technical challenges in deriving utility-based loss
functions have been overcome for some of the models typically used in monetary policy analysis. And in
at least one case it is found that the utility-based loss function has the same form as the usual “ad hoc”
quadratic loss function (albeit with the weights precisely pinned down by the parameters of the model).
However, it can be seen from Proposition 3 that this is not a general feature of all time-dependent pricing
models. While the output gap appears as normal in equation (4.3.5), the inflation rate must be replaced
by its deviation from the current level of intrinsic inflation and efficient cost-push shocks. Thus whenever
intrinsic inflation persistence is present, the “ad hoc” loss function will not coincide with the utility-based
loss function.
Analogous to differences in the extent to which the policymaker maximizes the welfare of households,
there is also a range of assumptions in the literature about the extent to which firms maximize profits when
they set prices. In this paper it is supposed that firms are always forward looking and rational in seeking to
maximize profits whenever they set a new price. The fact that firms are forward-looking profit maximizers
does not prevent the Phillips curve having a “backward-looking” component. Intrinsic inflation persistence
is introduced by relaxing the assumption of Calvo pricing, namely that the pricing hazard function is flat
(and the same for all industries). But it should be stressed that the most popular way of introducing such
persistence into the standard New Keynesian model actually takes the opposite approach, maintaining the
Calvo pricing assumption but relaxing the requirement of profit maximization (at least for some group of
firms).
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) posit a “rule of thumb” that is used by a certain fraction of firms to set
prices, with the remaining firms continuing to be forward-looking profit maximizers. The rule of thumb is
backward looking and does not maximize profits in general. The optimal policy implications of this idea are
analysed by Steinsson (2003). As in the work by Woodford, Steinsson is careful to base the policymaker’s
loss function on the level of household utility implied by the model. But because of the rule of thumb,
some firms are not maximizing profits when they set their prices, and thus the analysis of the extent of
market failure and the extent of disagreement between firms and the policymaker in Propositions 3 and 4
breaks down. The rule of thumb actually creates an additional market failure that would not be present
in an economy with imperfect competition and price stickiness alone. This leads to differences in policy
implications compared with this paper, even though the extent of intrinsic inflation persistence may be
similar. One difference that is apparent is the optimal commitment in Steinsson’s work does not fully
correct for past failures to hit the inflation target.
5Several papers making this assumption are found in Taylor (1999).
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6.2.3 Heterogeneity in price adjustment and the optimal weighting of the price index
The case where some firms’ prices are stickier than others on average has been considered in work by Aoki
(2001) and Benigno (2004). One of the findings of those studies is that the overall inflation rate that
is relevant for the welfare of households should be weighted in favour of those prices which are stickier.
This prescription essentially argues for the use of a core inflation measure to guide monetary policy. In
this paper, price stickiness can vary between industries, but the aggregate inflation rate appearing in the
intermediate targets is weighted solely on the basis of the relative sizes of different industries.
It is possible to reconcile this with the findings of Aoki and Benigno by noting that this paper considers
a case in which differences in price stickiness do not create a need for the weights to be adjusted. This case
depends on assuming that the inter-industry elasticity of substitution is the same as the steady-state within-
industry elasticities of substitution, though when the economy is not in the steady state these elasticities
can of course differ. This is done purely in the interests of keeping the analysis as simple as possible,
but it does show that both heterogeneity in price-adjustment probabilities and differences in elasticities of
substitution are needed to obtain the core inflation result.
6.2.4 Targeting rules and instrument rules
The policy implications of this paper take the form of targeting rules for monetary policy rather than
instrument rules. A targeting rule is a requirement for the policymaker to adjust the monetary policy
instrument until some given criterion is satisfied, whereas an instrument rule is a specific mapping from
observable economic variables to the monetary policy instrument. This distinction is discussed further in
Svensson (1999). Targeting rules are used here because it is generally not possible to find one instrument rule
which is optimal for a broad range of models of price stickiness. Different parameterizations of the hazard
functions for price adjustment will lead to different instrument rules being optimal, as would differences in
many other factors such as the combination of exogenous shocks hitting the economy. Another advantage of
targeting rules here is their relative simplicity even when fully optimal. An optimal instrument rule designed
to apply to just one price-setting model will often need a very complicated expression. The complexity of
optimal instrument rules has led some to consider optimal simple instrument rules, where the instrument
rule is constrained to depend linearly on a restricted subset of variables. An example of work in this area
is Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b). On the other hand, this paper has shown that there may be simple
optimal targeting rules that apply to a wide range of models, even when these models potentially feature
a huge number of free parameters.
It should be stressed however that this paper has focused on the implications of price stickiness for
optimal monetary policy and has excluded many other potentially relevant factors. Papers such as Khan
et al. (2003); Kollmann (2004); Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) also consider other features such as
transaction frictions, wage-stickiness, capital goods and investment in addition to price stickiness. But
while adding any of these features to the model may change the optimal targeting rule, it is unlikely to
remove completely the differences between the optimal targeting rule and the optimal discretionary policy
highlighted here. Thus by focusing on one particular aspect of the optimal monetary policy problem, a
precise analytical characterization of the differences between commitment and discretion when prices are
sticky is obtained, which also helps to provide some intuitive understanding of why these differences are
found. It avoids the problems of understanding and interpreting results that arise from the “black-box” of
a numerical solution of a calibrated model with many different features.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has analysed optimal monetary policy in a model of time-dependent pricing that imposes no
restrictions on how the probability of price adjustment depends on the number of periods a price has
remained fixed for. In addition, there is no restriction on the amount of heterogeneity in these price-
adjustment probabilities between industries. Taking this widest possible range of time-dependent pricing
models, it has been shown that certain principles of optimal monetary policy apply to all of them. In the
three cases of complete discretion over policy, commitment to a targeting rule from a specific initial date
onwards, and commitment from the timeless perspective, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for
an intermediate target that implements the best policy. This intermediate target always takes the form of a
flexible inflation target. Interest rates should be adjusted to ensure that a weighted average of the inflation
rate and the output gap reaches a target value. The weights attached to these two variables depend only
on the average amount of price competition in the economy and are otherwise the same for all the models
of price adjustment considered.
The differences between monetary policy with discretion, commitment from some initial date, and
timeless-perspective commitment are apparent in the generally time-varying level the flexible inflation
target is set at. In general, the current inflation target should be history dependent in all three cases,
but the nature of this history dependence changes radically as the scope for discretionary action varies. It
is always optimal for a policymaker with complete discretion to accommodate fully any intrinsic inflation
persistence by revising up the inflation target one-for-one with any rise in current intrinsic inflation. In
other words, if current inflation has a tendency to be too high as a result of high inflation in the past, and
if the only way to avoid this is a tightening of monetary policy which would have a deleterious effect on
the output gap, then the policymaker should passively accept this higher level of inflation.
But once binding commitments are allowed, the policymaker finds it optimal to resist accommodating
intrinsic inflation persistence. An optimal targeting rule that comes into force after some initial date
will stop the policymaker accommodating any intrinsic inflation that arises subsequent to the initial date.
However, at the same time it should also accommodate intrinsic inflation which is present when the rule
came into force. The asymmetric treatment of intrinsic inflation depending on whether it arises before or
after the commitment is made makes the optimal commitment time-inconsistent. If the choice of rule is
constrained to be time-consistent by considering the optimal commitment from the timeless perspective,
then it is found that no intrinsic inflation should be accommodated, irrespective of when it arose.
A second difference between discretion and commitment is in the response to deviations of inflation
from the level of the flexible inflation target in the past. With discretion, it is optimal to pay no attention
to these past deviations. On the other hand, if a binding commitment is feasible, the policymaker finds it
optimal to revise the current level of the flexible inflation target in response to past deviations of inflation
from the target. The policymaker takes the cumulative overshoot of inflation relative to target since the
rule came into force and subtracts this from the target that would otherwise be used. But like the response
to intrinsic inflation, this privileges the initial date on which the rule is introduced and thus is not time
consistent. If time consistency is enforced, the policymaker chooses a long-run price level target and uses
the past deviation of prices from this target to adjust the current level of the target. This has the same
effect of punishing excessively high inflation in the past with a tighter inflation target today.
The broad applicability of these results comes from a careful analysis of the market failures to which
the economy is subject and extent to which these can be mitigated by policy intervention. The paper thus
approches the optimal monetary policy problem from the perspective of public economics. When firms are
profit maximizers, the scope for intervening to correct distortions can be judged by asking whether firms
and the policymaker would currently be in agreement were all prices in the economy perceived to be fully
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flexible. This is true even though price stickiness can itself be a cause of relative-price distortions. The
finding allows simple targeting rules to be drawn up which are optimal for a very wide range of models of
price stickiness.
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A Steady state and log linearizations
This section gives more details about the steady state around which the equations of section 3 are log-
linearized. The steady state features flexible (or fully adjusted) prices, zero inflation, symmetry across
industries, and is also Pareto efficient. In what follows, a bar above a variable denotes its steady-state
value.
The steady-state level of technology common to all industries is some exogenous value A¯ > 0, and the
common steady-state elasticity of substitution ε > 1 is also given. Starting from this point, steady-state
output Y¯ , consumption C¯, real wage w¯, hours worked H¯, and real marginal cost C¯Y can be calculated. Any
variables that refer to money prices have no steady-state value, but the (gross) inflation rate has steady-
state value Π¯ = 1, and because all industries are treated symmetrically and prices are fully adjusted, the
steady-state relative price is %¯ = 1.
The production function (2.3.1), the first-order condition for optimal labour supply (2.1.2), the ex-
pression for real marginal cost (2.3.2), and the goods market clearing condition (2.5.1) respectively imply
that:
Y¯ = A¯H¯ηyh ,
vh(H¯)
uc(C¯)
= w¯ , C¯Y = w¯Y¯
1−ηyh
ηyh
ηyhA¯
1
ηyh
, C¯ = Y¯ (A.0.1)
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Equation (2.1.3) determines the steady-state value of the asset-pricing kernel M¯τ |t as a function only of
the gap between τ and t and households’ subjective discount factor β:
M¯τ |t = βτ−t (A.0.2)
Using the above, equation (2.6.2), and the steady-state (gross) inflation rate Π¯ = 1, the steady-state gross
nominal interest rate is I¯ = 1/β. This steady-state interest rate is strictly positive as required.
As all prices are flexible or fully adjusted, the derivative of the profit function (2.3.4) with respect
to its own relative price must be zero in the steady state. From equation (3.2.2), and using (A.0.1),
z%(%¯; %¯, Y¯ , A¯, w¯, ε) = 0 implies (
ε
ε−1
)
(1− s)Y¯
1−ηyh
ηyh vh(H¯)
ηyhA¯
1
ηyh uc(Y¯ )
= 1 (A.0.3)
where s is the government’s wage-bill subsidy.
There are no steady-state values for reset prices because these are expressed in terms of money. But
the steady-state value of a reset price relative to other prices, denoted r¯, does exist. Using the assumption
Π¯ = 1 together with %¯ = 1 and equations (2.2.4) and (3.2.10), it is clear that r¯ = 1.
The additional requirement of Pareto efficiency means that the steady-state ratio of the marginal utility
of leisure to the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal product of labour. These can be
obtained from utility function (2.1.1) and production function (2.3.1), leading to the following efficiency
condition:
vh(H¯)
uc(Y¯ )
=
ηyhA¯
1
ηyh
Y¯
1−ηyh
ηyh
(A.0.4)
By comparing (A.0.3) and (A.0.4), the twin requirements of prices being fully adjusted and the steady-
state being Pareto efficient necessitate a wage-bill subsidy s that satisfies
(
ε
ε−1
)
(1− s) = 1. It is clear that
setting s = ε−1 ensures both requirements are met. As ε > 1, the resulting subsidy satisfies the inequality
0 < s < 1, so is always well defined. This fully characterizes the steady state.
Having established the steady state, now the log-linearizations of the equations of the model are derived.
In what follows, unless otherwise stated, log-deviations of variables from their steady-state values are
denoted using sans serif letters. When the variable in question has no steady-state value (for instance, any
money price) the sans serif letter denotes just the logarithm of the variable. So for example, Ait ≡ logAit−
log A¯ is the log-deviation of technology in industry i from its steady-state value. Then it is defined to be the
log-deviation of the (gross) desired markup from its steady-state value, that is, it ≡ log
(
εit
εit−1
)
−log
(
ε
ε−1
)
.
The variables Ait and it are the only exogenous shocks introduce into the model, and so in principle, all
the log-deviations of the endogenous variables can be expressed in terms of them. If each industry-specific
shock is collected into n × 1 vectors At and t, then the 2n × 1 vector υt ≡ ( A′t , ′t )′ contains all the
exogenous shocks. Where it is necessary to indicate it, terms of order k in υt are denoted by O(||υt||k). In
the log-linearizations that follow, second- and higher-order terms are suppressed.
The log-linearized version of the first-order condition (2.1.2) for the optimal supply of labour of type ı
is
ηwhHt(ı) + ηicCt = wt(ı) , ηic ≡ − C¯ucc(C¯)
uc(C¯)
> 0 , ηwh ≡ H¯vhh(H¯)
vh(H¯)
> 0 (A.0.5)
where the coefficients ηic and ηwh are strictly positive because the utility function u(·) is strictly increasing
and concave, and the function v(·) is strictly increasing and convex. And the log-linearization of first-order
condition (2.1.3) is
mτ |t = ηic(Cτ − Ct) (A.0.6)
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where the positive coefficient ηic is defined in (A.0.5) above. Log-linear approximations of the industry
price level and aggregate price level indices defined in (2.2.2) and (2.2.4) are given by:
Pit =
1
ωi
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
Pt(ı, )ddı , Pt =
n∑
i=1
ωiPit (A.0.7)
The production function (2.3.1) for a firm (ı, ) in industry i is
Yt(ı, ) = Ait + ηyhHt(ı, ) (A.0.8)
when log-linearized. The log-linear approximation of real marginal cost (2.3.2) for firm (ı, ) in industry i
with production function (A.0.8) is denoted by xt(ı, ):
xt(ı, ) = wt(ı) +
1− ηyh
ηyh
Yt(ı, )− 1
ηyh
Ait (A.0.9)
This firm also faces the following log-linearized demand function (2.3.3) for its product:
Yt(ı, ) = −ε(Pt(ı, )− Pt) + Yt (A.0.10)
Finally, the goods market clearing conditions in (2.5.1) simply become:
Ct(ı, ) = Yt(ı, ) , Cit = Yit , Ct = Yt ,
∫
Ω
Ht(ı, )d = Ht(ı) (A.0.11)
This provides all the basic log linearizations necessary to obtain the results in section 3.
B Proofs of lemmas
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The equations characterizing the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources (the one that gives all households
equal consumption) are given as a block in (3.1.1). The log-linearizations of the production function
(3.1.1a), demand curve (3.1.1b), and labour supply curve (3.1.1c) are shown in equations (A.0.8), (A.0.10)
and (A.0.5) respectively,
Y∗it = Ait + ηyhH
∗
it (B.1.1a)
Y∗it = −ερ∗it + Y∗t (B.1.1b)
ηwhH
∗
it + ηicY
∗
t = w
∗
it (B.1.1c)
where the resource constraint in (A.0.11) has also been used. The steady state around which these ap-
proximations are made is described in appendix A. The output aggregator (3.1.1d) can be log-linearized as
follows:
Y∗t =
n∑
i=1
ωiY
∗
it (B.1.1d)
Finally, the real marginal cost and relative price condition (3.1.1e) and be log-linearized using the result
from equation (A.0.9):
ρ∗it = w
∗
it +
(
1− ηyh
ηyh
)
Y∗it −
1
ηyh
Ait (B.1.1e)
By solving linear equations (B.1.1a)–(B.1.1d) the solutions Y∗t = ηyAt and ρ∗it = −ηρ(Ait − At) are
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obtained, where At ≡
∑n
i=1 ωiAit denotes the weighted average of Ait across industries, and ηy and ηρ are
the following positive coefficients:
ηy ≡ 1 + ηwh1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic , ηρ ≡
1 + ηwh
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε (B.1.2)
This proves the claim of the lemma.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The aim is to obtain a second-order approximation to the average lifetime utility of all households from
period t onwards, denoted by Ut in equation (2.6.1). This welfare function is broken down first into utility
accruing to a single household (ı, ) at a point in time t, denoted by Ut(ı, ). This is defined with reference
to the household utility function (2.1.1):
Ut(ı, ) ≡ u(ct(ı, ))− v(ht(ı, )) (B.2.1)
It has been argued in section 2.1 that the existence of complete asset markets leads to full consumption
insurance, so ct(ı, ) = Ct for all (ı, ). As a result, from (2.1.2), all households supplying the same labour
input ı (and hence receiving the same wage) choose to supply the same number of hours, ht(ı, ) = Ht(ı) for
all . A second-order accurate approximation of the utility function in (B.2.1) in terms of the log-deviations
of consumption Ct and hours Ht(ı) is
Ut(ı, ) = U¯ + C¯uc
(
Ct − (ηic − 1)2 C
2
t
)
− H¯vh
(
Ht(ı) +
(1 + ηwh)
2
H2t (ı)
)
+O(||υt||3) (B.2.2)
where U¯ is the steady-state value of utility function (B.2.1) and O(||υt||3) refers to terms that are third-
order or higher in the exogenous shocks υt as described in appendix A. The positive parameters ηic and
ηwh are defined in equation (A.0.5), and the constants uc and vh denote partial derivatives of the functions
u(·) and v(·) evaluated at steady-state consumption C¯ and hours H¯ as given in appendix A.
The next step is find an approximation of the average utility Ut accruing to all households in one time
period t, which is defined as:
Ut ≡
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
Ut(ı, )ddı (B.2.3)
The goods market equilibrium condition (2.5.1) implies that C¯ = Y¯ , and in log-linear terms from (A.0.11),
Ct = Yt. The efficiency condition (A.0.4) for the steady state and the production function in (A.0.1)
mean that H¯ = ηyhY¯ . Hence, averaging (B.2.2) over all households (ı, ) yields the following second-order
approximation of (B.2.3),
Ut = U¯ + Y¯ uc
(
Yt − (ηic − 1)2 Y
2
t − ηyh
n∑
i=1
∫
Ωi
{
Ht(ı) +
(1 + ηwh)
2
H2t (ı)
}
dı
)
+O(||υt||3) (B.2.4)
where the integration over household hours worked has been broken down into blocks of labour types
associated with different industries. Substituting in the expression for the log-linearized production function
(A.0.8) and the labour-market equilibrium conditions in (A.0.11) into (B.2.4):
Ut = U¯ + Y¯ uc
(
Yt − (ηic − 1)2 Y
2
t
−
n∑
i=1
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
{
Yt(ı, )− Ait + (1 + ηwh)2ηyh (Yt(ı, )− Ait)
2
}
ddı
)
+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.5)
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A second-order approximation of the output aggregator Yt across industries in (2.5.2) is given by
Yt = EI [Yit] +
1
2
(
ε− 1
ε
)
VI [Yit] +O(||υt||3) (B.2.6)
where EI [·] denotes the cross-sectional weighted mean across the n industries, and VI [·] the inter-industry
cross-sectional variance. Similarly, the within-industry aggregator Yit in (2.5.2) can be approximated as
follows
Yit = EΩi [Yt(ı, )] +
1
2
(
εit − 1
εit
)
VΩi [Yt(ı, )] +O(||υt||3) (B.2.7)
where EΩi [·] and VΩi [·] denote the cross-sectional mean and variance within industry i. The variation over
time and across industries of the elasticity of substitution εit can be removed by noting εit = ε+O(||υt||).
It follows that εit/(εit − 1) = ε/(ε− 1) +O(||υt||) and so (B.2.7) becomes:
Yit = EΩi [Yt(ı, )] +
1
2
(
ε− 1
ε
)
VΩi [Yt(ı, )] +O(||υt||3) (B.2.8)
The second-order approximations of the across- and within-industry aggregators (B.2.6) and (B.2.8) can
be combined to produce:
Yt = EIEΩi [Yt(ı, )] +
1
2
(
ε− 1
ε
)
(VI [Yit] + EIVΩi [Yt(ı, )]) +O(||υt||3) (B.2.9)
The consolidated aggregator (B.2.9) can be substituted into the second-order approximation of Ut in
(B.2.5) to give
Ut = U¯ + Y¯ uc
(
EIEΩi [Yt(ı, )] +
1
2
(ε− 1)
ε
(VI [Yit] + EIVΩi [Yt(ı, )])−
(ηic − 1)
2
Y2t
− EIEΩi
[
(Yt(ı, )− Ait) + (1 + ηwh)2ηyh (Yt(ı)− Ait)
2
])
+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.10)
where the definitions of the cross-sectional expectation operators EI [·] and EΩi [·] have been used. By
simplifying (B.2.10) and introducing the notation “t.i.p.” for terms that are independent of monetary
policy, the following expression for Ut is obtained:
Ut = − Y¯ uc2
(
(ηic − 1)Y2t +
(1 + ηwh)
ηyh
EI [VΩi [Yt(ı, )] + (Yit − Ait)2]
+
(1− ε)
ε
(VI [Yit] + EIVΩi [Yt(ı, )])
)
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.11)
The definition of the cross-sectional variance operator VI [·] implies that EI [(·)2] = VI [·]+EI [·]2, so equation
(B.2.11) can be written as:
Ut = − Y¯ uc2
(
(ηic − 1)Y2t +
(1 + ηwh)
ηyh
(Yt − At)2 + (1− ε)
ε
VI [Yit] +
(1 + ηwh)
ηyh
VI [Yit − Ait]
+
(
(1− ε)
ε
+
(1 + ηwh)
ηyh
)
EIVΩi [Yt(ı, )]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.12)
The expression above is now written in terms of the Pareto-efficient levels of aggregate output Y∗t and
industry-specific output Y∗it. These can be obtained from the log-linearizations in (B.1.1b) and (B.1.2).
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Noting that both are terms which are independent of monetary policy, equation (B.2.12) can be restated
as:
Ut = − Y¯ uc2
(
(1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic)
ηyh
(Yt − Y∗t )2 +
(ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε)
ηyhε
VI [Yit − Y∗it]
+
(ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε)
ηyhε
EIVΩi [Yt(ı, )]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.13)
The demand curve for the products of industry i in (2.2.5) can be log-linearized as Yit = −ερit, where
the goods-market equilibrium conditions in (A.0.11) have also been used. Combining this with (B.1.1b),
the cross-sectional variance of the deviation of industry-specific outputs from their efficient levels is given
by
VI [Yit − Y∗it] = EI [{(Yit − Y∗it)− (Yt − Y∗t )}2] +O(||υt||3) = ε2EI [(ρit − ρ∗it)2] +O(||υt||3) (B.2.14)
where the efficient relative price ρ∗it is defined in (B.1.2). Likewise, the log-linearization of the individual
firm demand function in (A.0.10) shows that:
VΩi [Yt(ı, )] = ε
2VΩi [Pt(ı, )] +O(||υt||3) (B.2.15)
Putting equations (B.2.13), (B.2.14) and (B.2.15) together with the definition of the output gap, yt ≡
Yt − Y∗t , yields the following second-order approximation of Ut,
Ut = −ε(ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε)
ηyh
Y¯ uc
2
{ηx
ε
y2t + EI [(ρit − ρ∗it)2] + EIVΩi [Pt(ı, )]
}
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(B.2.16)
where the coefficient ηx is defined as ηx ≡ (1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic)/(ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε). By denoting
the cross-sectional variance of prices in industry i by σ2it ≡ VΩi [Pt(ı, )] and defining the coefficient η ≡
ηyh/(ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε), equation (B.2.16) can be expressed as:
Ut = − εY¯ uc2ηyhη
[
ηx
ε
y2t +
n∑
i=1
ωi({ρit − ρ∗it}2 + σ2it)
]
+ t.i.p. +O(||υt||3) (B.2.17)
Finally, lifetime utility averaged over all households Ut in (2.6.1) can be obtained from Ut given defini-
tions (B.2.1), (B.2.3) and (2.1.1):
Ut =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEtUτ (B.2.18)
By summing (B.2.17) over time, a second-order accurate approximation of average lifetime utility Ut is
obtained:
Ut = − εY¯ uc2ηyhη
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
ηx
ε
y2τ +
n∑
i=1
ωi({ρiτ − ρ∗iτ}2 + σ2iτ )
]
+ t.i.p. +O(||υt||3) (B.2.19)
This proves the result stated in the lemma.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The system of equations defining the profit-maximizing flexible relative price is given as the block (3.2.3).
The log-linearizations of the production function (3.2.3a), the demand function (3.2.3b), and the labour
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supply function (3.2.3c) can be taken from (A.0.8), (A.0.10), and (A.0.5) respectively:
Yˆit = Ait + ηyhHˆit (B.3.1a)
Yˆit = −ερˆit + Yt (B.3.1b)
ηwhHˆit + ηicYt = wˆit (B.3.1c)
Equation (3.2.3d) describing the profit-maximizing markup of price on marginal cost becomes
ρˆit = wˆit +
1− ηyh
ηyh
Yˆit − 1
ηyh
Ait (B.3.1d)
where (A.0.9) has been used. By solving linear equations (B.3.1a)–(B.3.1d) the following solution is ob-
tained:
ρˆit =
(
1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
)
Yt−
(
1 + ηwh
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
)
Ait+
(
ηyh
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
)
it (B.3.2)
The equation above can be restated in terms of the output gap yt ≡ Yt−Y∗t and efficient relative price ρ∗it,
as defined in Lemma 1, yielding ρˆit = ηxyt + ρ∗it + ηit with ηx and η defined by:
ηx ≡ 1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε , η ≡
ηyh
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε (B.3.3)
Therefore the result stated in the lemma is proved.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The first step in proving the result is to log-linearize the equations (3.2.8a)–(3.2.8c). This can be done by
using the log-linearizations of the production function, demand function, and labour supply equation in
(A.0.8), (A.0.10) and (A.0.5):
Yi,τ |t = Aiτ + ηyhHi,τ |t (B.4.1a)
Yi,τ |t = −ε(Rit − Pτ ) + Yτ (B.4.1b)
ηwhHi,τ |t + ηicYτ = wi,τ |t (B.4.1c)
The first-order condition for the profit-maximizing reset price (3.2.8d) can be log-linearized to produce
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tθi,τ−tEt
[
Rit − Pτ −
(
wi,τ |t +
1− ηyh
ηyh
Yˆi,τ |t −
1
ηyh
Aiτ
)
− iτ
]
= 0 (B.4.1d)
where the fact that Mτ |t = βτ−t +O(||υt||) and the definition it ≡ log(εit/(εit − 1))− log(ε/(ε− 1)) have
been used. The term in parentheses in (B.4.1d) is the real marginal cost at time τ of a firm in industry
i using a reset price chosen in period t. Using (B.4.1a)–(B.4.1c), the following expression for this real
marginal cost is obtained:
wi,τ |t +
1− ηyh
ηyh
Yˆi,τ |t −
1
ηyh
Aiτ = − ε
ηyh
(1− ηyh + ηwh)(Rit − Pτ )
+
(
1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh
)
Yτ −
(
1 + ηwh
ηyh
)
Aiτ
(B.4.2)
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This equation can be restated in terms of the output gap yt ≡ Yt − Y∗t using the definitions in (B.1.2):
wi,τ |t +
1− ηyh
ηyh
Yˆi,τ |t −
1
ηyh
Aiτ =− ε
ηyh
(1− ηyh + ηwh)(Rit − Pτ )
+
(
1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh
)
yτ +
(
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
ηyh
)
ρ∗iτ
(B.4.3)
By substituting (B.4.3) back into (B.4.1d) and rearranging terms, the following expression for the profit-
maximizing reset price is obtained:
Rit =
∞∑
τ=t
(
βτ−tθi,τ−t∑∞
j=0 β
jθij
)
Et
[
Pτ+
(
1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
)
yτ
+ ρ∗iτ +
(
ηyh
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
)
iτ
] (B.4.4)
Comparing this to the result in equation (B.3.3), the reset price can be written as a weighted average of
current and expected future profit-maximizing flexible prices:
Rit =
∞∑
τ=t
(
βτ−tθi,τ−t∑∞
j=0 β
jθij
)
Et[Pτ + ρˆiτ ] (B.4.5)
By noting the definition of sequence {ϑij}∞j=0 in (3.2.9), the result stated in the lemma is proved.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5
The first step in establishing the result is to obtain a second-order approximation of the profit function for a
single time period. Denote the profits made in period t by firm (ı, ) in industry i with relative price %t(ı, )
by Ft(ı, ) ≡ z(%t(ı, ); %it, Yt, Ait, wt(ı), εit). The profit function in (2.3.4) implies this can be written as
Ft(ı, ) = %t(ı, )Yt(ı, )− (1− s)C(Yt(ı, );Ait, wt(ı)) (B.5.1)
where output Yt(ı, ) is obtained from the demand function (2.3.3).
A second-order accurate approximation of the real revenue component of (B.5.1) around a symmetric
steady state (%¯(ı, ) = 1) is given by:
%t(ı, )Yt(ı, ) = Y¯ + Y¯
(
ρt(ı, ) + Yt(ı, ) +
1
2
(ρt(ı, ) + Yt(ı, ))2
)
+O(||υt||3) (B.5.2)
where O(||υt||3) refers to third-order and higher terms in the exogenous disturbances υt. By taking logs of
the demand function (2.3.3), the following exact expression is obtained:
Yt(ı, ) = −εitρt(ı, )− (ε− εit)ρit + Yt (B.5.3)
Note this expression includes the price elasticity of demand εit, which varies over time and across industries.
The log-deviation of the (gross) markup is denoted by it, so εit and it are related by it ≡ log(εit/(εit −
1))− log(ε/(ε− 1)). It follows that an approximate linear relationship between εit and it is given by:
εit = ε− ε(ε− 1)it +O(||υt||2) (B.5.4)
Hence, a second-order accurate expression for demand Yt(ı, ) can be obtained by combining (B.5.4) with
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(B.5.3):
Yt(ı, ) = −ερt(ı, ) + Yt + ε(ε− 1)(ρt(ı, )− ρit)it +O(||υt||3) (B.5.5)
By substituting (B.5.5) into (B.5.2) a second-order accurate expression for real revenue is obtained,
%t(ı, )Yt(ı, ) = Y¯
(
(1− ε)ρt(ı, ) + 12((1− ε)ρt(ı, ) + Yt)
2 − ε(1− ε)ρt(ı, )it
)
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.6)
where “t.i.d.” denotes terms that are independent of one individual firm’s pricing decision such as ρit and
Yt.
The second component of the profit function (B.5.1) is total real cost. The total cost function is given
in (2.3.2) and has the following second-order approximation,
C(Yt(ı, );Ait, wt(ı)) = ηyhY¯
(
1
ηyh
Yt(ı, ) +
1
2
(
wt(ı) +
1
ηyh
(Yt(ı, )− Ait)
)2)
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3) (B.5.7)
where the steady-state labour supply condition in (A.0.1) and efficiency condition (A.0.4) have been used
to deduce that w¯(Y¯ /A¯)1/ηyh = ηyhY¯ . By combining (B.5.7) with the approximation of the demand function
in (B.5.5) the following is obtained:
C(Yt(ı, );Ait, wt(ı)) = Y¯
(
− ερt(ı, ) + ηyh2
(
1
ηyh
(−ερt(ı, ) + Yt − Ait) + wt(ı)
)2
− ε(1− ε)ρt(ı, )it
)
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.8)
A second-order accurate approximation of profits Ft(ı, ) in (B.5.1) is obtained by combining the ap-
proximations of real revenue (B.5.6) and total real cost (B.5.8), and noting that the efficiency condition for
the steady state described in appendix A implies that 1− s = (ε− 1)/ε:
Ft(ı, ) =
Y¯
2
(
((1− ε)ρt(ı, ) + Yt)2 + ηyh(1− ε)
ε
(
1
ηyh
(−ερt(ı, )− Ait + Yt) + wt(ı)
)2
− 2(1− ε)ρt(ı, )it
)
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.9)
By expanding the brackets and collecting terms, the expression for profits in (B.5.9) can be simplified as
follows:
Ft(ı, ) =
(1− ε)Y¯
2
ρt(ı, )
((
1− ε+ ε
ηyh
)
ρt(ı, )− 2
(
1
ηyh
− 1
)
Yt
+ 2
1
ηyh
Ait − 2wt(ı)− 2it
)
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.10)
Noting that all of Yt, Ait, wt(ı) and it are independent of the pricing decision of any single firm, equation
42
(B.5.10) can be rewritten as:
Ft(ı, ) = − ηyh(ε− 1)Y¯2(ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε)
((
ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε
ηyh
)
ρt(ı, )−
(
1
ηyh
− 1
)
Yt +
1
ηyh
Ait
− wt(ı)− it
)2
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.11)
It is argued in section 2.4 that all firms using the same labour input ı will choose the same price, denoted
by Pt(ı) with corresponding relative price ρt(ı). This affects the determination of the real wage wt(ı), which
is found by solving equations wt(ı) = ηwhHt(ı) + ηicYt, Yt(ı) = Ait + ηyhHt(ı) and Yt(ı) = −ερt(ı) + Yt
obtained from log-linearizations (A.0.5), (A.0.8) and (A.0.10):
wt(ı) = −εηwh
ηyh
ρt(ı)− ηwh
ηyh
Ait +
(
ηwh
ηyh
+ ηic
)
Yt +O(||υt||2) (B.5.12)
Substituting the expression for the real wage in (B.5.12) into (B.5.11) produces a second-order approxim-
ation of the profits Ft(ı) made by a firm setting relative price ρt(ı):
Ft(ı) = − ηyh(ε− 1)Y¯2(ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε)
((
ηyh + (1− ηyh + ηwh)ε
ηyh
)
ρt(ı)−
(
1− ηyh + ηwh + ηyhηic
ηyh
)
Yt
+
(
1 + ηwh
ηyh
)
Ait − it
)2
+ t.i.d.+O(||υt||3)
(B.5.13)
By comparing the equation above to the expression for the profit-maximizing flexible relative price ρˆit given
in (B.3.2), equation (B.5.13) is equivalent to
Ft(ı) = − ηyh(ε− 1)Y¯2(ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε)η2
(ρt(ı)− ρˆit)2 + t.i.d.+O(||υt||3) (B.5.14)
where η is defined in (B.3.3).
When a firm in industry i is using a price at time τ chosen in period t, the level of profits is denoted by
Fi,τ |t ≡ z(Rit/Pτ ; %iτ , Yτ , Aiτ , wi,τ |t, εiτ ). From equation (B.5.14), the second-order approximation of this
level of profits is:
Fi,τ |t = −
ηyh(ε− 1)Y¯
2(ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε)η2
(Rit − Pτ − ρˆit)2 + t.i.d.+O(||υt||3) (B.5.15)
The function Fit defined in (3.2.6) represents the market value of profits earned by a firm in industry i
setting a price at time t over the period for which the price is in use. This function is sum of current and
expected future profits Fi,τ |t in (B.5.15):
Fit ≡
∞∑
τ=t
(θi,τ−t/θi0)Et[Mτ |tFi,τ |t] (B.5.16)
As the asset-pricing kernel Mτ |t satisfies Mτ |t = βτ−t +O(||υt||), a second-order approximation of Fit can
be obtained from equation (B.5.15) as follows:
Fit = − ηyh(ε− 1)Y¯2(ηyh + (1− ηyh)ε)η2
∞∑
τ=t
(
βτ−tθi,τ−t∑∞
j=0 β
jθij
)
Et[(Rit − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2] + t.i.d.+O(||υt||3) (B.5.17)
Comparing this with the definition of the sequence {ϑij}∞j=0 in (3.2.9) confirms that the statement of the
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lemma is true.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 6
The n× n matrix polynomial χ(z) introduced in (C.1.11) is constructed as follows,
χ(z) ≡ Ωf−1Υ (z) + ΩR (B.6.1)
where f and Υ (z) are defined in (C.1.7), and the matrixR in (C.1.9). The matrix polynomial Υ (z) is itself
defined in terms of Φ(z), which is a diagonal matrix polynomial built up from the sequences of recursive
coefficients {φij}m+1j=1 in (2.4.7). From (C.1.1) and (C.1.3), Φ(z) has degree m+ 1,
Φ(z) = I−
m+1∑
j=1
Φjzj , Φj ≡ diag{φ1j , . . . , φnj} (B.6.2)
and all the n × n matrices Φj are diagonal. Since Φ(z) has degree m + 1, equation (C.1.7) implies that
Υ (z) must have m+ 1 positive and negative powers of z:
Υ (z) =
m+1∑
j=−(m+1)
Υjzj (B.6.3)
All the Υj matrices are diagonal because all the Φj in (B.6.2) are diagonal. Using its definition in (C.1.7),
the matrix polynomial Υ (z) has the following property,
Υ (βz−1) = Φ(βz−1)Φ(β(βz−1)−1)−Φ(1)Φ(β) = Φ(z)Φ(βz−1)−Φ(1)Φ(β) = Υ (z) (B.6.4)
which since Υ (z) = Υ (z)′ means that Υ (z) is discounted para-Hermitian, that is, Υ (z) = Υ (βz−1)′.
Comparing (B.6.4) with (B.6.3), it follows that Υ−j = βjΥj . Therefore, Υ (z) can be written as:
Υ (z) =
m+1∑
j=1
Υjzj + Υ0 +
m+1∑
j=1
βjΥjz−j (B.6.5)
From the definition of χ(z) in (B.6.1), equation (B.6.5) implies that χ(z) also has m + 1 positive and
negative powers of z:
χ(z) =
m+1∑
j=1
χjz
j + χ0 +
m+1∑
j=1
βjχjz
−j , χj =
Ωf−1Υ0 + ΩR if j = 0Ωf−1Υj if j = 1, 2, . . . ,m+ 1 (B.6.6)
The formula forR in (C.1.9) implies that ΩR = Ω−ωω′, which is a symmetric matrix since Ω is diagonal.
Furthermore, f is diagonal, as are all of Υj . This means that all the χj matrices in (B.6.6) are symmetric.
Hence, the matrix polynomial χ(z) also has the discounted para-Hermitian property
χ(z) = χ(βz−1)′ (B.6.7)
for all z ∈ C\{0} that is claimed in the lemma.
In proving the second and third parts of the proposition it is useful to introduce the following n × n
matrix polynomial Q(z):
Q(z) ≡ Θ(z)Θ(βz−1)Θ(1)−1Θ(β)−1 (B.6.8)
Q(z) is stated in terms of Θ(z), which is itself defined in (C.1.3), and from (C.1.1) it can be seen to have
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infinitely many positive powers of z in general, each having a diagonal matrix as its coefficient:
Θ(z) =
∞∑
j=0
Θjzj , Θj ≡ diag{θ1j , . . . , θnj} (B.6.9)
It follows from (B.6.8) that Q(z) has infinitely many positive and negative powers of z, and each again has
a diagonal matrix coefficient:
Q(z) ≡
∞∑
j→−∞
Qjzj (B.6.10)
From its definition (B.6.8) and the fact that Θ(z) is a diagonal matrix polynomial, it is clear that Q(z) =
Q(βz−1), and so from (B.6.10) that Q−j = βjQj . It follows that Q(z) can be written in the form:
Q(z) = Q0 +
∞∑
j=1
Qj(zj + βjz−j) (B.6.11)
As each sequence {θij}∞j=0 is a probability distribution, all the matrices Θj in (B.6.9) are positive semi-
definite, Θ(1) = I and Θ(β) is a positive definite matrix. Moreover, equation (2.4.5) implies that Θ0 and
Θ1 are positive definite. Hence, all the matrices Qj are positive semi-definite and Q1 is positive definite.
From its definition (B.6.8) it is apparent that Q(1) = I, so (B.6.11) implies that the matrix Q0 is given by:
Q0 = I−
∞∑
j=1
Qj(1 + βj) (B.6.12)
Now consider the matrix polynomial Q(z) evaluated at some specific value of z ∈ C\{0}. Write this
number in polar form as z = |z|ei$, where i ≡ √−1, and |z| and $ are the modulus and argument of z
respectively. Since ei$ = cos$ + i sin$, the evaluated matrix polynomial Q(|z|ei$) can be split into real
and imaginary parts using (B.6.11):
Q(|z|ei$) =
Q0 + ∞∑
j=1
Qj(|z|j + βj |z|−j) cos(j$)
+ i
 ∞∑
j=1
Qj(|z|j − βj |z|−j) sin(j$)
 (B.6.13)
Using the definition of Υ (z) in (C.1.7) and the link between Θ(z) and Φ(z) in (C.1.4), the polynomial
Υ (z) can be expressed in terms of Q(z) and f using the definitions (C.1.7) and (B.6.8):
Υ (z) = f(Q(z)−1 − I) (B.6.14)
From the equations (B.6.1) and (C.1.9) defining χ(z) and R, the expression for Υ (z) in (B.6.14) can be
used to provide two alternative representations of χ(z):
χ(z) = ΩQ(z)−1(I−Q(z)) + ΩR , χ(z) = ΩQ(z)−1 − ωω′ (B.6.15)
Attention is now turned to establishing that χ(z) is positive definite if |z| = √β. The matrix Ω is
obviously positive definite since ωi > 0 for all i. Using (C.1.7) and (C.1.4) the diagonal matrix f is equal
to
f = (Θ(0)Θ(1)−1)(Θ(0)Θ(β)−1) (B.6.16)
The matrices Θ(1) = I and Θ(β) are known to be positive definite. Since θi0 > 0, so is Θ(0), implying
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that f too is positive definite. Next observe that R in (C.1.9) is idempotent,
R2 = (I− ιω′)2 = I− ιω′ − ιω′ + ι(ω′ι)ω′ = I− ιω′ = R (B.6.17)
because ω′ι = 1. Any idempotent matrix is automatically positive semi-definite.
The real component of Q(z) is denoted by <(Q(z)), and can be obtained from (B.6.12) and (B.6.13):
<(Q(z)) = I−
∞∑
j=1
{(1 + βj)− (|z|j + βj |z|−j) cos(j$)}Qj (B.6.18)
Because cos(j$) ≤ 1 for all $, and each matrix Qj is positive semi-definite, a matrix inequality for the
real component of Q(z) can be derived,
<(Q(z)) 5 I−
∞∑
j=1
(1− |z|j)(1− βj |z|−j)Qj (B.6.19)
where 5 signifies that the right-hand side is equal to the left-hand side plus some positive semi-definite
matrix. The imaginary component ofQ(z), denoted by =(Q(z)), is obtained in a similar way from (B.6.13):
=(Q(z)) =
∞∑
j=1
(|z|j − βj |z|−j) sin(j$)Qj (B.6.20)
Now it is shown that Q(z) is positive definite on the circle in the complex plane with radius √β. Set
|z| = √β and consider an arbitrary $. The restriction on the modulus of z implies that |z|j = βj |z|−j =
βj/2, which from the expression for the imaginary component of Q(z) in (B.6.20) means that =(Q(z)) = 0.
Furthermore, since βj/2 < 1 for all j = 1, 2, . . ., and all Qj are positive semi-definite with at least Q1 being
positive definite, the inequality in (B.6.19) implies that <(I −Q(z))  0, that is, the real component of
I −Q(z) is a positive definite matrix. Since the imaginary component of Q(z) is zero, =(I −Q(z)) = 0.
As I−Q(z) = <(I−Q(z)) + i=(I−Q(z)), the matrix I−Q(z) is positive definite whenever |z| = √β.
Next, note that the definition of Q(z) in (B.6.8) and the relationship between Θ(z) and Φ(z) given in
(C.1.4) imply that the inverse of the matrix polynomial Q(z) is equal to:
Q(z)−1 = Φ(z)Φ(βz−1) (B.6.21)
Let z† denote the complex conjugate of z, so z† = |z|e−i$. The inverse of z can be written in terms of
the complex conjugate as z−1 = (1/|z|2)z†. So when |z| = √β, βz−1 is equal to the complex conjugate z†.
Hence, using (B.6.21) and the definition of the diagonal matrix polynomial Φ(z) in (C.1.3):
Q(z)−1 = Φ(z)Φ(z†) = diag{φ1(z)φ1(z†), . . . , φn(z)φn(z†)} (B.6.22)
Because the coefficients in the polynomial φi(z) defined in (C.1.1) are real numbers, φi(z†) = φi(z)†. And
note that the product of any number with its conjugate, such as φi(z)φi(z)†, is non-negative and only equal
to zero when φi(z) = 0. This case can be ruled out by noting that |z| =
√
β < 1, which would imply that
φi(z) has a root strictly inside the unit circle if φi(z) = 0. But it is known that φi(z) has all its roots
strictly outside the unit circle. So by putting these results together it is deduced that φi(z)φi(z†) > 0 if
|z| = √β, and thus the diagonal matrix Q(z)−1 in (B.6.22) is positive definite.
Therefore, in summary, all of Ω, Q(z)−1 and I −Q(z) are positive definite when |z| = √β. As R is
positive semi-definite, the first expression for χ(z) given in (B.6.15) implies that χ(z) is a positive definite
matrix when z lies on the circle in the complex plane with radius
√
β.
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The next claim in the lemma to be checked is that no root of χ(z) has modulus strictly between β and
1. Let ζ ∈ C be any root of the equation |χ(z)| = 0. By definition, there must exist a non-zero vector
v ∈ Cn such that χ(ζ)v = 0. The vector v is referred to as the nullspace vector associated with the root ζ.
In what follows, it is supposed for contradiction that β < |ζ| < 1.
A necessary condition for ζ to be root of χ(z) is now derived in the case where β ≤ |ζ| ≤ 1, which
obviously includes the case just introduced. Using the weights in the vector ω, construct a weighted average
of the elements of v, denoted by v¯ ≡ ω′v. Using this definition, the second expression for χ(z) in (B.6.15)
implies that χ(ζ)v = 0 is equivalent to:
ΩQ(ζ)−1v = v¯ω (B.6.23)
Premultiplying (B.6.23) by Q(ζ)Ω−1 yields v = v¯Q(ζ)ι, and then averaging both sides using the weights
in ω implies:
v¯ω′Q(ζ)ι = v¯ (B.6.24)
First, consider the possibility that v¯ might be zero. By setting v¯ = 0 in (B.6.23) and using (B.6.21) this
entails:
Φ(ζ)Φ(βζ−1)v = 0 (B.6.25)
Since v 6= 0 and the matrix polynomial Φ(z) in (C.1.3) is diagonal, it is clear that there is some i = 1, . . . , n
such that vi 6= 0 and φi(ζ)φi(βζ−1)vi = 0. Hence, it must be the case that either φi(ζ) = 0 or φi(βζ−1) = 0.
But as β ≤ |ζ| ≤ 1, both |ζ| ≤ 1 and |βζ−1| ≤ 1, so φi(z) would have to have a root on or inside the unit
circle. But it is known that φi(z) has no such root. Therefore, the case of v¯ = 0 can be ruled out, and
when v¯ is non-zero, it can be cancelled from both sides of equation (B.6.24):
ω′Q(ζ)ι = 1 (B.6.26)
The earlier inequality for <(Q(ζ)) in (B.6.19) implies that:
<(ω′Q(ζ)ι) ≤ 1−
∞∑
j=1
ω′Qjι(1− |ζ|j)(1− βj |ζ|−j) (B.6.27)
Since β < |ζ| < 1, it is clear that 1−|ζ|j > 0 and 1−β|ζ|−j > 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . .. And as each element of
the diagonal matrix Qj is non-negative, and each diagonal element of Q1 is strictly positive, it follows that
<(ω′Q(ζ)ι) < 1. But equation (B.6.26) shows that <(ω′Q(ζ)ι) = 1 is a necessary condition for ζ to be a
root. This contradiction of the original supposition shows that there is no root ζ of χ(z) with β < |ζ| < 1.
It is now shown that both z = 1 and z = β are roots of χ(z). Note that the definition of Υ (z) in
(C.1.7) implies that Υ (1) = Υ (β) = 0. Next, observe from the definition of R in (C.1.9) that Rι = 0.
It follows that χ(1)ι = χ(β)ι = 0, establishing that both z = 1 and z = β are always roots of χ(z) with
corresponding nullspace vector ι.
Now suppose there exists a root with modulus |ζ| = 1 or |ζ| = β exactly, but ζ 6= 1 and ζ 6= β, so ζ is
not a positive real number. Note that in either case, |ζ|j + βj |ζ|−j = 1 + βj for all j = 1, 2, . . ., so using
the expression for <(Q(z)) in (B.6.18), <(ω′Q(ζ)ι) can be written as follows:
<(ω′Q(ζ)ι) = 1−
∞∑
j=1
(1 + βj)(1− cos(j$))ω′Qjι (B.6.28)
As ζ is not a positive real number, the argument $ of ζ must be such that cos($) < 1. Each diagonal
matrix Qj is positive semi-definite, and at least Q1 is positive definite. It follows that ω′Q1ι > 0, and
(1 − cos(j$))ω′Qjι ≥ 0 for all j = 2, 3, . . .. So it must be the case that <(ω′Q(ζ)ι < 1. But since
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β ≤ |ζ| ≤ 1, the necessary condition (B.6.26) for ζ to be a root requires <(ω′Q(ζ)ι) = 1. Thus z = 1 and
z = β are the only roots of χ(z) with modulus 1 or β exactly.
Finally, it is shown that the roots of χ(z) z = 1 and z = β have multiplicity one. To do this, denote
the determinant of matrix polynomial χ(z) by D(z) ≡ |χ(z)|. The expression for χ(z) in (C.1.11) means
that the determinant can be written as follows:
D(z) = |Ω| ∣∣f−1Υ (z) +R∣∣ (B.6.29)
As both z = 1 and z = β are roots, D(1) and D(β) are necessarily zero. The multiplicity of the roots can
be determined by calculating the first derivative of D(z) and evaluating it at z = 1 and z = β.
To calculate the derivative of D(z) in (B.6.29), note that f−1Υ (z) is a diagonal matrix polynomial, and
the matrix R is independent of z. Using the formula for the derivative of a determinant, D ′(z) is equal to
D ′(z) = |Ω|
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣[f−1Υ (z) +R]−i∣∣∣ [f−1Υ ′(z)]i (B.6.30)
where [·]−i denotes the matrix obtained after deleting the i-th row and i-th column, and [·]i denotes the
(i, i)-th element of the matrix. From definition (C.1.7), the matrix polynomial Υ (z) satisfies Υ (1) = 0, so
hence the derivative D ′(z) in (B.6.30) evaluated at z = 1 is equal to:
D ′(1) = |Ω|
n∑
i=1
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ [f−1Υ ′(1)]i (B.6.31)
The matrix R has been shown to be idempotent in (B.6.17), and thus is positive semi-definite. A
consequence of this is that all the determinants of the principal submatrices of R must be non-negative,
which means that
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ ≥ 0. Now suppose one of these determinants is zero. There must then exist a
non-zero vector v−i ∈ Rn−1 such that [R]−i v−i = 0. The definition of R in (C.1.9) implies that [R]−i can
be written as,
[R]−i = I− ι[ω]′−i (B.6.32)
where [ω]−i denotes the vector ω with the i-th element removed. So if [R]−i v−i = 0 then (B.6.32) implies
v−i = ([ω]′−iv−i)ι. Consequently, as the vector v−i is non-zero, it follows that [ω]
′
−iv−i 6= 0. Premultiplying
by [ω]′−i and cancelling the non-zero factor [ω]
′
−iv−i from both sides implies that [ω]
′
−iι = 1. But [ω]
′
−iι is
obviously less than 1 because:
[ω]′−i ι =
 n∑
j=1
ωj
− ωi = 1− ωi < 1 (B.6.33)
Therefore, the null space of [R]−i is empty for all i. This means that the determinant
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ is non-zero.
Hence, as this determinant has also been shown to be non-negative,
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ > 0 for all i.
The derivative of the matrix polynomial Υ (z) defined in (C.1.7) is given by
Υ ′(z) = Φ′(z)Φ(βz−1)− βz−2Φ(z)Φ′(βz−1) (B.6.34)
and the derivative Φ′(z) can be written in terms of Θ(z) using (C.1.4):
Φ′(z) = −Θ(0)Θ′(z)Θ(z)−2 (B.6.35)
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Equation (B.6.35) is substituted into (B.6.34) to get an expression for the derivative Υ ′(z):
Υ ′(z) = − (Θ(0)Θ(z)−1) (Θ(0)Θ(βz−1)−1) {(Θ′(z)Θ(z)−1)− βz−2 (Θ′(βz−1)Θ(βz−1)−1)} (B.6.36)
By defining a new matrix polynomial T(z),
T(z) ≡ zΘ′(z)Θ(z)−1 (B.6.37)
and by using the definitions in (C.1.7) and (C.1.4), the expression for Υ ′(z) in (B.6.36) evaluated at z = 1
can be simplified as follows:
Υ ′(1) = −f {T(1)−T(β)} (B.6.38)
An expression for the derivative of the determinant D(z) evaluated at z = 1 is thus obtained from (B.6.31)
and (B.6.38):
D ′(1) = −
n∑
i=1
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ [T(1)−T(β)]i (B.6.39)
The relationship between the terms T(1) and T(β) in (B.6.38) is studied by computing the derivative
of T(z), using its definition in (B.6.37):
T′(z) = z−1
{
zΘ′(z)Θ(z)−1 + z2Θ′′(z)Θ(z)−1 − (zΘ′(z)Θ(z)−1)2} (B.6.40)
Introduce the following sequences of matrix functions Nj(z) specified as follows
Nj(z) ≡ zjΘj
( ∞∑
k=0
zkΘk
)−1
(B.6.41)
where the matrices Θj are drawn from equation (B.6.9), and the sequence is well defined for 0 < z ≤ 1.
Each n× n matrix Nj(z) is thus diagonal and positive semi-definite. The sum of Nj(z) for j = 0, 1, . . . is
the identity matrix I for any value of z. The expressions appearing in the formula for the derivative T′(z)
in (B.6.40) can be stated in terms of the infinite series {Nj(z)}∞j=0 from (B.6.41) by noting that (B.6.9)
implies Nj(z) = zjΘjΘ(z)−1:
zΘ′(z)Θ(z)−1 =
∞∑
j=0
jNj(z) , zΘ′(z)Θ(z)−1 + z2Θ′′(z)Θ(z)−1 =
∞∑
j=0
j2Nj(z) (B.6.42)
By substituting these into equation (B.6.40),
T′(z) = z−1

∞∑
j=0
j2Nj(z)−
 ∞∑
j=0
jNj(z)
2 (B.6.43)
and noting that
∑∞
j=0Nj(z) = I, the following expression for T
′(z) is obtained:
T′(z) = z−1
∞∑
j=0
Nj(z)
(
jI−
∞∑
k=0
kNk(z)
)2
(B.6.44)
Equation (2.4.5) implies that both diagonal matrices Θ0 and Θ1 have strictly positive elements on their
main diagonals. This translates into diagonal matrix polynomials N0(z) and N1(z) from (B.6.41) being
positive definite for all 0 < z ≤ 1. All the other matrices Nj(z) are also diagonal and at least positive
semi-definite. So the matrix within parentheses in (B.6.44) is diagonal, and when squared becomes positive
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semi-definite for all j. It is clear that the term in parentheses for j = 1 differs from that term when j = 0
by the identity matrix I, and since both N0(z) and N1(z) are positive definite, the sum of the terms j = 0
and j = 1 in (B.6.44) must be a positive definite matrix. As all the remaining terms are at least positive
semi-definite, T′(z) 0 for 0 < z ≤ 1, that is, T′(z) is positive definite.
Since every diagonal element of T′(z) is positive for all 0 < z ≤ 1, it follows that each diagonal element
of T(z) is a strictly increasing function of z for 0 < z ≤ 1. Therefore, because β < 1, each diagonal element
of T(1)−T(β) is strictly positive. And from (B.6.39), together with the positive definiteness of [R]−i, this
means that D ′(1) < 0, so the root z = 1 must have multiplicity one.
For the other root z = β, the equivalent of expression (B.6.38) for the derivative of Υ (z) evaluated at
β can be obtained from (B.6.36) and (B.6.37):
Υ ′(β) = β−1f−1{T(1)−T(β)} (B.6.45)
And an expression for the derivative of determinant D(z) evaluated at z = β can be found from (B.6.30)
by noting that Υ (β) = 0 and combining this with (B.6.45):
D ′(β) = β−1
n∑
i=1
∣∣[R]−i∣∣ [T(1)−T(β)]i (B.6.46)
The positive definiteness of T(1) − T(β) and [R]−i ensure that D ′(β) > 0. Thus z = β is also found to
have multiplicity one, completing the proof of the claims of the lemma.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Start from the definition of the n × n matrix polynomial χ(z) in (C.1.11), and suppose this has all the
properties stated in Lemma 6. Let B(z) be equal to χ(z) evaluated at
√
βz:
B(z) ≡ χ(
√
βz) (B.7.1)
As can be seen from equation (B.6.6), the matrix polynomial χ(z) has m+ 1 positive and m+ 1 negative
powers of z, so this must also be a property of B(z) in (B.7.1):
B(z) =
m+1∑
j=−(m+1)
Bjz
j (B.7.2)
From definition (B.7.1), the coefficients of B(z) in (B.7.2) are linked to those of χ(z) by Bj = β
j
2χj .
Since Lemma 6 establishes that χ(z) is a discounted para-Hermitian matrix, χ(z) = χ(βz−1)′, its matrix
coefficients satisfy χ−j = βjχ′j , which implies B−j = Bj . From (B.7.2) this means that B(z) = B(z
−1)′
for all z ∈ C\{0}, and thus the matrix polynomial B(z) is para-Hermitian.
Lemma 6 establishes that χ(z) is a positive definite matrix when evaluated at any z with |z| = √β.
An immediate consequence of definition (B.7.1) is that B(z) is a positive definite matrix whenever |z| = 1.
This also means that there exists a z0 such that |B(z0)| 6= 0, and thus |B(z)| is not identically zero. The
definitions of χ(z) and B(z) in (C.1.11) and (B.7.1) show that coefficients matrices χj and Bj are real
valued.
According to a result proved by Youla (1961), if B(z) is a real-valued matrix polynomial with m + 1
positive and negative powers of z, which is para-Hermitian, and which is positive-semi definite everywhere on
the unit circle, and has a determinant which is not identically zero, then there exists a spectral factorization
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of B(z). All of these properties are met, so there exists a matrix polynomial C(z) such that
B(z) = C(z−1)′C(z) (B.7.3)
which is referred to as the spectral factorization of B(z). The matrix polynomial C(z) has no roots strictly
inside the unit circle, has only m+ 1 positive powers of z,
C(z) ≡
m+1∑
j=0
Cjz
j (B.7.4)
where all the matrices Cj are real valued. This spectral factorization of B(z) is used to construct a unique
discounted spectral factorization of χ(z).
The first step is to note that C0 must be an invertible matrix, otherwise C(z) would have a root at
z = 0, which is inside the unit circle. The invertibility of C0 allows a new matrix polynomial Λ(z) and a
non-singular matrix ℵ to be defined as follows:
Λ(z) ≡ C−10 C
(
1√
β
z
)
, ℵ ≡ (C′0C0)−1 (B.7.5)
The definition of ℵ in (B.7.5) ensures that it is real-valued, invertible, symmetric and positive definite. By
construction, Λ(z) is an n× n matrix polynomial satisfying Λ(0) = I. Using (B.7.4) and (B.7.5) it is clear
that Λ(z) has only m+ 1 positive powers of z, and can be written explicitly as
Λ(z) ≡ I−
m+1∑
j=1
Λjzj , Λj ≡ −C−10 Cj (B.7.6)
with real-valued coefficient matrices Λj .
The spectral factorization of B(z) in (B.7.3) and the definitions in (B.7.5) imply that,
B
(
1√
β
z
)
= C
((
1√
β
z
)−1)′
C
(
1√
β
z
)
= (C0Λ(βz−1))′(C0Λ(z)) (B.7.7)
which combined with the definition of B(z) in (B.7.1) yields a discounted spectral factorization of χ(z):
χ(z) = Λ(βz−1)′ℵ−1Λ(z) (B.7.8)
As it is known that C(z) has no roots with modulus |z| < 1, it follows from definition (B.7.5) that Λ(z)
has no roots with modulus |z| < √β. Moreover, if Λ(z) were to have a root with modulus √β ≤ |z| < 1,
then it would follow from (B.7.8) that χ(z) also shares this root. But any such a root has a modulus
β < |z| < 1, since 0 < β < 1 implies β < √β. This is contrary to the result of Lemma 6 that χ(z) has no
roots in this range. Therefore, Λ(z) must have no roots strictly inside the unit circle.
Now the question of the uniqueness of discounted spectral factorization (B.7.8) of χ(z) is addressed.
The spectral factorization of B(z) in (B.7.3) is known not to be unique, so take two matrix polynomials
C(z) and C˜(z) which can both be used in (B.7.3) and satisfy the properties identified earlier. Let ℵ˜ and
Λ˜(z) be constructed according to (B.7.5) using C˜(z) instead of C(z).
Equation (B.7.3) and the requirement that neither C(z) nor C˜(z) has any roots inside the unit circle
mean that both matrix polynomials C(z) and C˜(z) must share the same set of roots and nullspace vectors.
As they must both have exactly m+1 positive powers of z and no negative powers, the fact that they share
the same set of roots and nullspace vectors implies that C˜(z) can be obtained from C(z) by premultiplication
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of a non-singular matrix. So let C˜(z) = WC(z) for some invertible matrix W . Because (B.7.3) implies
that C(z−1)′C(z) = C˜(z−1)′C˜(z) for all z ∈ C\{0}, the matrix W must be unitary, that is, W ′W = I.
Then from the definitions of Λ˜j and ℵ˜ in (B.7.5) and (B.7.6) it is clear that,
Λ˜j = −(WC0)−1(WCj) = Λj , ℵ˜ = ((WC0)′(WC0))−1 = ℵ (B.7.9)
establishing the uniqueness of matrix polynomial Λ(z) and matrix ℵ in the discounted spectral factorization
(C.1.12).
Suppose ζ ∈ C is a root of χ(z) with |ζ| ≥ 1. This means that |χ(ζ)| = 0, or equivalently, there exists
a non-zero vector v ∈ Cn such that χ(ζ)v = 0. By using the factorization (B.7.8):
χ(ζ)v = Λ(βζ−1)ℵ−1Λ(ζ)v = 0 (B.7.10)
As |βζ−1| < 1, |Λ(βζ−1)| 6= 0 since Λ(z) has no roots inside the unit circle. Cancelling this non-singular
matrix along with ℵ−1 from (B.7.10) implies that Λ(ζ)v = 0, so ζ is a root of Λ(z) with the same nullspace
vector v.
Conversely, suppose ζ ∈ C is a root of Λ(z) and v the corresponding nullspace vector. Then Λ(ζ)v = 0.
The factorization (B.7.8) clearly implies χ(ζ)v = 0 also. So ζ is a root of χ(z) with nullspace vector v.
This establishes all the claims of the lemma.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 8
Take the coefficient matrices Λj of the matrix polynomial Λ(z) from (C.1.13) and define new n×n matrices
Γj for j = 1, . . . ,m and the matrix polynomial Γ (z) as follows:
Γ (z) ≡ I−
m∑
j=1
Γjzj , Γj ≡ −
m+1∑
k=j+1
Λk (B.8.1)
Using these definitions it follows that:
Γ (z)(1− z) +Λ(1)z = I−
m+1∑
j=1
Λj + Γ1
 z − m∑
j=2
(Γj − Γj−1)zj + Γmzm+1 (B.8.2)
Equation (B.8.1) implies that
∑m+1
j=1 Λj+Γ1 = Λ1, Γj−Γj−1 = Λj for all j = 2, . . . ,m, and Γm = −Λm+1.
Hence Λ(z) = Γ (z)(1− z) +Λ(1)z for all z.
Taking the definition of Λ(z) in (C.1.13), and the decomposition Pt = ιPt + ρt of the price-level vector
into economy-wide price level and relative price components:
Pt −
m+1∑
j=1
ΛjPt−j = Λ(L)Pt = Λ(L)ιPt +Λ(L)ρt (B.8.3)
Let ∆ ≡ I − L be the first-difference operator. By substituting the expression for Λ(z) for that in terms
of Γ (z), the first term on the right-hand side of (B.8.3) can be written in terms of economy-wide inflation
pit = ∆Pt,
Λ(L)ιPt = {Γ (L)∆ +Λ(1)L}ιPt = Γ (L)ιpit (B.8.4)
where the fact that Λ(1)ι = 0 has been used, which is obtained from the results of Lemmas 6 and 7. Next,
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the definitions of the Λ(z) and Γ (z) matrix polynomials are written out explicitly in the following:
Γ (L)ιpit +Λ(L)ρt =
ιpit − m∑
j=1
Γjιpit−j
+
ρt − m+1∑
j=1
Λjρt−j
 (B.8.5)
The definitions of the vector of inflation rates pit and the vector of relative prices ρt imply that ιpit + ρt =
pit + ρt−1. Putting this together with (B.8.3), (B.8.4) and (B.8.5) yields,
Pt −
m+1∑
j=1
ΛjPt−j = pit −
 m∑
j=1
Γjιpit−j − ρt−1 +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρt−j
 (B.8.6)
confirming the claim in (C.1.20).
The linear homogeneous difference equation (C.1.21) is equivalent to Λ(L)Pt = 0 in terms of matrix
polynomials and lag operators. The general solution is found by examining the roots and nullspace vectors
of the n × n matrix polynomial Λ(z) with degree m + 1, as given in (C.1.13). The determinant |Λ(z)| is
scalar polynomial of degree up to mn. For k = 1, . . . ,mn, let ζk denote the k-th root of |Λ(z)| = 0. This
may be a complex number, and when the polynomial |Λ(z)| has degree less than mn, it is necessary to
allow for some roots at infinity, so ζk belongs to the set C∪{∞} in general. Lemma 7 shows that Λ(z) has
no roots strictly inside the unit circle, so |ζk| ≥ 1 for all k.
Suppose ζk is a finite root with multiplicity one. There must exist a non-zero nullspace vector vk ∈ Cn
associated with this root. Define the n× 1 vector-valued function fk(τ) as follows:
fk(τ) ≡ (ζ−1k )τvk (B.8.7)
Multiplying the function fk(τ) by matrix polynomial Λ(L) yields Λ(L)fk(τ) = (ζ−1k )
τΛ(ζk)vk = 0 because
Λ(ζk)vk = 0 is the definition of a root–nullspace vector pair. Thus a multiple of fk(τ) must be part of the
general solution of Λ(L)Pt = 0.
When ζk does not have multiplicity one, or is not finite, the form of the function fk(τ) may need to
be different. It can be shown that if ζk is a finite repeated root then fk(τ) = tq(ζ−1k )
τ−qv˜k where q is a
finite positive number not more than the multiplicity of root ζk. It may also be necessary to use a vector
v˜k that is not one of the nullspace vectors. When ζk is an infinite (and possibly repeated root), then
fk(τ) = J(τ = q)v˜k where J(·) is the indicator function, and q and v˜k are as just described. But no matter
which expression it is necessary to use, all of the functions fk(τ) satisfy Λ(L)fk(τ) = 0. And if |ζk| > 1
then all of the fk(τ), including (B.8.7), have the property that limτ→∞ fk(τ) = 0.
A general solution of linear homogeneous difference Λ(L)Pt = 0 is obtained by taking a linear combin-
ation of all the vector-valued functions fk(t− t0) for k = 1, . . . ,mn,
Pt =
mn∑
k=1
ckfk(t− t0) (B.8.8)
where c1, . . . , cmn are arbitrary constants and t0 is some base time period. Lemma 6 shows that χ(z) has
only one root z = 1 on the unit circle, and this root has multiplicity one. The corresponding nullspace
vector is ι. The results of Lemma 7 show that this root is inherited by matrix polynomial Λ(z) (with the
same multiplicity), and that Λ(z) cannot have any other root on the unit circle. Without loss of generality
let this root be ordered first so that ζ1 = 1 and v1 = ι. Since this root has multiplicity one, the formula in
(B.8.7) can be used to conclude that f1(t− t0) = ι. Note that all the other roots must lie outside the unit
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circle, so |ζk| > 1 for k = 2, . . . ,mn. Now define the following n× 1 vector-valued function:
f(τ ; c2, . . . , cmn) ≡
mn∑
k=2
ckfk(τ) (B.8.9)
This has limit 0 as τ → ∞ since each function fk(τ) tends to zero as τ → ∞. Therefore, the claim in
equation (C.1.21) is proved by substituting (B.8.9) into (B.8.8).
C Proofs of propositions
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The first step in deriving the system of pricing equations in (4.1.2) is to represent the information contained
in the industry-specific hazard functions (2.4.1) using polynomials. Knowledge of a particular hazard
function {αij}∞j=1 is equivalent to specifying the distribution of the duration of price stickiness {θij}∞j=0
for that industry in (2.4.3), which is in turn determined by the recursion (2.4.7) based on the sequence
{φij}m+1j=1 . These latter two sequences are represented by polynomials using the z-transform:
θi(z) ≡
∞∑
j=0
θijz
j , φi(z) ≡ 1−
m+1∑
j=1
φijz
j (C.1.1)
From (2.4.7), the industry i polynomials θi(z) and φi(z) are related to each other as follows:
φi(z) =
θi(0)
θi(z)
, θi(z) =
φi(1)
φi(z)
(C.1.2)
One property of the series {θij}∞j=0 is that
∑∞
j=0 θij = 1, so θij must converge to zero as j → ∞. This
means the recursive polynomial φi(z) must have all its roots strictly outside the unit circle, otherwise the
θij would not tend to zero. And Lemma 1 in Sheedy (2007b) shows that if the hazard function satisfies
the assumptions in (2.4.2) then the polynomial θi(z) must also have no roots on or inside the unit circle.
Therefore, θi(z) and φi(z) are well-defined, analytic for |z| ≤ 1 and have no roots on or inside the unit
circle.
The potentially different polynomials in (C.1.1) for each industry are collected together in matrix
polynomials, that is, matrices in which every element is a polynomial in z. The n× n matrix polynomials
Θ(z) and Φ(z) contain the scalar polynomials θi(z) and φi(z) from (C.1.1) respectively on their principal
diagonals:
Θ(z) ≡ diag{θ1(z), . . . , θn(z)} , Φ(z) ≡ diag{φ1(z), . . . , φn(z)} (C.1.3)
By using the link between the scalar polynomials in (C.1.2) and the fact that Θ(z) and Φ(z) in (C.1.3) are
diagonal matrices for each value of z, a correspondence between the two matrix polynomials is obtained:
Φ(z) = Θ(z)−1Θ(0) , Θ(z) = Φ(z)−1Φ(1) (C.1.4)
The rationale for the introduction of these scalar and matrix polynomials is to allow the use of lag
operator analysis to study the dynamics of the pricing equations. The lag operator L applied to any time
series shifts back the elements of the time series by one period. Correspondingly, the forward operator F
shifts time forward by one period. These operators are inverses of each other, so F = L−1 and L = F−1.
In what follows, both operators are defined with respect to a particular information set. The particular
information set intended should be apparent from the context in which the operators are used. This means
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the operators will shift only the time subscripts of variables, not the time subscripts of any conditional
expectation operator.
If Pt and Rt are n × 1 vectors of industry-specific price levels Pit and reset prices Rit respectively,
then the equations (3.2.11) and (3.2.9) determining these variables can be written in terms of the matrix
polynomial Θ(z),
Pt = Θ(L)Rt , Θ(β)Rt = Et[Θ(βF)(ιω′Pt + ρˆt)] (C.1.5)
where ω is the n × 1 vector of industry sizes ωi, ι is an n × 1 vector of 1s, and ρˆt is the vector of profit-
maximizing flexible relative prices defined in (4.1.1). Using (C.1.4), recursive versions of pricing equations
(C.1.5) can be found in terms of the matrix polynomial Φ(z):
Φ(L)Pt = Φ(1)Rt , Et[Φ(βF)Rt] = Φ(β)(ιω′Pt + ρˆt) (C.1.6)
A single set of equations for the price vector Pt is obtained by eliminating the vector of reset prices Rt
from (C.1.6). To this end, define an n× n matrix f and matrix polynomial Υ (z) as follows:
Υ (z) ≡ Φ(z)Φ(βz−1)−Φ(1)Φ(β) , f ≡ Φ(1)Φ(β) (C.1.7)
Substituting the reset-price equation into the price-level equation in (C.1.6), and using the definitions in
(C.1.7) yields
Et[Υ (L)Pt] = f(ρˆt − ρt) (C.1.8)
where ρt ≡ Pt − ιPt is the n× 1 vector of industry relative prices. As Pt = ω′Pt, the relative price vector
ρt is a linear combination of the vector of industry price levels Pt:
ρt = RPt , R ≡ I− ιω′ (C.1.9)
Multiplication by the n× n matrix R subtracts the weighted average of a vector from each element of the
vector. Hence (C.1.9) allows (C.1.8) to be written exclusively in terms of the money price vector Pt and
vector of profit-maximizing flexible relative prices ρˆt:
Et[{Υ (L) + fR}Pt] = fρˆt (C.1.10)
Equation (2.4.5) ensures that θi0 > 0 for all industries i, which means that the matrix Θ(0) is invertible.
The sequence {θij}∞j=0 represents a probability distribution, so Θ(1) = I and Θ(β) has strictly positive
elements on its main diagonal. From the relationship in (C.1.4), it follows that both Φ(1) = Θ(1)−1Θ(0)
and Φ(β) = Θ(β)−1Θ(0) are diagonal matrices with strictly positive elements on the main diagonal. They
are thus non-singular. As ωi > 0 for all industries, the diagonal matrix Ω ≡ diag{ω1, . . . , ωn} containing
the industry sizes is also invertible. Therefore, an equivalent system of equations is obtained by multiplying
both sides of (C.1.10) by Ωf−1. A new matrix polynomial χ(z) is defined to be the coefficient of the price
vector Pt in the resulting equation:
Et[χ(L)Pt] = Ωρˆt , χ(z) ≡ Ωf−1Υ (z) + ΩR (C.1.11)
This system of expectational difference equations fully characterizes the profit-maximizing behaviour of
firms with sticky prices, conditional on the profit-maximizing relative prices ρˆt that firms would like to
choose were prices completely flexible.
The system of equations (C.1.11) contains both leads and lags of the price vector Pt because the
construction of the matrix polynomial χ(z) in (C.1.7) and (C.1.11) involves both positive and negative
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powers of z. The next step is to find a discounted spectral factorization of χ(z) which separates positive
and negative powers of z. This corresponds to a breakdown of price and inflation dynamics into backward-
and forward-looking components. In order for such a spectral factorization to exist, it is necessary to verify
that the matrix polynomial χ(z) has certain technical properties.
Lemma 6 The n× n (real) matrix polynomial χ(z) defined in equation (C.1.11) has the following prop-
erties:
(i) χ(z) is discounted para-Hermitian, that is, χ(z) = χ(βz−1)′ for all z ∈ C\{0};
(ii) χ(z) is a positive definite matrix if |z| = √β;
(iii) χ(z) has no roots with modulus β < |z| < 1;
(iv) Both z = 1 and z = β are roots of χ(z) with corresponding nullspace vector ι. Both of these roots
have multiplicity one, and they are the only roots with modulus 1 or β.
Proof. See appendix B.6. 
Given the properties of matrix polynomial χ(z) established in Lemma 6, a discounted spectral factor-
ization exists.
Lemma 7 If the n × n (real) matrix polynomial χ(z) defined in equation (C.1.11) satisfies all of the
properties stated in Lemma 6, then there exists a unique n×n (real) matrix polynomial Λ(z) and an n×n
(real) symmetric, positive definite matrix ℵ such that the following hold:
(i) Λ(z) spectrally factorizes the matrix polynomial χ(z):
χ(z) = Λ(βz−1)′ℵ−1Λ(z) (C.1.12)
(ii) Λ(z) is a matrix polynomial with m+ 1 non-negative powers of z and satisfies Λ(0) = I:
Λ(z) ≡ I−
m+1∑
j=1
Λjzj (C.1.13)
(iii) Λ(z) has no roots with modulus |z| < 1;
(iv) Any root of Λ(z) is a root of χ(z); any root of χ(z) with |z| ≥ 1 is a root of Λ(z). When Λ(z) and
χ(z) share a root, they also share the corresponding nullspace vector.
Proof. See appendix B.7. 
By substituting equation (C.1.12) into the pricing equations (C.1.11) the following expression is ob-
tained:
Et[Λ(βF)′ℵ−1Λ(L)Pt] = Ωρˆt (C.1.14)
As Λ(z) has no roots strictly inside the unit circle, and since 0 < β < 1, it follows that matrix polynomial
Λ(βz) has no roots on or inside the unit circle. Therefore the inverse matrix polynomial (Λ(βz)′)−1 is
analytic and has a convergent Taylor series expansion for all z ∈ C with |z| ≤ 1. This polynomial is
denoted by Ξ(z) and has an expansion in non-negative powers of z written in terms of a sequence of n×n
(real) matrices {Ξj}∞j=0:
Ξ(z) ≡ (Λ(βz)′)−1 , Ξ(z) ≡
∞∑
j=0
Ξjzj (C.1.15)
The leading term Ξ0 is the identity matrix I. By inverting the matrix polynomial Λ(βF)′ in (C.1.14) using
the definition of Ξ(z), and then multiplying both sides by matrix ℵ, a separation of equation (C.1.11) into
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backward- and forward-looking components is obtained:
Λ(L)Pt = ℵEt[Ξ(F)Ωρˆt] (C.1.16)
When written out explicitly using the definitions of matrix polynomials Λ(z) and Ξ(z) in (C.1.13) and
(C.1.15), the system of equations (C.1.16) becomes:
Pt =
m+1∑
j=1
ΛjPt−j + ℵ
∞∑
j=0
ΞjΩEtρˆt+j (C.1.17)
It is desirable to express this system of pricing equations in terms of inflation rates pit and relative prices
ρt. It is known from Lemmas 6 and 7 that χ(z) has a unit root, and that this root is inherited by Λ(z).
The next result shows how this root can be factored out of matrix polynomial Λ(z):
Lemma 8 If Λ(z) is the matrix polynomial described in Lemma 7 then there exists an n×n (real) matrix
polynomial Γ (z) with the following properties:
(i) Γ (z) has m non-negative powers of z and satisfies Γ (0) = I:
Γ (z) ≡ I−
m∑
j=1
Γjzj (C.1.18)
(ii) Γ (z) is the matrix associated with divisor (1− z) of Λ(z):
Λ(z) = Γ (z)(1− z) +Λ(1)z (C.1.19)
(iii) The price level Pt is related to inflation pit and relative prices ρt according to,
Pt −
m+1∑
j=1
ΛjPt−j = pit −
 m∑
j=1
γjpit−j − ρt−1 +
m+1∑
j=1
Λjρt−j
 (C.1.20)
where γj ≡ Γjι.
(iv) The general solution of the homogeneous linear difference equation Pt −
∑m+1
j=1 ΛjPt−j = 0 is of the
following form
Pt = c1ι+ f(t− t0; c2, . . . , cmn) (C.1.21)
where c1, . . . , cmn are mn arbitrary constants, t0 is some base time period, ι is an n × 1 vectors of
1s, and f(τ ; · · · ) is an n × 1 vector-valued function such that limτ→∞ f(τ ; · · · ) = 0 for any choice of
c2, . . . , cmn.
Proof. See appendix B.8. 
By combining pricing equations (C.1.17) with (C.1.20) and the expression for ρˆt in (4.1.1), the result
(4.1.2) is obtained. This proves the claim of the proposition.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
According to the hypothesis, all the hazard functions (2.4.1) for price adjustment in each industry are
identical. Formally, this requires αij = αj for all i and j. From (2.4.4), this implies there is a common
distribution of price stickiness durations {θj}∞j=0 in (2.4.3) applicable to all industries, so θij = θj . And of
course, this means there is also a common recursive representation (2.4.7) with φij = φj . Let the function
φ(z) = φi(z) be the polynomial defined similarly to (C.1.1) using these common recursive coefficients. And
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let the scalar polynomial Υ (z) and scalar f be defined analogously to their matrix equivalents in (C.1.7) as
Υ (z) ≡ φ(z)φ(βz−1)−φ(1)φ(β) and f ≡ φ(1)φ(β). The corresponding matrix polynomial Υ (z) and matrix
f can be obtained from
Υ (z) = Υ (z)I , f = fI (C.2.1)
where I is the n×n identity matrix. By substituting these expressions into the definition of χ(z) in (C.1.11)
the following is obtained:
χ(z) = Ω{f−1Υ (z)I +R} (C.2.2)
Now consider the diagonalization of relative price matrixR defined in (C.1.9). It is known from (B.6.17)
that R is idempotent and so has eigenvalues equal to either 0 or 1. Since Rι = 0, it is clear that the
vector of 1s is an eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 0. The i-th eigenvector of R is denoted by
n × 1 vector vi. Without loss of generality, let the eigenvalue 0 be ordered first, so v1 = ι. Now consider
an eigenvector v associated with eigenvalue 1. It is clear from the definition of R in (C.1.9) that this is
equivalent to ω′v = 0, which means that v must lie in the (n− 1)-dimensional subspace of Rn comprising
vectors that are orthogonal to ω. Any basis for this subspace provides a set of n− 1 linearly independent
eigenvectors v2, . . . , vn. Denote the matrix of eigenvalues by V ≡ ( v1 , . . . , vn ). As the set of vectors
{ v1 , v2 , . . . , vn } is linearly independent, the matrix V is invertible, and so R can be diagonalized.
The diagonal matrix of eigenvalues is denoted by J and is related to R as follows:
V−1RV = J , J ≡ diag{0, 1, . . . , 1} (C.2.3)
Since Υ (z) = Υ (βz−1), the scalar polynomials f−1Υ (z) and f−1Υ (z) + 1 have the equivalent of the
para-Hermitian property discussed in Lemma 7. Using results analogous to those for matrices in Lemmas
6 and 7, there exist positive constants Xp and X%, and scalar polynomials Lp(z) and L%(z) such that,
f−1Υ (z) = Lp(βz−1)XpLp(z) , f−1Υ (z) + 1 = L%(βz−1)X%L%(z) (C.2.4)
The polynomials Lp(z) and L%(z) have m + 1 non-negative powers of z, have no roots strictly inside the
unit circle, and are normalized so that Lp(0) = L%(0) = 1. Using the matrix of eigenvectors V, an n × n
matrix X and an n× n matrix polynomial L(z) can be defined as follows:
L(z) ≡ Vdiag{Lp(z),L%(z), . . . ,L%(z)}V−1 , X ≡ Vdiag{Xp,X%, . . . ,X%}V−1 (C.2.5)
Using these definitions of L(z) and X in (C.2.5), the definition of J in (C.2.3), and the factorizations in
(C.2.4), it can be seen that L(βz−1)XL(z) = V(f−1Υ (z)I + J)V−1. An alternative expression for the
discounted spectral factorization of χ(z) can be obtained from this result, together with the equation for
χ(z) in (C.2.2) and the diagonalization of R in (C.2.3):
L(βz−1)XL(z) = Ω−1χ(z) (C.2.6)
The usual discounted spectral factorization of χ(z) is given in equation (C.1.12). By substituting this
into (C.2.6), it can be compared with the new factorization:
L(βz−1)XL(z) = Ω−1Λ(βz−1)′ℵ−1Λ(z) (C.2.7)
It is apparent from the definition of L(z) in (C.2.5) and the properties of the scalar polynomials introduced
in (C.2.4) that L(z) = I −∑m+1j=1 Ljzj has the same form as Λ(z) in (C.1.13). And L(z) has the same
set of roots as its constituent scalar polynomials Lp(z) and L%(z), neither of which has any roots strictly
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inside the unit circle. Thus, equation (C.2.7) implies that both Λ(z) and L(z) have the same set of roots.
Because both have the same degree, and both satisfy Λ(0) = L(0) = I, the two polynomials Λ(z) and L(z)
must be identical, and thus from (C.2.5), Λ(z) = Vdiag{Lp(z),L%(z), . . . ,L%(z)}V−1.
If L(z) = Λ(z) then (C.2.7) implies that L(βz−1)X = Ω−1Λ(βz−1)′ℵ−1. So using the definition of
matrix polynomialΞ(z) in (C.1.15), ℵΞ(z)Ω = (Ω−1Λ(βz)′ℵ−1)−1 = (L(βz)X)−1, and hence from (C.2.5)
the following result is obtained:
ℵΞ(z)Ω = Vdiag{(Lp(βz)Xp)−1, (L%(βz)X%)−1, . . . , (L%(βz)X%)−1}V−1 (C.2.8)
Using the definitions of the eigenvectors in V, ω′v1 = ω′ι = 1 and ω′vi = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n since these
latter eigenvectors belong to a subspace that is orthogonal to ω. Therefore, ω′V = ( 1 , 0 , . . . , 0 ). Now
take any vector c such that ω′c = 0. As c belongs to the subspace orthogonal to ω, c is a linear combination
only of the vectors {v2, . . . , vn} since these are a basis for that subspace. Thus V−1c = ( 0 , k2 , . . . , kn )′
for some constants k2, . . . , kn.
Hence if ω′c = 0, by putting the above results together with Λ(z) = L(z) and (C.2.5), it is shown that:
ω′Λ(z)c = ( 1 , 0 , . . . , 0 )diag{Lp(z), . . . ,L%(z)}( 0 , k2 , . . . , kn )′ = 0 (C.2.9)
Similarly, using these results and the expression for ℵΞ(z)Ω in (C.2.8), it follows that
ω′ℵΞ(z)Ωc = ( 1 , 0 , . . . , 0 )diag{(Lp(βz)Xp)−1, . . . , (L%(βz)X%)−1}( 0 , k2 , . . . , kn )′ = 0 (C.2.10)
for any c with ω′c = 0. Since ω′ρt = 0 because of the definition of the relative price vector, and ω′ρ∗t = 0
because of equation (3.1.2), the claim of the proposition is established by (C.2.9) and (C.2.10).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The policymaker’s loss function derived in Lemma 2 is stated in vector form in equation (4.3.1). Here,
attention is focused solely on the second and third terms, which correspond to inter-industry and intra-
industry price distortions respectively. No further simplifications can be made to the first term involving
the output gap. The loss resulting from price distortions collectively is denoted by Pt and the following
expression for it is taken from (4.3.1):
Pt ≡ 12
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ ) + σ′τΩστ ] (C.3.1)
The first part of the proposition requires an expression be obtained for Pt that connects it to the loss
functions of firms as derived in Lemma 5.
The vector σt in (C.3.1) contains the cross-sectional standard deviations of prices within each of the n
industries. Formally, the cross-sectional variance σ2it for industry i at time t is defined as follows,
σ2it ≡ VΩi [Pt(ı, )] = EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− EΩi [Pt(ı, )])2] , EΩi [·] ≡
1
ωi
∫
Ωi
∫
Ω
· ddı (C.3.2)
where Ωi denotes the set of firms in industry i, and EΩi [·] and VΩi [·] are the cross-sectional expectation
and variance operators respectively. First note that the equation for the price index Pit in (2.2.2) and the
definition of the operator EΩi [·] imply that Pit is equal to EΩi [Pt(ı, )] up to terms that are second- or
higher-order in the exogenous shocks. This yields the following second-order accurate approximation of the
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cross-sectional variance:
σ2it = EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− Pit)2] +O(||υt||3) (C.3.3)
By adding and subtracting Pt + ρˆit and using the definition of the relative price ρit ≡ Pit − Pt, the cross-
sectional expectation in (C.3.3) is algebraically identical to:
EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− Pit)2] = EΩi [((Pt(ı, )− Pt − ρˆit)− (ρit − ρˆit))2] (C.3.4)
Because ρit − ρˆit is constant on the set Ωi and EΩi [Pt(ı, )] is equivalent to Pit up to second-order terms,
equation (C.3.4) can be used to deduce:
EΩi [((Pt(ı, )− Pit)2] = EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− Pt − ρˆit)2]− (ρit − ρˆit)2 +O(||υt||3) (C.3.5)
By combining (C.3.3) and (C.3.5), a second-order accurate expression is obtained for the cross-sectional
variance of prices in industry i:
σ2it = EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− Pt − ρˆit)2]− (ρit − ρˆit)2 +O(||υt||3) (C.3.6)
Putting (C.3.6) back into the loss function (C.3.1) produces a new expression for Pt,
Pt ≡ 12
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )− (ρτ − ρˆτ )′Ω(ρτ − ρˆτ )
+
n∑
i=1
ωiEΩi [(Pτ (ı, )− Pτ − ρˆiτ )2]
] (C.3.7)
where since this is a second-order approximation, third- and higher-order terms O(||υt||3) are suppressed.
Using the cross-sectional distribution {θij}∞j=0 of the duration of price stickiness in industry i from (2.4.3),
the cross-sectional expectation in (C.3.7) can be replaced by a summation over past reset prices:
EΩi [(Pt(ı, )− Pt − ρˆit)2] =
∞∑
j=0
θij(Ri,τ−j − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2 (C.3.8)
And by substituting (C.3.8) into the final term of (C.3.7):
Pt ≡ 12
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )− (ρτ − ρˆτ )′Ω(ρτ − ρˆτ )
+
n∑
i=1
ωi
∞∑
j=0
θij(Ri,τ−j − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2
] (C.3.9)
An alternative, but equivalent, expression for Pt in terms of firms’ loss functions can be obtained by
changing the order of summation in the final term of (C.3.9):
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
 ∞∑
j=0
θij(Ri,τ−j − Pτ − ρˆiτ )2
 = ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
 ∞∑
j=0
βjθij(Riτ − Pτ+j − ρˆi,τ+j)2

+
t−1∑
τ→−∞
βτ−tEt
 ∞∑
j=t−τ
βjθij(Riτ − Pτ+j − ρˆi,τ+j)2
 (C.3.10)
Therefore, using the definition of firms’ loss functions Fit and Fi,t|T in (4.3.2), and summing (C.3.10) over
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all industries yields,
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
n∑
i=1
ωiEΩi [(Pτ (ı, )− Pτ − ρˆiτ )2]
]
=
n∑
i=1
ωiθi0
ϑi0
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tFiτ +
t−1∑
τ→−∞
βτ−tFi,t|τ
]
(C.3.11)
where the sequence {ϑij}∞j=0 is defined in (3.2.9). In summary, an expression for the total loss to the
benevolent policymaker arising from price distortions is obtained by combining (C.3.7) and (C.3.11):
Pt =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(ρt − ρ∗t )′Ω(ρt − ρ∗t )− (ρτ − ρˆτ )′Ω(ρτ − ρˆτ )
]
+
n∑
i=1
ωiθi0
ϑi0
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tFiτ +
t−1∑
τ→−∞
βτ−tFi,t|τ
] (C.3.12)
As Pt is equal to Ut apart from the first output-gap term in (4.3.1), this equation confirms that (4.3.3) is
true.
The next step is to compute the partial derivatives of (C.3.12). Starting with the reset price vector Rτ ,
since Riτ satisfies first-order condition (3.2.9), Riτ minimizes firms’ loss function Fiτ . As this reset price
does not appear in any of the other terms of (C.3.11), it follows that the derivative of Pt with respect to
Rτ is zero if firms are maximizing profits (that is, minimizing their loss functions). The derivative with
respect to the relative price vector ρτ can be obtained by differentiating the quadratic forms on the first
line of (C.3.12) since that is the only place this vector occurs:
∂Pt
∂Rτ
= 0 ,
∂Pt
∂ρτ
= βτ−tΩ(ρˆτ − ρ∗τ ) (C.3.13)
The derivatives of Pt with respect to the other endogenous variables Pτ and yτ are best calculated with
the equation for Pt in (C.3.9) before the order of summation was changed. Differentiating with respect to
Pτ yields
∂Pt
∂Pτ
= −βτ−tω′(Θ(L)Rτ − ιPτ − ρˆτ ) = βτ−tι′Ω(ρˆτ − ρ∗τ ) (C.3.14)
where the equivalence up to second-order terms of Θ(L)Rτ and Pτ from (C.1.5) has been used, along with
the definition of the price level Pτ = ω′Pτ and the fact that ω′ρ∗τ = 0. Finally, consider the output gap
yτ . This clearly has an effect on Ut through the first term in (4.3.1), but the result below shows that it has
no indirect effect on price distortions through ρˆτ as given in equation (4.1.1). Since ∂ρˆτ/∂yτ = ηxι, the
derivative of (C.3.9) with respect to yτ is,
∂Pt
∂yτ
= ηxβτ−tι′Ω(ρτ − ρˆτ )− ηxβτ−tι′Ω(Θ(L)Rτ − ιPτ − ρˆτ ) = 0 (C.3.15)
where again the fact that Θ(L)Rτ − ιPτ is equal to ρτ up to second-order terms has been used. The
derivative of Pt with respect to price vector Pτ can be obtained by noting that Pτ = ω′Pτ , and ρτ = RPτ
from (C.1.9), and then applying the chain rule,
∂Pt
∂Pτ
=
∂ρ′τ
∂Pτ
∂Pt
∂ρτ
+
∂Pτ
∂Pτ
∂Pt
∂Pτ
= βτ−tΩ(ρˆτ − ρ∗τ ) (C.3.16)
together with ∂ρ′τ/∂Pτ = R′ and ∂Pτ/∂Pτ = ω, and using the definition of R in (C.1.9) to simplify the
expression. This confirms the second part of the proposition.
The third claim of the proposition requires that the losses from price distortions be reduced to a single
quadratic form involving the inflation vector pit. Notice that the equation for the price index Pit in (3.2.11)
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and the definition (C.3.2) of the cross-sectional variance of log prices in industry i imply that
σ2it =
 ∞∑
j=0
θijR
2
i,t−j
− P2it +O(||υt||3) (C.3.17)
where {θij}∞j=0 is the age distribution of prices for industry i defined in (2.4.3). The expected discounted
sum of current and future cross-sectional variances in (C.3.17) can be written as
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEtσ2iτ =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
θi(β)R2iτ − P2iτ
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.18)
where the definition of θi(z) in (C.1.1) has been used and where “t.i.p.” denotes terms independent of policy
(exogenous or predetermined at time t). Using (C.1.3) and (C.3.18) the second term in the expression for
Pt from (C.3.1) corresponding to the discounted sum of total intra-industry price distortions is given by:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
σ′τΩστ
]
=
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(Φ(1)Rτ )
′ (Φ(1)−1ΩΘ(β))Rτ − P′τΩPτ ]+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.19)
By making use of (C.1.4) and (C.1.6) equation (C.3.19) becomes:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
σ′τΩστ
]
=
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(Φ(L)Pτ )′
(
ΩΦ(β)−1
)
Rτ − P′τΩPτ
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.20)
A change in the order of summation in (C.3.20) yields the following equivalent expression:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
σ′τΩστ
]
=
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τ
(
ΩΦ(β)−1Φ(βF)Rτ
)− P′τΩPτ ]+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.21)
Then using the first part of (C.1.6) again shows that (C.3.21) can be written as:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
σ′τΩστ
]
=
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τ
(
ΩΦ(1)−1Φ(β)−1Φ(βF)Φ(L)Pτ
)− P′τΩPτ ]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(C.3.22)
The expression in (C.3.22) can be written in the simpler way by using the definitions of Υ (z) and f in
(C.1.7):
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
σ′τΩστ
]
=
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τ
(
Ωf−1Υ (L)Pτ
)]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.23)
Now consider the first term in the expression for Pt in (C.3.1) corresponding to inter-industry price
distortions. Since efficient relative prices ρ∗t are always independent of monetary policy and satisfy ω′ρ∗t = 0,
the quadratic form in relative prices ρt can be written as
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )] =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[P′τΩRPτ − 2P′τΩρ∗τ ] + t.i.p. (C.3.24)
using the fact that ρ∗t = Rρ∗t , ρt = RPt and R′ΩR = ΩR from the definition of R in (C.1.9). By taking
the result from equation (C.4.4), terms in ℘t appearing in (C.3.24) can be substituted for those in ρ∗t as
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follows:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )] =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
P′τΩRPτ − 2P′τ
(
Λ(βF)′ℵ−1℘τ
)]
+ t.i.p. (C.3.25)
Because all terms dated earlier than t are predetermined with respect to monetary policy decisions made
from time t onwards, (C.3.25) is equivalent to:
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )] =
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τΩRPτ − 2P′τ
(
Λ(βF)′ℵ−1℘τ
)]
+ t.i.p. (C.3.26)
Using the definition of the matrix polynomial Λ(z) from (C.1.13), the symmetry of the matrix ℵ as es-
tablished in Lemma 7, and by changing the order of summation in the second right-hand side term of
(C.3.26):
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt[(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ )] =
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τΩRPτ
]
− 2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(Λ(L)Pτ )′ ℵ−1℘τ
]
+ t.i.p.
(C.3.27)
By combining the results in equations (C.3.23) and (C.3.27) and using the definition of matrix polyno-
mial χ(z) in (C.1.11), the expression in (C.3.1) for the loss Pt created by relative-price distortions is given
by:
Pt =
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τ (χ(L)Pτ )
]− 2 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(Λ(L)Pτ )′ ℵ−1℘τ
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.28)
Now substitute the factorization of χ(z) from (C.1.12) as established by Lemma 7 into (C.3.28) and use
the result Λ(L)Pt = pit −xt from (C.1.20) to deduce:
Pt =
∞∑
τ=t−m−1
βτ−tEt
[
P′τ
(
Λ(βF)′ℵ−1(piτ −xτ )
)]− 2 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(piτ −xτ )′ℵ−1℘τ
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(C.3.29)
Next, change the order of summation in the first term of (C.3.29) to obtain the following:
Pt =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(Λ(βL)Pτ )′ ℵ−1(piτ −xτ )
]− 2 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(piτ −xτ )′ℵ−1℘τ
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3)
(C.3.30)
Finally, note that Λ(L)Pt = pit−xt and that ℘t is independent of monetary policy to deduce the following
quadratic form for Pt from (C.3.30):
Pt =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEt
[
(piτ −xτ − ℘τ )′ℵ−1(piτ −xτ − ℘τ )
]
+ t.i.p.+O(||υt||3) (C.3.31)
By comparing (4.3.5) and (C.3.1) and substituting (C.3.31) the third and final part of the proposition is
proved.
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The expression for the policymaker’s loss function Ut in (4.3.1) reveals that the terms associated with price
distortions from time period t0 onwards are:
Pt0 ≡
1
2
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0Et0
[
(ρτ − ρ∗τ )′Ω(ρτ − ρ∗τ ) + σ′τΩστ
]
(C.4.1)
By comparing this with the equation for Ut in equation (4.3.5), an equivalent expression for Pt0 is:
Pt0 =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0Et0
[
(piτ −xτ − ℘τ )′ℵ−1(piτ −xτ − ℘τ )
]
(C.4.2)
As it is shown in Lemma 7 that the matrix ℵ is positive definite, it follows that Pt0 = 0 if and only if
pit = xt +℘t for all t ≥ t0. This establishes the equivalence of the first two statements in the proposition.
To establish the equivalence of the second and third statements, note that the combination of equations
(C.1.14), (C.1.20), and (4.2.2) implies:
Et[Λ(βF)′ℵ−1(pit −xt)] = Ωρˆt (C.4.3)
The definitions of the efficient cost-push shock vector ℘t in (4.2.4) and the matrix polynomial Ξ(z) in
(C.1.15) imply the following:
Et[Λ(βF)′ℵ−1℘t] = Ωρ∗t (C.4.4)
Then subtracting (C.4.4) from (C.4.3) and multiplying both sides by the inverse of Ω yields:
ρˆt − ρ∗t = Et[Ω−1Λ(βF)′ℵ−1(pit −xt − ℘t)] (C.4.5)
Because the matrix polynomial Λ(βz) has all its roots strictly outside the unit circle, equation (C.4.5) can
be converted into the following using the definition of Ξ(z) in (C.1.15):
pit −xt − ℘t = Et[ℵΞ(F)Ω(ρˆt − ρ∗t )] (C.4.6)
Therefore, it is clear from (C.4.5) and (C.4.6) that pi = xt + ℘t for all t ≥ t0 implies and is implied by
ρˆt = ρ∗t for all t ≥ t0, completing the proof.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 5
First consider the problem of finding the time-path of prices assuming that the policymaker minimizes price
distortions from period t0 onwards. Start by defining the stochastic process P∗∗t|t0 as follows,
P∗∗t|t0 =
m+1∑
j=1
ΛjP∗∗t−j|t0 + ℘t (C.5.1)
using the efficient cost-push shock process ℘t from (4.2.4) and with m + 1 initial conditions given by
P∗∗t0−1|t0 = 0, . . . , P
∗∗
t0−(m+1)|t0 = 0. With these initial conditions it is clear that (C.5.1) defines a unique
stochastic process {P∗∗t|t0}∞t=t0 such that Λ(L)P∗∗t|t0 = ℘t for all t ≥ t0. Using the results of Lemma 8, in
particular equation (B.8.6), it is seen that the difference equation (C.5.1) is equivalent to the system in
(4.3.7).
It has been shown in Proposition 4 that ρˆt = ρ∗t when t ≥ t0 is equivalent to pit = xt + ℘t for t ≥ t0.
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Let the resulting path of the price vector be denoted by P∗t|t0 . The initial conditions are given by the
actual history of prices prior to t0, so P∗t|t0 = Pt if t < t0. Since equations (4.2.2) and (C.1.20) show that
pit−xt = Λ(L)Pt, the price-level path P∗t|t0 is determined by Λ(L)P∗t|t0 = ℘t. Let gt|t0 ≡ P∗t|t0 −P∗∗t|t0 , and
note that the construction of the vector P∗∗t|t0 in (C.5.1) implies the price path can be determined by solving
Λ(L)gt|t0 = 0 with initial conditions gt|t0 = Pt for t < t0. By using (4.2.2), (4.2.6) and (C.1.20), it can
be seen that the unique solution for gt|t0 is given by the time-path of intrinsic inflation, gt|t0 = P˜t(Ht0).
Hence, P∗t|t0 = P˜t(Ht0) + P∗∗t|t0 . This proves the first part of the proposition.
Now consider the case where price distortions are minimized in all time periods, not just after some
date t0. From Proposition 4 this is equivalent to ρˆt = ρ∗t for all t. The solution for the price vector in this
case is denoted by P∗t . By using equations (C.1.16) and (4.2.4), P
∗
t is determined by the following difference
equation
Λ(L)P∗t = ℘t (C.5.2)
for all t. Suppose {P∗∗t } is a particular solution of (C.5.2), and let {P∗t } be any other solution. Denote
the difference between these solutions by gt ≡ P∗t − P∗∗t . It is clear from (C.5.2) that gt must satisfy the
following linear homogeneous difference equation for all t:
Λ(L)gt = 0 (C.5.3)
With arbitrary initial conditions given for some date t0, the result in Lemma 8 shows that the solution
would take the form,
gt|t0 = P¯ι+ f(t− t0; c2, . . . , cmn) (C.5.4)
for some constants P¯ and c2, . . . , cmn. As (C.5.3) must hold in all periods, take the limit t0 → −∞
to get the class of solutions for which gt is well-defined in all time periods. As Lemma 8 shows that
limτ→∞ f(τ ; c2, . . . , cmn) = 0, this class of solutions is given by gt = P¯ι. Therefore, the range of possible
solutions for P∗t is given by P
∗
t = P¯ι + P
∗∗
t , where P¯ is an arbitrary constant, and P
∗∗
t is the particular
solution of (C.5.2) normalized so that P∗∗t0 = 0 in some time period t0. The process P
∗∗
t depends only on the
exogenous cost-push shocks ℘t and an arbitrary constant P¯, which cancels out from the implied inflation
rate, ensuring that it is uniquely determined by the exogenous cost-push shocks ℘t. This establishes the
second part of the proposition.
Finally, under the hypothesis that all industry pricing hazard functions are identical, the results of
Proposition 2 can be applied. If ω′c = 0 then equation (C.2.9) shows that ω′Λ(z)c = 0. Use the definition
of the matrix polynomial Λ(z) in (C.1.13) to write this explicitly as:
(ω′c)−
m+1∑
j=1
(ω′Λjc)zj = 0 (C.5.5)
Equation (C.5.5) is a polynomial in z that is identically equal to zero when ω′c = 0. So it must be the
case that all coefficients of the powers of z are zero, that is, ω′Λjc = 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m + 1. Now
pre-multiply both sides of (C.5.1) by ω′ to obtain:
ω′P∗∗t|t0 =
m+1∑
j=1
ω′ΛjP∗∗t−j|t0 + ω
′℘t (C.5.6)
The results of Proposition 2 directly show that under the hypothesis of identical hazard functions it must
be the case that ω′℘t = 0 for all realizations of the cost-push shocks. Now suppose that ω′P∗∗t−j|t0 = 0
for some t and all j = 1, . . . ,m + 1. It follows that ω′ΛjP∗∗t−j|t0 = 0 for all j. Since ω
′℘t = 0, equation
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(C.5.6) implies ω′P∗∗t|t0 = 0 as well. As the initial conditions for (C.5.1) guarantee that ω
′P∗∗t0−j|t0 for all
j ≥ 1, the result ω′P∗∗t|t0 = 0 follows for all t ≥ t0 by induction. The third part of the proposition is a direct
consequence of this statement, completing the proof.
D Proofs of theorems
D.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let the vector gt ≡ pit −xt −℘t be the deviation of the inflation vector from the sum of current intrinsic
inflation and efficient cost-push shocks, as defined in (4.2.2) and (4.2.4). The system of pricing equations
in (C.1.14) together with (C.1.20), (4.1.1) and definitions (4.2.2) and (4.2.4) imply that:
ℵ−1gt −
m+1∑
j=1
βjΛ′jℵ−1Etgt+j = ηxωyt + Ωt (D.1.1)
The expression for the policymaker’s loss function in (4.3.5) can also be written in terms of gt and yt:
Ut =
1
2
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tE
[ηx
ε
y2τ + g
′
τℵ−1gτ
]
(D.1.2)
The system of equations (D.1.1) and loss function (D.1.2) suggest that a natural discretionary equilibrium
will make both gt and yt functions of the current state of the exogenous stochastic process {t}, denoted
by t. Attention is focused only on such Markovian equilibria.
At time t, suppose that the public believes that such a Markovian equilibrium will prevail in all future
time periods from t+ 1 onwards. This means that the system of pricing equations in (D.1.1) is equivalent
to
ℵ−1(pit −xt − ℘t)− ηxωyt = ηΩt + k(t) (D.1.3)
where k(·) is some n × 1 vector-valued function of exogenous state t. Likewise, the belief that this
Markovian equilibrium will prevail in the future means that the loss function (D.1.2) can be written as
Ut =
1
2
(ηx
ε
y2t + (pit −xt − ℘t)′ℵ−1(pit −xt − ℘t)
)
+ ג(t) (D.1.4)
for some function ג(·) of the exogenous state t.
As the policymaker can control aggregate demand by setting the interest rate it in (3.1.4), and since
this interest rate does not enter the loss function, the pricing equations in (D.1.3) are the only effective
constraint. Thus, the Lagrangian for minimizing the loss function (D.1.4) subject to (D.1.3) is
Ldt =
1
2
(ηx
ε
y2t + (pit −xt − ℘t)′ℵ−1(pit −xt − ℘t)
)
+ ג(t)
+ `dt
′ (ηxωyt − ℵ−1(pit −xt − ℘t) + ηΩt + k(t)) (D.1.5)
where `dt is an n×1 vector of Lagrangian multipliers. The first-order conditions of Lagrangian (D.1.5) with
respect to yt and pit are:
∂Ldt
∂yt
= ηx
{
1
ε
yt + ω′`dt
}
= 0 (D.1.6a)
∂Ldt
∂pit
= ℵ−1
{
(pit −xt − ℘t)− `dt
}
= 0 (D.1.6b)
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Equation (D.1.6b) implies that the Lagrangian multipliers are given by `dt = pit−xt−℘t. By substituting
this into (D.1.6a), the Lagrangian multipliers are eliminated from the first-order conditions (D.1.6) leaving
the following optimality condition:
ω′gt +
1
ε
yt = 0 (D.1.7)
Substituting this back into the original system of pricing equations (D.1.1) implies that gt is determined
by the following:
(ℵ−1 + ηxεωω′)gt −
m+1∑
j=1
Λ′jℵ−1Etgt+j = ηΩt (D.1.8)
The equation above involves only the current and expected future values of gt and the current vector of
disturbances t. Hence, there exists a solution for {gt} in which gt depends only on the current exogenous
state t. From (D.1.7) it follows that there is also a solution for {yt} in which yt depends exclusively on
t. This confirms the supposition under which (D.1.3) and (D.1.4) were derived. Thus, a discretionary
Markovian equilibrium exists in which (D.1.7) is satisfies. This equilibrium requires that the policymaker
adjust interest rates to ensure that:
ω′(pit −xt − ℘t) + 1
ε
yt = 0 (D.1.9)
This clearly implies equation (5.1.1), so the claim of the theorem is verified.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Pick an initial date t0 when the binding commitment comes into force. Take the time-series {P∗∗t|t0} construc-
ted in equation (C.5.1) which has the properties thatΛ(L)P∗∗t|t0 = ℘t for all t ≥ t0 and P∗∗t|t0 = 0 if t < t0. The
definitions of ℘t in (4.2.4) and the matrix polynomial Ξ(z) in (C.1.15) imply that Et[Λ(βF)′ℵ−1℘t] = Ωρ∗t ,
and it follows that P∗∗t|t0 satisfies
Et[χ(L)P∗∗t|t0 ] = Ωρ
∗
t (D.2.1)
for all t ≥ t0. At time t0, the constraints from pricing equations Et[χ(L)Pt] = Ωρˆt in (C.1.11) apply in all
time periods from t0 onwards. By subtracting (D.2.1) from both sides and using (4.1.1), these constraints
can be equivalently stated as
Et[χ(L)(Pt − P∗∗t|t0)] = ηxωyt + Ωt (D.2.2)
for all t ≥ t0.
The problem of minimizing loss function Ut0 from (4.3.1) subject to all the constraints in (D.2.2) can
be solved by setting up the following Lagrangian function
Lct0 ≡ Ut0 +
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0Et0
[
`cτ |t0
′{ηxωyτ − χ(L)(Pτ − P∗∗τ |t0) + ηΩτ}
]
(D.2.3)
where `ct|t0 is an n × 1 vector of Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints in (D.2.2) at time
t. Future Lagrangian multipliers are multiplied by the subjective discount factor β for convenience. The
result contained in equation (4.3.4) implies that ∂Ut0/∂Pt = β
t−t0Ω(ρˆt − ρ∗t ), so the first-order conditions
of the Lagrangian (D.2.3) are
∂Lct0
∂yt
= ηxβt−t0
{
1
ε
yt + ω′`ct|t0
}
= 0 (D.2.4a)
∂Lct0
∂Pt
= βt−t0
{
(ρˆt − ρ∗t )− Et
[
χ(βF)′`ct|t0
]}
= 0 (D.2.4b)
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for all t ≥ t0, and where the Lagrangian multiplier `ct|t0 has been set to 0 when t < t0 because the pricing
equations from periods prior to t0 do not act as constraints.
Using the expression for ρˆt and ρ∗t in (4.1.1) and equation (D.2.2) it can be seen that ρˆt − ρ∗t =
Et[Λ(L)(Pt − P∗∗t|t0)] for all t ≥ t0. Together with the discounted para-Hermitian property of matrix
polynomial χ(z), that is χ(z) = χ(βz−1)′, the first-order condition (D.2.4b) is equivalent to the following
for all t ≥ t0:
Et
[
χ(L)(Pt − P∗∗t|t0 − `ct|t0)
]
= 0 (D.2.5)
The factorization of the matrix polynomial χ(z) = Λ(βz−1)′ℵ−1Λ(z) given in (C.1.12) and the knowledge
that Λ(βz) has all its roots strictly outside the unit circle mean that first-order condition (D.2.5) is also
equivalent to
Λ(L)(Pt − P∗∗t|t0 − `ct|t0) = 0 (D.2.6)
again for t ≥ t0. Define gt|t0 as gt|t0 ≡ Pt −P∗∗t − `ct|t0 , so equation (D.2.6) can be stated as Λ(L)gt|t0 = 0.
Since both P∗∗t|t0 and `
c
t|t0 are 0 for t < t0, this difference equations has initial conditions given by gt|t0 = Pt
for t < t0. By comparing it to equation (C.1.20), the definition of intrinsic inflation xt in (4.2.2), it is clear
that the time-path P˜t(Ht0) of the price level implied by intrinsic inflation, defined in (4.2.6), provides the
unique solution gt|t0 = P˜t(Ht0) of this difference equation. Hence,
Pt − P∗∗t − `ct|t0 = P˜t(Ht0) (D.2.7)
holds for all t.
The long-run target price path is taken from Proposition 4, which defines P∗t|t0 ≡ P˜t(Ht0) +P∗∗t|t0 . From
(D.2.7), the Lagrangian multipliers are thus equal to the difference between the actual price path and this
long-run target path, `ct|t0 = Pt − P∗t|t0 . Combined with the first-order condition (D.2.4a) associated with
the output gap, this yields the following optimality condition
1
ε
yt + ω′(Pt − P∗t|t0) = 0 (D.2.8)
for all t ≥ t0. In terms of the economy-wide price level Pt and long-run price-level target P∗t|t0 , equation
(D.2.8) becomes
Pt +
1
ε
yt = P∗t|t0 (D.2.9)
again for all t ≥ t0. As Pt = pit+
∑t−1
τ=t0
piτ +Pt0−1, P∗t|t0 = pi
∗
t|t0 +
∑t−1
τ=t0
pi∗τ |t0 +P
∗
t0−1|t0 and Pt0−1 = P
∗
t0−1|t0 ,
equation (D.2.9) implies the targeting rule stated in (5.2.1), confirming the claim of the theorem.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Fix an arbitrary long-run price level target P¯, and define the price-level path P∗t = P¯ι+P
∗∗
t in accordance
with that constructed in Proposition 4. The unique time-series {P∗∗t } from Proposition 4 depends only
on the exogenous stochastic process {ρ∗t }. It is clear from equations (4.2.4), (C.1.12) and (C.5.2) that
Et[χ(L)P∗t ] = Ωρ∗t for all t.
Putting the above property of P∗t together with equations (C.1.11) and (4.1.1), the system of pricing
equations (4.1.2) can be equivalently expressed as:
Et[χ(L)(Pt − P∗t )] = ηxωyt + ηΩt (D.3.1)
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As ω′Pt = pit + Pt−1 and ω′P∗t = pi∗t + P∗t−1, the conjectured targeting rule in (5.3.1) can be written as:
1
ε
yt = −ω′(Pt − P∗t ) (D.3.2)
By substituting the targeting rule (D.3.2) into (D.3.1), a system of equations is produced that can be used
to solve for the difference Pt − P∗t :
Et
[
(χ(L) + ηxεωω′)(Pt − P∗t )
]
= ηΩt (D.3.3)
Examination of the matrix polynomial χ(z) in (B.6.6) shows that (D.3.3) has m+1 lags of Pt and P∗t . The
history Ht in (4.2.1) comprises knowledge of m+ 1 lags of Pt. Similarly, define a history of the exogenous
stochastic process P∗t as H∗t ≡ { P∗t−1 , . . . , P∗t−m−1 }. Equation (D.3.3) also contains the current value
of the exogenous disturbance t, and this exogenous process has current state t. Therefore, there exists
a solution Pt − P∗t = g˜t(Ht,H∗t ,t) of (D.3.3) which has the following form,
g˜t(Ht,H∗t ,t) =
m+1∑
j=1
Bj(Pt−j − P∗t−j) + i(t) (D.3.4)
where the Bj are n × n coefficient matrices, and i(·) is an n × 1 vector-valued function of the current
exogenous state t. This solution gives the current value of Pt − P∗t in terms of both predetermined and
exogenous variables.
Consider the problem of choosing an optimal commitment starting from some date t0. The policymaker
faces pricing constraints (D.3.1) in all periods from t0 onwards. In addition, there are m + 1 vectors of
constraints requiring that the policymaker initially allow inflation to evolve as it would were the conjectured
targeting rule (5.3.1) followed. This evolution of inflation is given by the solution for Pt − P∗t in (D.3.4).
Thus, these constraints are of the form Pt = P∗t + g˜t(Ht,H∗t ,t) for t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , t0 +m. It is known
that there is a price-level and output gap path consistent with all these constraints because solution (D.3.4)
was derived on the assumption that both the pricing equations (D.3.1) and the targeting rule (5.3.1) held
from t0 onwards.
The Lagrangian for this problem is obtained from loss function (4.3.1), pricing constraints (D.3.1),
time-consistency constraints derived from (D.3.4),
L
p
t0
= Ut0 +
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0Et0
[
`pτ |t0
′ {ηxωyτ − χ(L)(Pτ − P∗τ ) + ηΩτ}
]
+
t0+m∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0Et0
′τ |t0

m+1∑
j=1
Bj(Pτ−j − P∗τ−j)− (Pτ − P∗τ ) + i(τ )

 (D.3.5)
where `pt|t0 and t|t0 are the vectors of Lagrangian multipliers associated with the pricing and time-
consistency constraints respectively. The first-order condition of the Lagrangian (D.3.5) with respect to
the output gap yt is
∂Lpt0
∂yt
= ηxβt−t0
{
1
ε
yt + ω′`
p
t|t0
}
= 0 (D.3.6a)
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for all t ≥ t0. For t = t0, . . . , t0 +m the first-order condition with respect the price level vector Pt is
∂Lpt0
∂Pt
= βt−t0
(
m+1∑
j=0
βjχjEt[Pt+j − P∗t+j − `pt+j|t0 ] +
t−t0∑
j=1
χj(Pt−j − P∗t−j − `pt−j|t0)
+
m+1∑
j=t−t0+1
χj(Pt−j − P∗t−j)−t|t0 +
m−(t−t0)∑
j=1
B′jEtt+j|t0
)
= 0
(D.3.6b)
but takes a different form for t ≥ t0 +m+ 1:
∂Lpt0
∂Pt
= Et
[
χ(L)(Pt − P∗t − `pt|t0)
]
= 0 (D.3.6c)
In both (D.3.6b) and (D.3.6c), the result that ∂Ut0/∂Pt = β
t−t0Ω(ρˆt − ρ∗t ) = βt−t0Et[χ(L)(Pt −P∗t )] from
(4.3.4), (4.1.1) and (D.3.1), and the para-Hermitian property χ(z) = χ(βz−1) from (B.6.7) have been used.
Suppose the Lagrangian multipliers `pt|t0 are such that `
p
t|t0 = Pt − P
∗
t . This is a time-consistent
expression, and when combined with the first-order condition (D.3.6a), it implies equation (D.3.2), which
is equivalent to the conjectured targeting rule (5.3.1) for t ≥ t0. If this targeting rule is used in all periods
after t0, then the price level vector evolves according to the solution in (D.3.4), which means that all the
constraints on the policymaker are satisfied. Substituting the expression for `pt|t0 into (D.3.6b) yields
t|t0 =
m−(t−t0)∑
j=1
B′jEtt+j|t0 +
m+1∑
j=t−t0+1
χj(Pt−j − P∗t−j) (D.3.7)
for all t = t0, . . . , t0 +m. This can be solved recursively for t|t0 starting from t0 +m. All the Lagrangian
multipliers t|t0 are functions of predetermined values of Pt and P
∗
t at t0. Hence, values of the Lagrangian
multipliers `pt|t0 and t|t0 have been found such that the first-order conditions (D.3.6) and constraints are
satisfied by the evolution of prices and the output gap implied by the conjectured targeting rule (5.3.1).
This proves the claim of the theorem.
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